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China’s Infiltration Tactics in Central Asia

CUS’s 106-page report analyses China’s encroachment in Central Asia via Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Belt and Road Initiative….reports Asian Lite News

The Centre for Uyghur Studies (CUS), an institute that combines academic research and human rights advocacy and is focused on Uyghur-related studies and activities, released a report on Thursday highlighting the effects and tactics employed by China to infiltrate Central Asia.

According to a press statement released by CUS, the 106-page report analyses the strong role of two major entities belonging to China, namely the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which serve as the cornerstones for China’s increasing encroachment into the region.

The statement further states the factors influencing the use of East Turkistan as a corridor and its geopolitical implications. Furthermore, the report also extends to China’s burgeoning presence in Central Asian countries through large-scale infrastructure projects, enhanced bilateral trade, and collaborative security measures. An important aspect of this study is the investigation of China’s soft power strategies in shaping regional dynamics.

Highlighting this, the report stated that “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has provided China with a legal status and a stable mechanism for active military activity in the region, and the newly established China-Central Asia Summit has further enhanced China`s political position in the region. The role of Central Asia is vital in the < The report also emphasizes the multifaceted consequences of these deepening bilateral relations, and how economic engagements, particularly in infrastructure and trade, have led some Central Asian countries into a potential debt trap, fostering a perilous dependence on China. The report also stresses the position of the democratic countries, surrounding China over the genocide of ethnic minorities like Uyghur and Turkic Muslims in East Turkistan, as China currently has political and economic leverage on them.

The report also sheds light on the alarming human rights abuses linked to these relationships, raising critical questions about the ethical implications of such partnerships and CCP’s exporting corruption through BRI. Additionally, China’s support and bolstering of authoritarian regimes in the region are critically examined, probing the impact on regional governance and political stability.

Additionally, the report even delves into unraveling the complex web of economic, diplomatic, and security ties, and their profound implications for the region’s future and its place in global geopolitics. While highlighting the genocide inflicted by China on the Uyghur community, it stated that “the Chinese Communist Party has accused those who recognize the Uyghur Genocide in East Turkistan or states that speak out about the Uyghur Genocide of interfering in their internal affairs. It explains this argument with the principle of noninterference in internal affairs. However, these analyses to date have revealed that China`s principle of non-interference in internal affairs actually means supporting authoritarian regimes all over the world, especially in Central Asian countries. This perspective, which ignores universal international rules, also applies to the relations between China and Central Asia”.

Conclusively, the report reveals a multifaceted and deeply impactful narrative of China`s infiltration into Central Asia. Through a combination of diplomatic initiatives, economic investments, and security alliances, China has successfully expanded its influence in this strategically important region.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Belt and Road Initiative have emerged as critical instruments in this expansion, facilitating infrastructure development, trade, and regional cooperation. However, this growing influence has not been without its challenges and controversies.

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Over 80% of Taiwanese Support Status Quo with China

More than 80 per cent of Taiwanese people want to maintain the status quo with China, with those preferring to keep Taiwan’s current status indefinitely rising sharply, while those who want independence have been dropping since 2020, according to the results of a survey released on Friday, Central News Agency Taiwan reported.

In the survey titled “Changes in the Unification-Independence Stances of Taiwanese,” National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center, which has tracked the annual change in Taiwanese residents’ stance on the issue from 1994-2023, said it saw increasing support for the continuation of cross-strait status quo.

The three most preferred choices in 2023 were: “maintain the status quo indefinitely” (33.2 per cent), “maintain the status quo, decide at a later date” (27.9 per cent) and “maintain the status quo, move toward independence” (21.5 per cent), according to the Center.

Added together, those three categories of people who either want to maintain the status quo for now or indefinitely accounted for 82.6 per cent of the total, Central News Agency Taiwan reported.

The least preferred option was “unification as soon as possible,” which had never exceeded 5 per cent since the survey has been conducted and stood at only 1.2 per cent in 2023, according to the findings.

That category of people who want to “maintain the status quo, move toward unification,” has dropped from the third highest percentage overall, or 15.6 per cent, in 1994, to 6.2 per cent in 2023.

Also, in 2023, only 3.8 per cent of respondents expressed a desire for Taiwan’s immediate independence, making it the second least preferred option overall, with support over the decades never exceeding 7.8 per cent.

Central News Agency Taiwan reported that the percentage of people who want independence now and those who want it later have been steadily dropping since 2020. The two groups added together fell from a high of 32.1 per cent in 2020 to 25.3 per cent last year.

The fastest growing category of people were those who want to maintain the status quo indefinitely; it rose from 9.8 per cent in 1994 to 33.2 per cent last year, rising sharply since 2020.

It surpassed those who favored “maintain status quo, decide at later date” for the first time in 2022.

This survey was released in tandem with another one that tracked the year-on-year changes in how Taiwanese people identify themselves (as Taiwanese or Chinese) between 1992 and 2023.

