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Economic realities of CPEC in Balochistan

The story of Balochistan and CPEC is a complex one, characterized by a mix of hope and despair, promise and betrayal.

Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest and most resource-rich province, remains a region marred by conflict, underdevelopment, and deprivation. Despite its vast natural wealth, the people of Balochistan have largely been left out of the economic prosperity that these resources should ideally provide.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a massive infrastructure and economic project touted as a game-changer for Pakistan, has been particularly contentious in Balochistan. While CPEC is often promoted as a vehicle for regional development and economic upliftment, many argue that it has exacerbated the existing inequalities and exploitation in Balochistan.

Historical context: Balochistan’s plight

To understand the dynamics at play, it’s essential to delve into the historical background of Balochistan. Balochistan has a long history of resistance against what many Baloch people see as the exploitation of their resources by external powers. Since the accession of Balochistan to Pakistan in 1948, there have been multiple insurgencies, driven by grievances related to political marginalisation, economic exploitation, and cultural suppression.

Despite being home to vast mineral resources, including natural gas, coal, copper, and gold, Balochistan remains the poorest province in Pakistan. According to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Balochistan’s contribution to the national GDP is disproportionately low compared to its resource wealth, with a GDP per capita significantly lower than the national average.

These figures highlight the stark disparities between Balochistan and the rest of Pakistan, illustrating the longstanding neglect and underdevelopment that has fueled resentment and unrest in the province.

Promise and perils of CPEC

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), aiming to connect Gwadar Port in Balochistan with China’s Xinjiang region through a network of highways, railways, and pipelines.

With an estimated investment of over $62 billion, CPEC is marketed as a transformative project that will bring prosperity to Pakistan, particularly its less developed regions like Balochistan.

However, the reality on the ground in Balochistan paints a different picture. Critics argue that CPEC has primarily served the interests of the central government in Islamabad and Chinese investors, with little regard for the local population’s needs and aspirations. The following points shed light on how CPEC exploits Balochistan rather than fulfilling its promise of development:

1. Resource exploitation and environmental degradation: Balochistan’s natural resources have long been extracted without adequate compensation or reinvestment in the local economy. CPEC has exacerbated this issue, with large-scale projects often leading to environmental degradation and displacement of local communities. For example, the extraction of minerals and the construction of infrastructure have led to deforestation, loss of arable land, and pollution of water sources.

2. Marginalisation of local workforce: One of the most significant grievances related to CPEC in Balochistan is the marginalisation of the local workforce. Despite promises of job creation, a large portion of the labour force employed in CPEC projects comes from other provinces or China. This exclusion has left the local population feeling alienated and resentful.

3. Security concerns and human rights violations: The militarisation of Balochistan under the guise of securing CPEC projects has led to widespread human rights abuses. The Baloch people have been subjected to enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and a heavy military presence, further alienating them from the state.

4. Economic disparities and unequal distribution of benefits: The economic benefits of CPEC have largely been concentrated in other regions, particularly Punjab, while Balochistan continues to lag in terms of infrastructure development, healthcare, and education. This unequal distribution of benefits has deepened the sense of deprivation in Balochistan.

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Xinhua/IANS)

Voices of dissent: Mahrang Baloch and Baloch resistance

In recent years, voices from within Balochistan have become increasingly vocal in their opposition to CPEC and the broader policies of the Pakistani state. Among these voices is Mahrang Baloch, a prominent Baloch activist who has consistently highlighted the exploitation and marginalisation of the Baloch people under CPEC.

Mahrang Baloch has criticised CPEC as a project that primarily serves the interests of the Pakistani elite and foreign investors while further entrenching the economic and political disenfranchisement of the Baloch people.

In a recent statement, she said: “CPEC is not a development project for the people of Balochistan. It is a tool of exploitation that has only brought more suffering to our land. Our resources are being taken, our environment is being destroyed, and our people are being displaced, all in the name of development. But where is this development? It is not in our schools, our hospitals, or our roads. It is in the pockets of the rich and powerful.”

Mahrang Baloch’s words resonate with many in Balochistan who feel that their voices are being ignored in the national discourse. Her activism has brought international attention to the plight of the Baloch people, shedding light on the darker side of CPEC.

Gwadar Port controversy

At the heart of CPEC is Gwadar Port, a deep-sea port in Balochistan that is strategically located on the Arabian Sea. Gwadar is often portrayed as the crown jewel of CPEC, with promises of turning it into a bustling trade hub that will bring prosperity to the region.