That second survey showed that 61.7 per cent of Taiwanese in 2023 identified themselves as Taiwanese, falling a little from the record high of 64.3 per cent seen in 2020. That self-identification preference has ballooned from 17.6 per cent in 1992 to more than threefold last year, Central News Agency Taiwan reported.

Last year, around one third of respondents considered themselves both Taiwanese and Chinese, continuing a general downward trend from 46.4 per cent in 1992 to 32 per cent in 2023. But last year those who considered themselves to be Taiwanese and Chinese rose slightly from the record low of 29.9 per cent in 2020.

In contrast, significantly fewer people consider themselves to be simply Chinese, with the number falling from 25.5 per cent to 2.4 per cent over the past 30 years.

Only 3.9 per cent of respondents showed no response in 2023, down from 10.5 per cent in 1992.

According to the center, the surveys were conducted via telephone questionaires with respondents ranging from 1,209 to 34,854 per year.

The center said it used key sample variables to weight the sample’s partial characters such as sex, age, and education through an iterated (or raking) process to ensure the sample structure is representative of the population.

It did not provide the confidence level and margin of error. (ANI)

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How World Bank Strengthens Central Asia’s Socio-Economic Fabric

The World Bank has made net commitments totalling USD 3.5 billion across seven active regional integration projects in Central Asia…reports Asian Lite News


For more than thirty years, the World Bank has consistently supported the development efforts of Central Asian countries, striving to improve living standards and promote economic growth.

According to the World Bank, embracing a forward-looking strategy, the Bank is intensifying its regional approach, promoting cross-border cooperation, dialogues, and knowledge exchange, with a particular focus on vital sectors such as energy, water, transportation, and healthcare.

Increased electricity trade among Central Asian countries could conservatively generate economic benefits of up to USD 6.4 billion between 2020 and 2030.

The World Bank has made net commitments totalling USD 3.5 billion across seven active regional integration projects in Central Asia.

Estimated costs from insufficient cooperation in the use of regional water-energy resources amount to more than USD 4.5 billion per year.

The Climate Adaptation and Mitigation Program for Aral Sea Basin (CAMP4ASB) has reached nearly 135,000 beneficiaries, creating over 27,500 jobs since 2014.

CAWEP has facilitated 23 water, energy, and environmental investments worth approximately USD 3.78 billion since 2009.

A road rehabilitation project in Kyrgyz Republic since 2010 directly benefited 1.2 million people, enhancing connectivity and economic opportunities.

World Bank Plans Packages For Poorest Nations

The Kazakhstan – East West Roads Project significantly reduced cargo transportation time along the Western Europe – Western China road corridor from 45 days to 8-10 days.

Despite challenges in connectivity and climate vulnerability, the World Bank aims to turn regional coordination into a development opportunity.

The World Bank is working closely with Central Asian countries to strengthen connections in water and energy, trade and logistics, climate change, information technology, and healthcare.

A regional electricity market is being developed to harness economic benefits and enhance energy interconnectivity, emphasizing a diverse energy mix.

The Central Asia Water and Energy Program (CAWEP) has been instrumental in supporting regional cooperation, facilitating investments, and enhancing sector capacity.

Sustainable Land Management for Economic Growth:

Sustainable land management measures, including efficient irrigation systems, led to income increases for over 10,000 farmers in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

The World Bank committed USD 1.3 billion to mitigate COVID-19 impacts, supplying ventilators and supporting social protection programs.

A Central Asia One Health Framework for Action is being developed to address zoonotic diseases, antimicrobial resistance, and food safety.

The World Bank collaborates with various partners, including the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program, Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Union, Switzerland, United Kingdom, EBRD, IMF, USAID, UNDP, AIIB, EIB, IsDB, and others to amplify its impact.

As the World Bank marks its 30th anniversary of engagement in Central Asia, it underscores a shared vision with the countries, focusing on regional challenges and global goals. The Bank remains committed to innovative approaches and sustained collaboration, aiming for a resilient, sustainable, and prosperous future for Central Asia. (ANI)

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Will Taliban, Neighbours Ever Find Common Ground?

While no countries in the region have officially recognized the interim government in Kabul, some countries, particularly Iran, have established channels of communication and trade with the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate….reports Asian Lite News

Ever since the eventful return of Taliban in Afghanistan, their relations with neighbours like Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Iran continues to be complex, with a strong undercurrent of hostility. While three of them opened dialogue with them, the Tajik government did not.

No countries in the region have officially recognised the interim government in Kabul. But, countries, especially Iran, have also opened channels of communication and trade with the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate.

Worries in Central Asia

Maintaining economic relations, as well as stabilisation of humanitarian and political conditions in Afghanistan, have been at the forefront for Central Asian states. Diplomatically, Kazakhstan and others have been very cautious engaging with the Taliban by maintaining discussion through diplomatic envoys but without giving the regime full state recognition.

On April 15 this year, Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister and Minister of Trade and Integration Serik Zhumangarin made an official visit to Kabul. During the visit, Zhumangarin unveiled his government’s trade plans with Afghanistan: “Politics is politics, and economy is economy — we plan to ramp up this trade cooperation,” stated the prime minister. He noted that the current trade volume with Afghanistan amounts to approximately $1 billion, and given the market in the country is “very large and promising,” there are real prospects for delivering wheat, flour, and seed oil. Specifically, he emphasised that Kazakhstan has a $174 million export potential to Afghanistan in food, petrochemical, chemical, metallurgical, light machine-building, construction, and other key industries. In this line, Kazakhstan is planning to open a trade liaison office in Kabul. Such improvements in bilateral trade can also contribute to increased regional connectivity, as well as improvement of supply chain and energy routes.

Following Zhumangarin’s visit, Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Aibek Smadiyarov said on April 17 that Kazakhstan has agreed to provide diplomatic accreditation to the representatives of Afghanistan without recognising the legitimacy of the Taliban government itself.

In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, both immediate neighbors of Afghanistan, Islamist groups and movements have already fought for the Islamic state in the past and thus they have raised local governments’ domestic concerns about the rise of extremism.

Tajikistan remains as the only Central Asian state reluctant to engage with the Taliban, largely due to its concerns about the militant groups such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Tajikistan (TTT).

Iran’s Pragmatic-Problematic Relations

Iran has charted a practical route of diplomacy to Afghanistan under Taliban rule. This is in sharp contrast to popular perceptions that Taliban, hardline Deobandis who are even close to Ahle Hadith and Wahhabis, may be natural enemies of Shia Iran.

On February 26, Iran officially handed over the Afghan embassy in Tehran to diplomats from the Taliban — a big step in formalising and deepening their ties.

The situation is notably different from the tensions that characterised the first iteration of the Taliban’s “Islamic Emirate,” when Tehran had deep security concerns about the group due to its mistreatment of Afghanistan’s Shia Hazara community and its 1998 killing of Iranian diplomats at the Mazar-e-Sharif consulate.

“America’s long involvement in Afghanistan helped thaw relations between the two regimes given their mutual enmity toward Washington and desire for US withdrawal. Hence, the years leading up to the 2021 fall of Kabul saw increasing reports of Iran providing weapons to the Taliban, and their ties would only widen and accelerate afterward,” Mehdis Hedayat, a West Asia expert based in Tehran, told India Narrative, while sharing her reading of Taliban-Iran equation.

She added that the Taliban leadership was even invited to attend multiple festivities last month related to the anniversary of Iran’s Islamic Revolution in February and Muharram processions last month.

Over the years, trade and economic cooperation have boomed, with two-way trade reaching $1 billion as per the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce. For Tehran, trade with Kabul has been a means to transcend the crippling effects of the US sanctions, sporadically in place since 2005, and has helped support Iran’s ‘resistance economy’. The border regions are also deeply integrated, with Iranian rials being used in the Afghan border town of Zaranj and the ubiquitous presence of Iranian goods on supermarket shelves.

But while trade has boomed, differences in other aspects have continued to fester.

Last year (March 2022- February 2023), nearly 445,403 refugees from Afghanistan took refuge in Iran. Tehran has historically hosted a large proportion of Afghan refugees, mainly from the Shia Hazara and Tajik communities with around 3.6 million refugees already present in the country. But while its refugee policy has been relatively inclusive, it has repatriated many refugees back to Afghanistan, sometimes voluntarily and oftentimes through force.

Since the coming of the Taliban, around 100 refugees who were trying to enter Iran illegally have been killed by Iranian security forces.

Differences over the equitable distribution of water flowing from the Helmand River in Afghanistan to the Hamoun wetlands in Iran’s Sistan-Balochistan province have also been a sticky issue. As both Kabul and Tehran grapple with water shortages and the lack of a robust water management infrastructure.

The Afghanistan-Iran border has also witnessed frequent skirmishes because of apparent ‘misunderstandings,’ sometimes resulting in an exchange of fire and the capture of posts. The last few months have seen multiple major incidents in Hirmand county, Herat, and Nimroz province. The Iranian border guards have intercepted the Taliban’s attempts to raise their flags in territories claimed by Iran and construct illegal roads, while warning against conflating its muted response to these transgressions as its weakness. A joint commission to cooperate on the issue was formed in August 2022 but the clashes have continued.

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GCC, Central Asia stress closer cooperation

Saudi Crown Prince said the summit was an extension of ties to establish a promising start based on the historical heritage, capabilities, human resources, and economic growth of the participating countries…reports Asian Lite News

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Central Asian countries concluded a summit in Jeddah with plans for further cooperation.

The summit, which was chaired by Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, was the first-ever meeting between the six Gulf Arab countries and five Central Asian nations: Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.

The leaders and heads of delegations of the participating countries agreed to hold an investment forum between Gulf and Central Asian countries in Saudi Arabia in the last quarter of 2023. They also announced the initiatives of Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan to host the GCC-Central Asian Investment Forum in 2024.

The summit agreed to hold the next summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, in 2025, Xinhua news agency reported.

In a statement, the Saudi Crown Prince said the summit was an extension of ties to establish a promising start based on the historical heritage, capabilities, human resources, and economic growth of the participating countries.