However, the reality for the people of Gwadar has been quite different. Despite the massive investment in the port and its surrounding infrastructure, the local population has seen little improvement in their living conditions. Basic amenities such as clean drinking water, electricity, and healthcare remain scarce.

The fishing community, which has traditionally been the backbone of Gwadar’s economy, has been particularly hard hit by the development of the port, with many fishermen losing their livelihoods due to restricted access to the sea.

In response to these grievances, protests have erupted in Gwadar, with local residents demanding their rights and a fair share of the benefits from the port. The “Gwadar Ko Haq Do” (Give Gwadar Its Rights) movement has gained momentum, highlighting the disconnect between the grand promises of CPEC and the reality on the ground.

CPEC and the Baloch Nationalist Movement

The perceived exploitation of Balochistan under CPEC has also fueled the Baloch nationalist movement, which seeks greater autonomy or even independence for Balochistan. Baloch nationalist groups argue that the central government’s policies, including CPEC, are designed to extract resources from Balochistan without giving the local population a say in how their land and resources are used.

The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), a separatist group, has been particularly active in targeting CPEC projects and personnel, viewing them as symbols of the state’s exploitation of Balochistan. The BLA has carried out several high-profile attacks on Chinese nationals and CPEC infrastructure, further complicating the security situation in the region.

Economic impact of CPEC on Balochistan

Despite the criticism, the Pakistani government and proponents of CPEC argue that the project has the potential to bring economic development to Balochistan. They cite the construction of roads, energy projects, and industrial zones as evidence of CPEC’s positive impact on the region.

However, the data suggests that the economic benefits of CPEC in Balochistan have been limited and unevenly distributed. While there has been some improvement in infrastructure, the overall economic impact on the province has been modest at best.

The slight improvements in GDP growth and industrial growth have not translated into significant reductions in poverty or unemployment, suggesting that the benefits of CPEC have not reached the broader population.

The story of Balochistan and CPEC is a complex one, characterized by a mix of hope and despair, promise and betrayal. While CPEC has the potential to bring much-needed development to Balochistan, the current approach has largely marginalized the local population and exacerbated existing inequalities.

For CPEC to truly benefit Balochistan, there needs to be a shift in how development is approached in the province. This includes ensuring that the local population is genuinely involved in decision-making processes, that the economic benefits are equitably distributed, and that the environmental and social impacts of projects are carefully managed.

The voices of dissent, like that of Mahrang Baloch, should not be ignored. Instead, they should be seen as a crucial part of the conversation on how to build a more just and inclusive future for Balochistan.

Without addressing the underlying grievances of the Baloch people, CPEC risks becoming yet another chapter in the long history of exploitation and neglect in Balochistan.

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TAPI Pipeline: Can Pakistan Overcome Its Legacy of Failure?

Recent diplomatic activities underscore the project’s importance and the growing impatience of Pakistan’s partners…writes Dr Sakariya Kareem

As Pakistan prepares to embark on its role in the ambitious Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project, the nation stands at a critical juncture. This massive undertaking, spanning 1,735 kilometers and boasting an annual capacity of 33 billion cubic meters, represents not just an opportunity for energy security but a test of Pakistan’s ability to shed its troubled history of mismanagement and corruption in international collaborations. 

The TAPI pipeline promises to be a game-changer for the region’s energy landscape, with Pakistan set to receive 13 billion cubic meters of gas per year – enough to meet about a quarter of its annual needs.  This influx of energy could be transformative for a country long plagued by power shortages and economic instability. However, the path to realizing these benefits is fraught with challenges, many of which stem from Pakistan’s own historical shortcomings.

Recent diplomatic activities underscore the project’s importance and the growing impatience of Pakistan’s partners. The upcoming visit of former Turkmenistan President Arkadag Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov to Islamabad, after an eight-year hiatus, signals a renewed push for implementation. Similarly, the July visit of Turkmen Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov, where he met with key Pakistani leaders including President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, emphasizes the project’s priority status.  

While Pakistani officials, such as Director General of ISI Lt. Gen. Nadeem Anjum, have stressed Islamabad’s commitment to TAPI, actions have yet to match rhetoric. Of particular concern is Pakistan’s apparent reluctance to make necessary changes to its domestic laws as required by the project’s framework agreements. These legal adjustments are crucial for providing safeguards to the TAPI Pipeline Company and ensuring smooth operation of the project.