The summit announced the action plan adopted by the GCC and the Central Asian countries for 2023-2027, which includes political and security dialogue, economic cooperation and investment opportunities, and strengthening communication among people.

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Central Asia vulnerable to China’s debt trap strategy

Chinese President Xi Jinping has promised 26 billion RMB – approximately 3.6 billion USD – in grants and financial assistance for development of the Central Asian region, writes Aditi Bhaduri

China recently held a two-day summit with the heads of state of the five Central Asian states in Xi’an – where the ancient Silk Road began. In attendance were President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan, President Sadyr Japarov of Kyrgyzstan, President Emamoli Rahmon of Tajikistan, President Serdar Berdimukamedov of Turkmenistan, and President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan. In Xian, China promised more investment, enhanced security and development assistance to Central Asian states, which thanked Beijing for building infrastructure networks in the region, boosting trade and understanding their challenges.

Saying the world needs a “stable, prosperous, harmonious and inter-connected Central Asia,” Chinese President Xi Jinping warned of “external attempts to interfere in domestic affairs … or instigate colour revolutions” and urged the CARs to have “zero tolerance” for terrorism, separatism and extremism. “China is ready to help Central Asian countries strengthen law enforcement, defence … and jointly promote peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan,” the Chinese President said.

At the summit, Beijing promised to increase trade volumes and develop a number of infrastructure and connectivity projects like the Line D of the China Central Asia natural gas pipeline, the trans-Caspian international transport corridor and the China Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan railway were made. Xi also promised 26 billion RMB – approximately 3.6 billion USD – in grants and financial assistance for development of the region.

This is the first in-person summit of Chinese and the Central Asian heads of states. Last year, China convened its first summit, rather hastily and just on the eve of India’s first India-Central Asia summit, but it was conducted in a virtual format. This year’s summit also coincided with the G7 meet in Japan, where China’s “economic coercion” was called out, with British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak saying that China posed “the greatest challenge of our age” in regards to global security and prosperity. No doubt the summit was a strength of show for China. Also not to forget, all the heads of the Central Asian states will also be visiting India in July for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit.

Yet, the summit could be more show and rhetoric than substance. Undoubtedly, China is an important neighbour and economic partner for the countries of the Central Asian Region – it continues to be the largest trade partner for most of them. With Russia, the net security provider of the region, and for whom the Central Asian Republics (CARs) constitutes its sphere of influence preoccupied with Ukraine and under sanctions from the West, China has come to play an even greater role in the economy and trade of the five countries, with trade volumes amounting to 70 billion USD in 2022. It remains the primary source of credit and loans in the region, which has become a double-edged sword for the CARs.

While these loans have been coveted – most of the Central Asian countries, envisaging development and economic prosperity, enthusiastically signed up to the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – unveiled a decade ago in Kazakhstan, they have put countries of the region like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan heavily in debt to China. China’s share in their external debt in 2020 was 45 and 52 percent respectively. Just as the turmoil that unfolded in Sri Lanka last year because, Akylbek Japarov, the chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s cabinet of ministers was reported as reminding parliament of Kyrgyzstan’s need to pay its public debt.

While Kazakhstan, the largest and most resource rich country in the region, received the bulk of Chinese investments in the region, research carried out by AidData AidData, a research lab at William & Mary’s Global Research Institute, found that more populous districts and those with natural gas pipelines were the most likely recipients of Chinese financial diplomacy dollars in Central Asia (as in South Asia). In Kazakhstan’s case it was the China-Central Asia Gas Pipeline. Kazakhstan is among the 10 countries whose hidden debt to China amounts to more than 10 percent of GDP.

Moreover, benefits from Chinese investments in the CARs, like in Pakistan or in Africa, usually go back to China. For instance, in January 2020, thousands of Kyrgyz villagers protested a proposed logistics hub – meant to be a major stage-post in the BRI – in Naryn, funded by the Kyrgyz-Chinese enterprise At-Bashi SEZ because imported Chinese labour was taking away their jobs. The government withdrew support for this project. A year earlier 500 Kyrgyz villagers entered the site of a mine in eastern Kyrgyzstan operated by a Chinese company and fought with its Chinese workers.

In Kazakhstan there have been frequent protests against Chinese investments and businesses, as well as clashes with Chinese migrant labour. In 2016 the government had to roll back a proposed law to allow foreigners to rent agricultural plots for up to 25 years in the face of popular protests fearing Chinese takeover of Kazakh territories.

In countries like Tajikistan, the inability to pay its debt has resulted in Chinese takeover of lucrative gold mines and more recently of a military base. But there has been no debt relief announcements by China as it did recently for some African countries in similar debt to it.

Turkmenistan, which is the only country in the region to have a positive balance of trade with China, has been pushing for the Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan India (TAPI) gas pipeline as it wants to reduce export dependency on China and diversify its export market.

The opaqueness of Chinese investments and terms and conditions have fed into the local fear and resentment against China. A two years of survey data collected by Central Asia Barometer an independent pollsters based in the region only 7 percent of Kazakhs and 9 percent of Kyrgyz “strongly support” China developing energy and infrastructure projects in their countries. While 65 percent of Uzbeks said they “strongly support” Chinese energy and infrastructure development in 2019, in 2020 now only 48 percent did. Those who counted themselves “strongly opposed” grew from 2 percent to 10 percent in 2020.

On the other hand, China’s persecution of its Uighur population and its crackdowns in Xinjiang province have also fuelled anti-China sentiments amongst many of the local populaces in CARs, especially in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan where communities have ethnic and religious ties with China’s Uighurs, Kazakh and Kyrgyz minorities.

According to Central Asian expert Oyuna Baldakova, China is more popular with elites than with the public in Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan, with what she terms “warm politics, cold public”.

Therefore, while the summit was high on rhetoric, with gushing editorials in the Chinese media, it is doubtful how much of the promises and pledges made will materialize. The Chinese economy has slowed down because of first Covid and then with the Ukraine war and sanctions on Russia. The Central Asian countries have also had to turn to China because the war in Ukraine has triggered wariness in the region, given the borders that Russia shares with countries like Kazakhstan, and the spectre of a possible Ukraine-like scenario there in future. They would now not want to come under increased Chinese dominance as an overt economic dependence on it would herald. China has had irredentist claims on a number of countries in the region that it borders with. While borders have been demarcated with Kazakhstan, with Tajikistan, and with Kyrgyzstan, in each case countries have ended up ceding territory. This has naturally instilled a fear of Chinese expansion in the publics of the region.

The countries are following a process of slow reforms, and democratization. Uprisings last year in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan prove that public sentiments do impact governance and society, and “warm politics, cold public” may not work for too long.

Emerging from the rubble of the Soviet Union, the CARs are slowly coming into their own after centuries. Kazakhstan famously coined the term – “multi-vectoral” foreign policy where, moving away from Russia’s shadow, it would forge relations with other powers as well. Countries of the region aspire to this multi-vectoral policy. There is a role for India to play here.

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India and Central Asia propose connectivity projects

Top security officials from India and Central Asia have agreed to abide by the principles of transparency, financial prudence and sovereignty in defining grand connectivity projects for the region. 

In a joint communique at the end of the First India-Central Asia Meeting of National Security Advisers/Secretaries of the Security Council hosted by National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval, the participants agreed that greater connectivity could be a force multiplier for enhancing trade and commerce as well as closer interactions between India and Central Asian countries.

Apart from India, representatives of the National Security Councils of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan participated in the event. Turkmenistan was represented by their Ambassador in New Delhi.

“They agreed that connectivity initiatives should be based on the principles of transparency, broad participation, local priorities, financial sustainability, and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries,” the joint communique mentioned.

Monday’s meeting flows from the agreement reached during the first India-Central Asia Summit held on January 27 this year on holding regular interactions of Secretaries of the Security Council to discuss issues of regional security.

Lured for long by China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructural projects, the landlocked countries of Central Asia are realising the significance of India-backed plans of unlocking the full potential of the region through greater usage of Iran’s Chabahar port and development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

“We stand ready to cooperate, invest and build connectivity in the region. While expanding connectivity it is important to ensure that the initiatives are consultative, transparent and participatory,” NSA Doval told his counterparts from the Central Asian region.

New Delhi has been batting for the improvement of the transport and logistics architecture of the Eurasian region much before it took over the presidency of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Samarkand in September this year.

Since the takeover of operations by India Ports Global Chabahar Free Zone (IPGCFZ) in December 2018, the Shahid Behesti Terminal of Chabahar Port in Iran has witnessed a gradual increase in transit traffic between Central and South Asia through the transportation corridor.

India has also utilized the Chabahar port to ship lakhs of tonnes of wheat and pulses as humanitarian food assistance to Afghanistan since 2020, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic – a step that has not gone unnoticed.

Discussing further development of the transport corridor, the NSAs on Monday supported India’s proposal to include Chabahar within the framework of INSTC – a mechanism that allows Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries to connect to Chabahar for the transit of goods.

They called upon other Central Asian countries to consider joining the initiative, including the Ashgabat Agreement on International Transport and Transit Corridor.

The importance of the implementation of the TAPI gas pipeline project in expanding connectivity between Central Asian countries and India was also stated by Turkmenistan during the meeting.

Interestingly, India’s renewed push for realising the full potential of Chabahar – and its linking with INSTC – comes at a time when Beijing continues to make deep inroads into the region by planning new alternative regional and interregional transport corridors.

Last month, while speaking at the Summit of the Organisation of Turkic States in Samarkand, Kyrgyzstan President Sadyr Japarov spoke about the “practical implementation” of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway construction project which will accelerate the delivery of goods to western countries.

However, as the Central Asian countries acknowledged once again on Monday, the 30-year diplomatic partnership with India is based on “mutual trust, understanding, and friendship” – a reason big enough for them to engage with New Delhi in shaping a better future of Eurasia.