The stakes are high, and alternatives are not in Pakistan’s favor. Turkmenistan has hinted at the possibility of rerouting the pipeline towards China if progress stalls, a move that would deprive Pakistan of much-needed energy resources and squander an opportunity for regional leadership. Beyond energy, TAPI offers Pakistan a chance to boost regional connectivity and trade. Proposals for a Transit Trade Agreement, utilization of Pakistani ports, and plans for a logistics hub and fiber optic line along the pipeline route demonstrate the project’s broader economic potential. However, realizing these ambitions requires Pakistan to address its historical issues of corruption and mismanagement head-on.

Pakistan’s history with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects serves as a cautionary tale for its involvement in TAPI. Despite the promise of transformative economic benefits, many CPEC initiatives have been plagued by delays, cost overruns, and allegations of corruption.  One of the most glaring examples is the Gwadar Port project. Touted as a game-changer for Pakistan’s economy, its development has been marred by security concerns, local opposition, and slow progress. The promised special economic zone has yet to materialize fully, and the port operates well below its capacity.

Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng (L), the special representative of Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif attend the Decade of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) celebration event in Islamabad, Pakistan, July 31, 2023. He on Monday attended the Decade of CPEC celebration event in the Pakistani capital, during which he read President Xi’s congratulatory letter and delivered a speech. (Xinhua/Ahmad Kamal)

Similarly, several CPEC power projects have faced significant delays and cost escalations. The Sahiwal Coal Power Plant, for instance, ran into environmental concerns and local protests, leading to extended timelines and increased expenses. 

The Karachi Circular Railway revival project has been stuck in bureaucratic limbo for years, with little progress to show despite its critical importance for urban transportation. Moreover, accusations of opacity in CPEC deals have raised concerns about Pakistan’s commitment to transparency and fair practices. The lack of open bidding processes and clear public disclosures has fueled speculation about corruption and mismanagement of funds.

These issues with CPEC projects highlight Pakistan’s struggles with implementing large-scale international collaborations effectively. As Pakistan embarks on the TAPI project, it must learn from these missteps and demonstrate a renewed commitment to responsible project management and transparency. The international community is closely watching Pakistan’s performance. With the United States acknowledging the need to provide Turkmenistan with alternatives to reduce Chinese dependence, and interest from entities like Abu Dhabi National Oil Company and Russia, TAPI has global significance. Pakistan’s handling of the project will impact not only its bilateral relations with Turkmenistan but its standing in the international community as a whole.

As Pakistan moves forward with TAPI, it must embrace a new paradigm of international cooperation. This means swiftly implementing necessary legal and regulatory changes, establishing transparent project management structures, combating corruption at all levels, fostering positive diplomatic relations with all stakeholders, and leveraging its strategic position to enhance regional connectivity and trade. The TAPI project represents more than just an energy pipeline; it’s a lifeline for regional cooperation and economic development. Pakistan stands at a crossroads – it can either perpetuate its reputation as a difficult partner in international projects or seize this opportunity to redefine itself as a responsible and reliable collaborator.

Russia hints headway in TAPI gas pipeline project after Putin key aide visits Kabul.(photo:IN)

The eyes of the region and the world are on Pakistan. By demonstrating commitment, efficiency, and integrity in its approach to TAPI, Pakistan can not only secure its energy future but also pave the way for a new era of international cooperation and economic prosperity. The time for rhetoric has passed; now is the time for action, responsibility, and leadership. Pakistan must rise to the occasion and prove that it can be a constructive force in regional development, shedding the specter of past failures and embracing a future of successful international collaboration. The success of TAPI could mark the beginning of a new chapter in Pakistan’s international relations, one characterized by reliability, transparency, and mutual benefit. The alternative – a continuation of past patterns of delay and mismanagement – would be a missed opportunity of historic proportions.

As the project moves forward, all eyes will be on Pakistan’s ability to navigate the complex web of diplomatic, legal, and logistical challenges that lie ahead. The nation’s leaders must recognize that their actions in the coming months and years will have far-reaching consequences, not just for the success of TAPI, but for Pakistan’s place in the region and the world. The path ahead is clear – Pakistan must step up, fulfill its commitments, and prove to the world that it can be a trusted partner in international development. The future of regional energy security and cooperation hangs in the balance, and Pakistan’s role in shaping that future has never been more critical.

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‘Pakistan in CPEC Debt Trap, China Holds the Key’

Pakistan’s senior officials emphasized that simply seeking loans from international organizations is insufficient; instead, Pakistan must devise a strategy to repay the debts incurred through CPEC extensions…reports Asian Lite News

Pakistan’s struggling economy and current monetary policies have left the nation unable to repay loans and fulfill commitments related to Independent Power Producer (IPP) projects initiated under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

The administration has always turned a blind eye towards the matter, stated Kamran Khan the President and Editor-in-Chief for the Dunya Media Group, a prominent news organization in Pakistan.

In a debate session with Khalid Mansoor the Former Special Assistant to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on CPEC and Shabbar Zaidi the Former Chairman, the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) mentioned Pakistan is now locked in a CPEC debt trap, and only China has the key to set us free. Today, Pakistan’s IPPs under the CPEC offer a classic example of a debt trap. According to his statement during the Dunya news debate, “The creditor country extends excessive credit to a debtor country with the intention of extracting economic or political concessions when the debtor country becomes unable to meet its repayment obligations. The conditions of the loans are often not publicized. The borrowed money commonly pays for contractors and materials sourced from the creditor country.”

China-Pakistan.

His statement also mentioned that “Highly over-invoiced, non-competitive CPEC power projects, with a promised minimum of 17 per cent dollarized profits, have delivered the world’s most expensive electricity to Pakistani people and industries. Capacity payments and 3.5 per cent plus London Interbank Offer Rate loan terms have turned Pakistan’s debt burden into a full-fledged national security crisis. And now classic outcome of an intelligently laid debt trap: Pakistan just can’t pay the financial charges and now China has a critical say in our economic destiny.”

He said that merely asking for a loan from international bodies is not enough, Pakistan needs to find a way by which Pakistan can pay back the debt extended by CPEC.

In the debate, he questioned Mansoor, “Why did we not enquire that the loans that we are getting from China are on the market price and not over invoiced, and was Pakistan capable of paying the questioned loans back when they were offered?”

Answering the same, Mansoor said “We did not make any adequate policies for China separately, as making policies is the job of the government. We were supposed to get investment to set up industries, if these industries had been set up it could have enabled us to pay back the loan. But all this did not happen”

Taking the same issue even further, Shabbar Zaidi the Former Chairman of FBR said “Since day one I have been the person who has raised questions over the financial viability of CPEC. I have been the one person in Pakistan who has always said that the proposed Special Economic Zones cannot be developed and the strategy behind CPEC is wrong, and our country will not be able to return loans at 17 per cent return. And I always have shown my confidence the transfer pricing designed by Pakistan is wrong”.

Zaidi also added, “Tell me a single CPEC plant that has maintained proper operations in Pakistan and we have verified the entity’s supply”. He also added that the loans and projects offered under the CPEC are not a Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) but a bond that has to be paid back to China which Pakistan in its current economic conditions cannot fulfil in any way. (ANI)

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CPEC Optimism Fades Amid Security Concerns

President Xi Jinping emphasised that China’s commitment to Pakistan depends on the Shehbaz Sharif government’s ability to implement tangible measures to establish a “secure, stable, and predictable” security environment in the country….reports Asian Lite News

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has become pivotal in China-Pakistan relations in the past decade. Positioned as a focal point of President Xi Jinping’s expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) — a network of transcontinental connectivity projects aimed at establishing an alternative global economic framework to the Western-led order of the United States, the CPEC aims to bolster strategic cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad and open new avenues for economic collaboration between the two nations.

However, nearly a decade later, initial optimism associated with the project seems to be fading, with China expressing dissatisfaction with Pakistan’s current state of affairs, particularly the deteriorating security situation.

Recent months have witnessed repeated targeted attacks on Chinese nationals and interests on Pakistani soil, prompting Beijing to gradually reassess its relationship with Islamabad, despite both nations characterising themselves as ‘ironclad friends’ and ‘All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partners’. Consequently, China has reportedly downgraded its stance towards Pakistan from “highest priority” to “priority”, reflecting Beijing’s frustration with both Pakistan’s military leadership and the civilian government.

CPEC.

Interestingly, President Xi Jinping has not categorically dismissed the possibility of enhancing and advancing Beijing’s economic cooperation with Islamabad. However, he emphasised that China’s commitment to Pakistan depends on the Shehbaz Sharif government’s ability to implement tangible measures to establish a “secure, stable, and predictable” security environment in the country.