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Toqayev sworn in as Kazakh President

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. (Xinhua file photo/IANS)

After taking an oath , Toqayev said the Central Asian country will enter a new era of development…reports Asian Lite News

Qasym-Jomart Toqayev was sworn in as the Kazakh leader.

After taking an oath at an inauguration ceremony held in the capital city of Astana, Toqayev on Saturday said the Central Asian country will enter a new era of development.

Kazakhstan held a snap presidential race last Sunday, with six candidates running for the top job. Toqayev garnered 81.31 per cent of about 8.3 million ballots, which were cast by more than 11.95 million registered voters, Xinhua news agency reported.

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Moscow wants to rebuild its image in Central Asia

Before the meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States. (Photo by President of Kazakhstan Press Service)

With the region being so central to the Greater Eurasian Partnership, Russia may now be directing more investments – earlier directed to the West – towards the region, writes Aditi Bhaduri

On October 14, Russian President Vladimir Putin participated in the first-ever dialogue between Russia and the five Central Asian Republics (CARs) of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan through the Russia – Central Asia Forum in Astana.

Nothing unusual given that these are all former Soviet Republics and form part of Russia’s traditional and centuries-long sphere of influence, something that predates even the former Soviet Union. However, what is interesting is that this is the first ever Russia-Central Asia dialogue.

Dialogues with the CARS is the flavour of the season.

Earlier this year India convened a summit with heads of states of the CARS in a virtual format. As news broke of India’s plans, China hastily convened one. The US, European Union, and Japan all convened their own dialogues in this format. Yet, it took Russia this long to convene one.

Coming as it did immediately after the annual meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) of which all six are member states, does this signify a renewed Russian interest or diminished Russian influence in the region?

That Russia may not have felt the need for holding a Russia-C5 dialogue may not be surprising. There are, after all, a number of other mechanisms and platforms where all parties get to interact and engage with each other. Prime amongst them, apart from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) platform, are the military Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), and the economic Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union.

Yet, Central Asia’s centrality to Moscow’s sphere of influence, and in particular the Putin-floated Greater Eurasian Partnership cannot be disputed.

With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Baltic States, never quite acquiescing to the Soviet Union immediately moved away from Moscow. In the subsequent decades, Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus also diminished, given the war with Georgia and Azerbaijan’s resource and financial independence. Armenia was the only republic solidly allied with Russia in the region.

From 2014, Russia became alienated from fellow Slavic republic Ukraine with a full blown war taking place now. That leaves only the Central Asian Region allied with Moscow. Here too, from time to time states have flexed their muscle. For instance, Uzbekistan left the CSTO in 2012. Yet, economic and security dependence assured that this region remained within Russia’s strategic radar.

From 2013, China began making inroads economically with its massive investments and trade opportunities for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Nevertheless, the Ukraine conflict has effected rethinking and thrown things in sharp relief. First, the conflict coincides with the CARS celebrating their 30 years of independence and sovereignty which makes greater autonomy and independence in domestic and foreign affairs inevitable. Second, when Kazakh President Kassym Jomart Tokayev spoke at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum about the sanctity and sovereignty of nation states alluding to their non-recognition of the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions, he spoke for the other CARS.

Territorial sovereignty is a sensitive issue for all the CARS, not only in relation to Russia, but also in terms of the region. Ever since the demise of the Soviet Union, the region has been marked by a series of border conflicts, from between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, (now settled), to the one ongoing between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Besides, of course, all the countries have sizeable Russian populations and some border Russia, and would wish to prevent any similar Russian military intervention against them, similar to the one in Ukraine or earlier in Georgia.

Third, while Russia remains the major economic partner and investor in most of the CARS, Western sanctions against it has spooked many of them, necessitating ways to bypass them. For instance, Kyrgyzstan, more economically dependent on Russia, has refused to use the Russian MIR cards, in a bid to hedge itself from Western wrath. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, Russia’s military distraction has meant a less effective CSTO. Even powerful states like Kazakhstan have felt the need to call in CSTO help when it was wracked by large scale domestic violence in the beginning of this year.

But it also had to soon get the CSTO to remove its troops from Kazakh territory in deference to popular will. More recently in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, a CSTO member, the CSTO was nowhere to be seen. Similarly, a fierce conflict rages on between Kyrgystan and Tajikistan, on the border with the CSTO playing almost no role.

With the Taliban back in Afghanistan, and insurgency, alleged to be backed by “foreign forces” rearing its head in a number of states this year alone in the region, the security alliance matters more than ever to the region. It is here that Russia has felt the need to reassure the region of its support.

This is where the dialogue between Russia and the CARS assumes salience. In spite of the discomfort felt with the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia still remains central to both security and the economy in the region. Russia remains the leading investor in the Central Asian economies, with direct investment amounting to almost US$5 billion. Not only have Russia’s trade with these countries doubled in the last five years, reaching $37.1 billion, but have actually increased this year by another 16 per cent, that is after the beginning of the Ukraine war.