Although both nations have in principle agreed to commence the second phase of CPEC, Beijing has refrained from making any substantial new commitments to Islamabad, despite expressing intentions to align the project with Pakistan’s developmental priorities. A joint statement issued on June 8 indicates that, besides making minor adjustments to ongoing projects like the Karakoram Highway project, the Chinese government did not announce any fresh initiatives under the CPEC.

Regarding the $6 billion Main Line-1 (ML-1) railway project, while the Pakistani government anticipated signing a framework agreement for its execution, China only agreed to proceed with it in a phased manner. This cautious stance is notable, particularly in light of concerns raised by Sinosure, the Chinese state-owned insurance firm overseeing CPEC insurance, regarding Pakistan’s financial instability exacerbated by mounting circular debt.

The joint statement underscores that Beijing has committed to “encouraging Chinese companies to invest in Pakistan’s Special Economic Zones based on market and commercial principles”. However, this commitment is contingent upon Islamabad’s efforts to enhance its business environment and policy framework to better facilitate Chinese investment. This approach suggests China’s emphasis on business-oriented investments in Pakistan, prioritising sectors with potential for commercial returns in the second phase of CPEC.

Specifically, Beijing has strategically prioritised sectors such as IT, agriculture, science and technology, and industry, which also invite third-party investments. The sole sector where Beijing has made an exclusive commitment is the mining of natural resources, aiming to safeguard its commercial interests and maintain a monopoly for assured economic benefits.

Tensions in China-Pakistan relations have been simmering due to Pakistan’s struggle to curb the increasing wave of extremism and terrorism in the country, notably rising incidents of attacks on various Chinese-operated CPEC projects in the past few years. For instance, in March 2024 alone, Pakistan witnessed a series of attacks on CPEC projects in Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa provinces, leading to the deaths of five Chinese nationals.

On March 20, Baloch rebels launched an assault on the heavily fortified Gwadar Port Authority complex, which houses several key offices, resulting in significant structural damage. Notably, Gwadar port represents the flagship project of the CPEC, and an attack on this highly secured complex sends a clear message that no Chinese project, however fortified, is immune to risk in the country.

Subsequently, on March 25, Baloch rebels carried out another attack, this time on the Pakistan Naval Station (PNS) in Turbat. The rebel group claimed that the attack epitomised protest against the growing Chinese presence in the province and the joint Pakistan-China exploitation of Balochistan’s resources.

For Beijing, the inability of Pakistani security forces to protect such prominent and sensitive locations, despite its stringent security measures, raises significant doubts about Islamabad’s capability to safeguard China’s interests effectively.

China’s patience wore thin with Pakistan’s failure to prevent attacks on its interests, highlighted by a suicide bombing by terrorist group Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on March 26. The attack targeted a convoy of Chinese engineers on the Karakoram Highway in Bisham, resulting in the deaths of five engineers and their local driver. These engineers were working on a Chinese-funded Dasu hydropower project in Bisham, located in Shangla district of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province.

These escalating incidents prompted Beijing to publicly criticise the Pakistani government for its failure to ensure the security of Chinese nationals and projects. The Chinese Embassy in Pakistan urged the Pakistani government to “thoroughly investigate the attack and punish the perpetrators severely”.

Similarly, a statement from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 27 called on Islamabad to promptly investigate the incident and “capture the perpetrators and bring them to justice”. This pressure compelled the Pakistani government to promptly dismiss several officials, marking a significant first, due to their negligence in securing the convoy of Chinese engineers.

It should be noted that Beijing made Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to China conditional on Pakistan committing to launch a large-scale counter-terrorism operation akin to Zarb-e-Azb in 2014 and Raddul Fasaad in 2017. According to a local news report, Chinese government officials explicitly urged Islamabad to take decisive military action to “eliminate” all terrorist groups once and for all, citing concerns over the growing threats to Chinese nationals involved in CPEC-related and other ventures in Pakistan.

Chinese government officials have consistently advocated for a comprehensive military operation against extremist groups. During his visit to Islamabad on June 21, Liu Jianchao, Minister of the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China (CPC), emphasised that “Pakistan’s internal security shortcomings pose a significant challenge that undermines investor confidence”, stating that “security threats are the primary risks to CPEC cooperation”.

Under pressure and influenced by Chinese demands for enhanced economic cooperation, the Pakistani government announced a large-scale military operation, named Operation Azm-i-Istehkam, on June 22, just a day after public statements by Liu Jianchao. A statement from Pakistan’s Prime Minister’s Office described this as a “revitalised and intensified national counter-terrorism campaign”, aimed at “coordinating and integrating multiple efforts to decisively combat extremism and terrorism comprehensively”.

The changing relationship dynamics between China and Pakistan underscore increasing Chinese distrust towards Pakistan, stemming from Pakistan’s persistent instability and deteriorating security scenario. While Beijing may have compelled Islamabad to declare a substantial military campaign against terrorism, prospects for improving the security scenario in Pakistan appear uncertain, given the outcomes of previous similar operations conducted by the Pak Military. Without creating a favourable security environment and addressing Beijing’s apprehensions, substantial advancement in the CPEC is likely to remain unattainable.

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CPEC – A bane for China?

Of the 122 projects initially announced under CPEC, only 36 have been completed. Although CPEC was envisioned as a transformative force for Pakistan’s economy, it has not succeeded in alleviating Islamabad’s economic troubles….reports Asian Lite News

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), announced in 2015 subsequent to Pakistan’s engagement with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, represents a considerable collaborative venture. Originally valued at $46 billion, the project focuses on sectors such as energy, transportation, and industry, aiming to connect China’s Kashgar in northeastern Xinjiang with Gwadar port in Pakistan’s Balochistan province across approximately 3,000 kilometers.

Subsequently, CPEC, often referred to as a ‘flagship project’, escalated into a $62 billion initiative projected for completion by 2030.

At the time of its announcement, Pakistan was grappling with a precarious economic condition characterised by a shortage of Foreign Direct Investment, significant electricity deficits, macroeconomic instability, and a severe internal security crisis due to terrorist activities.

Consequently, CPEC was perceived as a transformative element for Islamabad’s economic framework.

For China, the successful completion of CPEC promises enhanced access to the Indian Ocean and beyond.

Some experts believe that the project was also anticipated to mitigate separatist tensions in Xinjiang through increased infrastructural development and connectivity with Pakistan. Nonetheless, nearly nine years post-launch, the progress of projects under CPEC has fallen significantly short of its objectives, raising severe concerns regarding its actual benefit to China.

To date, Chinese investment in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has reached approximately $25 billion.

Of the 122 projects initially announced under CPEC, only 36 have been completed. Although CPEC was envisioned as a transformative force for Pakistan’s economy, it has not succeeded in alleviating Islamabad’s economic troubles.

Furthermore, the projects have been marred by allegations of corruption within Pakistan, including reports that Chinese investors were assured significant annual returns on their investments.

Additionally, the suspension of several CPEC projects in 2018 during Imran Khan’s administration contributed to Beijing’s frustration.

Concurrently, Pakistan’s total debt to China has escalated to $30 billion, exacerbating its economic challenges, which remain unaddressed despite the initiation of numerous CPEC projects.

The primary endeavor of the CPEC, the development of Gwadar port, has been embroiled in controversy due to Pakistan’s apparent neglect of the interests of local Gwadar residents and Baloch nationalist groups.

This oversight has precipitated increasing resentment within the province, exemplified by the emergence of the Gwadar Haq Do Tehreek (Gwadar Rights Movement).

Despite being declared ‘fully operational’ in 2021, Gwadar port has attracted minimal traffic and has underperformed compared to smaller ports, failing to secure any regularly scheduled deep-sea lines, thereby generating no significant cargo revenue for Pakistan or China.

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Xinhua/IANS)

In addition to its lackluster performance, political and economic instability in Balochistan; one of Pakistan’s most impoverished regions, has severely impeded the port’s potential as CPEC’s “game changer”.

This situation has intensified major unrest among natives and separatist groups in Balochistan, who demand a greater share in CPEC’s benefits. Chinese officials have repeatedly voiced concerns to Pakistan, emphasizing that the success of CPEC hinges on improving the conditions in Gwadar and alleviating poverty in Balochistan.

The frequent attacks on Chinese nationals involved in CPEC projects by insurgents have further decelerated progress, leading to significant investment losses and heightened security concerns for China.

Whether dealing with isolated terrorist incidents or orchestrated attacks targeting Chinese interests, Beijing is confronting diminishing returns from CPEC amid escalating security risks to its nationals in Pakistan.

This growing concern has compelled China to press Pakistan to prioritise addressing Beijing’s security apprehensions, highlighting a primary challenge in advancing CPEC initiatives.

The ambitious vision of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in a country grappling with economic and political challenges, such as Pakistan, has proven costly for Beijing.