Even Kazakhstan, whose president has been most outspoken, has seen its bilateral trade with Russia increase since the commencement of the Ukraine conflict to $12 billion, an increase of almost 30 per cent from 2021; it uses Russian territory for access to the Arctic Sea and the Northern Sea Passage, which is important for this landlocked country, and Russian pipelines to transport its oil.

In fact, the conflict has helped increase the turnover of the CARS with its Western partners with a lot of re-export to Russia, hit by the sanctions. Further, countries like Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have sizeable populations living and working in Russia, sending back remittances which make significant contributions to the economies of their home countries. While Ukraine has led to a number of such migrants returning because of curtailed employment opportunities they still remain a potent source of income. Given all this, and the Western boycott of Russia, it may have been prompted to renew its interest in a region it has long held as its own.

In his speech to the forum Putin outlined this: “Russia’s reorientation of exports and imports is stimulating the development of transport corridors throughout the Greater Eurasia region. The key task is to develop new trans-Eurasian corridors passing through the territories of your countries: East-West, North-South and Europe-Western China. The introduction of information technologies and the use of artificial intelligence, as well as the development of border checkpoints for the seamless transportation of goods and cargo can significantly accelerate cargo flows.”

With the region being so central to the Greater Eurasian Partnership, Russia may now be directing more investments – earlier directed to the West – towards the region.

Security is another aspect that Russia has had to reassure its Central Asian partners in. That was the basis for a trilateral dialogue between Putin and his Kyrgyz and Tajik counterparts Sadyr Japarov and Emamoli Rahmon respectively, where the border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and ways to settle it were discussed.

Another area that Putin reminded his Central Asian counterparts about Russia’s centrality in preserving the region’s security was Afghanistan.

“A hotbed of tensions is indeed smouldering on our southern borders with the potential to unleash waves of refugees, terrorist threats and the spread of extremist ideology. In the process, Western secret services, primarily American and British, are cultivating units that are opposing the Taliban, pointing them in the direction of the border areas of some of our countries to shell,” Putin underscored in his speech.

Rationalising Russia’s recent outreach to the Taliban promising financial and energy aid, Putin promised to shore up collective security for the region, implying Western interference and raising the spectre of yet another civil war in that country. The security promise was renewed by the Director of Russia’s Foreign Ministry’s Department for New Challenges and Threats Vladimir Tarabrin at a high level conference on terrorism in Dushanbe yesterday.

What does all of this point to — a diminished Russian role in the region or a lack of Russian interest there? Or a possibility that one may have fed into the other? Whatever the probability, one thing is sure. Even a diminished Russian role does not take away from the fact that the destinies of the CARS and Russia remain deeply intertwined with each other, and will continue to be so in the foreseeable future. And a hitherto West-centric Russia may rediscover anew the opportunities abounding in its near abroad.

(The content is being carried under an arrangement with indianarrative.com)

ALSO READ: Is Central Asia rethinking its ties with Russia?

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Central Asia: Windfall or global showdown?

For decades Central Asia was ignored by both the Soviet Union and the emerging new world order afterwards as key to an economic link between China and Eurasia. It was Beijing that first saw an opportunity to bring those countries together under a new coalition. Thus in 1996 with five members, the Shanghai Five was born as a modest attempt by China to build an emerging political and economic coalition … writes Osama Al Sharif

Central Asia promises to be the next big thing in global geopolitical evolution. It could be the hub of the world’s major economic Promised Land or it could easily turn into ground zero for the next apocalyptic world showdown. It all depends on the outcome of Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Central Asia today is defined by five former Soviet republics; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Each has its own troubled ties with the Russian Federation. Break up from the rump Soviet Union was relatively easy, but historical skeletons in the cupboard threaten to conjure up old rivalries. In so many the buried corpses of Joseph Stalin, who forged the current borders by force and at a huge humanitarian cost, may soon rise like zombies to haunt the current leaders.

For decades Central Asia was ignored by both the Soviet Union and the emerging new world order afterwards as key to an economic link between China and Eurasia. It was Beijing that first saw an opportunity to bring those countries together under a new coalition. Thus in 1996 with five members, the Shanghai Five was born as a modest attempt by China to build an emerging political and economic coalition. The Shanghai Five consisted of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. Over the years, and with China as a founding member and major economic power, the SCO has expanded slowly but surely since 2001, boasting nine member states, with Pakistan and India joining in 2017 in addition to Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Today this economic coalition is the world’s largest organization with more than 30 percent of the globe’s GDP. But still few people have heard of it. The SCO has expanded slowly but surely since 2001, boasting nine member states, with Pakistan and India joining in 2017 in addition to Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

At least five other nations, including the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt have been invited as dialogue partners. Iran signed its membership forms this month and will officially join by 2023.

As much as this new coalition presents serious challenges to beleaguered European Union (EU) and other regional groupings like ASEAN, the challenge is that it could easily be penetrated.

Even though the group now covers 60 percent of the area of Eurasia and 40 percent of the world population with Central Asia featuring as its most promising growth region; a strategic part of Beijing’s Belt and Road global initiative, the problem is that with the Russian war in Ukraine it is still vulnerable.