In response to security concerns for its investments near the Wakhan Corridor compromised by Pakistan’s inability to secure the safety of Chinese nationals, China had resolved to expand CPEC into Afghanistan in May of the previous year, thereby incorporating the Taliban-led government into this flagship initiative.

This decision to seek alternatives, particularly with the Taliban regime, arises from Pakistan’s consistent failure to safeguard Chinese personnel and its ongoing issue with cross-border terrorism.

Nonetheless, this strategic shift appears to counteract Beijing’s initial intentions, as China now faces security issues in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, notably concerning attacks by Pakistani militant groups like Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other factions such as Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K), which is a staunch adversary of the Taliban, threatening Chinese interests in the region.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif undertook a five-day visit to Beijing in early June 2024 with the objective of soliciting foreign investment to alleviate Pakistan’s financial distress, was perceived as an attempt to rejuvenate the CPEC.

During this visit, both nations agreed to progress CPEC to its second phase, despite the incomplete status of the majority of Phase I projects.

However, it is widely believed that Sharif’s commitments to enhance security for these projects did not sufficiently reassure China, considering previous experiences.

Notably, despite the declaration of upgrading CPEC, Sharif was unable to secure any new investments or debt restructuring arrangements from Beijing as anticipated.

Just days prior to the visit, Islamabad’s plea for an additional $17 billion to support nine infrastructure and energy projects, along with a $15 billion debt restructuring proposal, received a tepid response from Beijing.

This reflects China’s definite scepticism regarding Pakistan’s management of economic and security issues.

Furthermore, reports suggest that Pakistan plans to reallocate CPEC funds towards military activities along the Indian border, indicating a blatant disregard for both China’s security concerns and its own economic predicaments.

Evidently, the ambitious CPEC has become a strategic liability for China, presenting a complex challenge that it struggles to resolve.

Not surprising, an article in ‘The Diplomat’ claims that China had been upset with Pakistan and has subsequently downgraded Pakistan’s status from ‘Highest Priority’ to just ‘Priority’.

Regardless of the veracity of the claims made in ‘The Diplomat’ article, Pakistan has seen its relations with China and Afghanistan turn cold recently owing to its turbulent internal security dynamics.

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Pakistan Concerned Over Sluggish Chinese CPEC Investments

The findings reveal that no industrial growth has taken place in Pakistan due to its proximity to the CPEC project….reports Asian Lite News

It’s been almost a decade since China launched the much-hyped China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), but the infrastructure project has failed to offshoot considerable economic growth in cash-strapped Pakistan.

A report by DW highlighted the assessments of several experts who have concluded that CPEC’s outcomes in Pakistan have fallen short of expectations

Azeem Khalid, a Pakistan-China relations scholar at COMSATS University Islamabad told DW, “The overpromising and underdelivering have remained a crucial factor, coupled with inherent capacity issues, and instability on the political and security fronts”.

Khalid said that he believes the tangible benefits of CPEC for the Pakistani people have been limited, while the burden of public debt and payments to Chinese companies has surged.

“It is safe to assert that the hype surrounding CPEC was more a product of propaganda than a reflection of reality. China, aided by elements within Pakistan’s media and academia, vigorously marketed the project, leading to inflated expectations,” he told DW.

The multi-billion dollar CPEC project pledges huge Chinese investment into developing rail and road links as it is intended to ship Chinese goods via the Xinjiang region across the mountain border through Pakistan and into the Arabian Sea at Gwadar Port.

Michael Kugelman, a South Asia expert at the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars told DW that the CPEC slowdown can be attributed to both economic and security factors. Pakistan’s worsening economic crisis, and China’s own recent slowdown, have dampened prospects for new projects.

A video report by VOA News also emphasized on the reasons behind no major impact on Pakistan’s economic growth because of the CPEC project.

The findings reveal that no industrial growth has taken place in Pakistan due to its proximity to the CPEC project.

Ammar Habib Khan, an economist told VOA, “The objective of CPEC was essentially improving infrastructure and connectivity that could result in higher exports but did not expect industrial growth to happened”.

Red tape, political turmoil and security risks in Pakistan plus the COVID-19 pandemic pushed Chinese investors away. The report said that these factors also delayed Phase II of the CPEC project.

So far, four out of 13 Special Economic Zones planned under CPEC have seen any development.

Ammar Habib Khan said, “The scale at which the Chinese require infrastructure that doesn’t exist in Pakistan due to which SEZs have not been able to take off as of yet. And concerns are they will not be able to take-off in the next few years.”