In the recently held summit in the Uzbek capital Samarkand, it was clear that many members were hesitant to side with Moscow in its war in Ukraine. That was clear in the position of China’s President Xi Jinping and India’s Prime Minister and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Both did not offer support to Vladimir Putin’s war and opted for a diplomatic solution to the conflict.

While India and China prefer to focus on international trade and regional cooperation instead of a showdown with the West, Putin seems to be held hostage by ideological schisms that are a relic of the Cold War.

This is where Central Asia becomes a key factor in the current geopolitical confrontation. For starters some countries in the region have more business ties to Europe than to Russia. Attempts to present the coalition as anti-western were derailed by the host country, Uzbekistan, whose leader was clear in stating that the SCO is not an anti-western alliance, although the leading members, Russia and China, have major issues with the United States and Europe.

The reality is that a number of Central Asian members have important trade ties with the west. For China, these states present themselves as a bridge between East Asia and the EU.

The Central Asian republics represent a soft underbelly for Russia which seeks to buffer its Eurasian frontiers. The recent border skirmishes between Azerbaijan and Armenia are a test to the Kremlin’s ability to keep the peace among former republics.  Same thing with the flare up between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan over border disputes. These old disputes could present a major challenge to the Kremlin as it seeks to win a war in Ukraine.

The reality is that Central Asian republics, with huge natural sources, could be the bridge that China seeks to build between the East and Europe as part of its ambitious Belt and Road initiative. But the Russian war in Ukraine could derail such plans. Russia may have to deal with eruptions along its southern borders that could trigger border wars in the old Central Asian republics. That is not what China wants now. The fact is that Putin may find his foray into Ukraine costing him much more than he is willing to pay.       

(Osama Al Sharif is a journalist and a political commentator based in Amman)

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Central Asia upset over rising religious radicalism

It is for the first time that a meeting of the heads of the military departments from countries of the region has been held in this format..writes ATEET SHARMA

Led by Russia, the Central Asian countries have expressed their deep concern over the ideology of religious radicalism fast spreading in the region due to the growing activity of international terrorist organisations in Afghanistan.

In a first of its kind meeting, the defence ministers of Russia and Central Asian countries went into a huddle in Moscow on Friday to strengthen their coordination and form common approaches to combating these structures.

The meeting was attended by the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and his counterparts from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – Ruslan Zhaksylykov, Baktybek Bekbolotov, Sherali Mirzo and Bakhodir Kurbanov, respectively.

According to the Russian Defence Ministry, it is for the first time that a meeting of the heads of the military departments from countries of the region has been held in this format.

On Thursday, as he held talks with the new Kazakh Defence Minister Ruslan Zhaksylykov, Shoigu had stated that everyone “began to forget Afghanistan a little”, but “nothing has changed” there.

“The situation remains rather tense and serious. Everything that our American colleagues left there continues to degrade. All the risks that we talked about are growing. This is also a manifestation of international terrorism… There are also the weapons that have been left by the Americans in huge quantities and its distribution into not the best hands,” commented the Russian Army General.

Last month in Dushanbe, during the meeting of regional security heads on the situation in Afghanistan, National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval had highlighted similar concerns over sophisticated American arms and ammunition from terror-torn country landing in the hands of Islamic jihadists in the region.

Today, Shoigu told the gathering of defence ministers that there is a “growing military danger” in Central Asia with the activation of international and regional terrorist organizations in Afghanistan, primarily the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and Al-Qaeda.

“The leaders of international terrorists consider Afghan territory as a base for infiltrating neighbouring countries and creating an extensive network of jihadist underground, replenished, among other things, by transferring militants from hot spots,” said Shoigu.

He maintained that besides religious radicalism, drug trafficking and cross-border crime are also on the rise which calls for strengthening coordination between the law enforcement agencies of the states of Central Asia and Russia.

Earlier in the day, Shoigu had held a similar meeting with the Council of Defence Ministers of the CIS countries to provide information on the course of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine.

“The meeting heard information about the military-political situation in the world, the growing threats to the security of the Commonwealth of Independent States,” the Kazakhstan Defence Ministry said in a statement later.

Data on the state of aviation safety in the armed forces of the Commonwealth in 2021 and training of specialists for engineering troops were also considered.

Meanwhile, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is planning a major joint exercise ‘Frontier-2022’ with the units of the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces Central Asian Region (CSBR CAR) right at the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border.

Representatives of the defence departments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and a group of officers of the CSTO Joint Staff, headed by Major General Viktor Lisovsky held a three-day meeting in Dushanbe (June 21-23) to finalise the composition of the national contingents.

A reconnaissance of the exercise area Kharbmaidon training ground in Tajikistan, which is located just 20 kilometers from Afghanistan, was also carried out.

The collective forces are designed to fulfill the tasks of ensuring the military security of the CSTO member states of the Central Asian Collective Security Region, including participating in repelling external military aggression and conducting joint counter-terrorist operations.

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