China is also concerned about security threats to BRI projects which could jeopardize new investment projects in Pakistan. (ANI)

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Afghanistan, Iran: China’s Plan-B to CPEC?

Experts say that China is getting tired of Pakistani lethargy in supporting timely completion of CPEC projects, writes Mohammed Anas

By briskly appointing an ambassador to Kabul, China has emitted that it is planning to reconfigure its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative projects. There are signals that China may focus more on the Afghanistan-Iran leg of its projects as “delays” are plaguing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) due to a dysfunctional Pakistani government.

On Wednesday, the Taliban-led foreign ministry said that Prime Minister Mohammad Hassan Akhund had accepted Ambassador Zhao Xing’s credentials at a ceremony in the Afghan capital.

Beijing did not immediately signal if Zhao’s appointment could lead to a formal recognition of the Taliban government. In any case, it is unlikely that China would go that far, as there appears to be a consensus among various external stakeholders that Taliban should first form an inclusive government before formal recognition can be considered.

China in Afghanistan

No government has formally recognised the Taliban since they seized power from a US-backed government in August 2021 when all American-led NATO troops withdrew after nearly 20 years of involvement in the Afghan war.

Only Pakistan and the European Union have their top diplomats in Kabul in the capacity of charge d’affaires. Overall, India, Iran, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, the UAE and Uzbekistan are among the countries that have kept or reopened their diplomatic missions in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover.

Ahead of appointing its ambassador, Beijing has taken steps to help the Taliban stabilise the Afghan economy and deal with a dire humanitarian crisis. Western nations suspended all financial aid and imposed economic sanctions on the new Kabul rulers after departing the country. Chinese investors have signed significant agreements with Kabul in the Afghan mining and oil sectors.

Analysts say China’s security concerns are driving its increased diplomatic engagement with the Taliban to prevent the conflict-torn country from sliding into chaos again.

“China is interested in Afghanistan’s security and the potential development of terror groups in its immediate neighborhood,” said Torek Farhadi, a senior regional analyst and former Afghan official. “This is why next to the new ambassador, the Chinese military attaché is seated,” he said, referring to the photo the Taliban official released after the meeting with Zhao.

But senior Pakistani journalist Haroon Rashid says that the Chinese are getting tired of Pakistani lethargy in supporting timely completion of CPEC projects. “Chinese have realised that if they get late on CPEC projects and in the meanwhile the India-Middle East-Europe project gets on track, they will miss the bus. They are ready to take the risk with the Taliban and then convince Iran to take their BRI forward,” said Rashid.

He added that Chinese have not interacted with the Interim Pakistan government significantly since it came to power and it says a lot about their trust on the present Pakistani regime. “Plus, Arab countries like Saudi, UAE and Qatar have already bid for several Pakistani properties like major airports and other installations. We know that Americans are in full cahoots with these Arab nations. It is also driving Chinese away from Pakistani rulers,” he said.

Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng, the special representative of Chinese President Xi Jinping, attends the Decade of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) celebration event in Islamabad, Pakistan, July 31, 2023. (Xinhua/Ahmad Kamal)

Afghanistan, unlike Pakistan, is China’s neighbour and thus it will be more convenient for China to manage any future project.

Meanwhile, some analysts also say that once the new Pakistani government will assume charge, it will work to implement the agreement to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan.

The lack of security in Pakistan and the resurgence of TTP (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan) and other terrorist organisations in the region have prevented any movement for the CPEC being linked to Afghanistan.

China and Iran Partnership

More than China, the India-Middle East-Europe project has evoked sharp reactions in Iran. The Iranian media has described it as a US plot to get Israel recognized by Arabs and sideline Iran, China and Russia in the West Asian scheme of things. “The India-Middle East-Europe corridor will compete with China’s BRI project. The goal of this project is to connect India’s ports with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, etc. by developing a large-scale rail network and then get access to Israel and Europe from there.

This is not only limited to economic matters, but by standing with Saudi Arabia and Iran, China has given a clear message that now its political position has also become strong in this region and the UAE and Saudi Arabia have also joined BRICS, which also includes India, China and Russia. America cannot afford such a situation,” wrote Tehran Times in one of its edit pieces.

Tehran Times compared US designs with that of the British Empire that following the fall of the Ottoman Empire shadowed the Arab region.

Persian newspaper Sobh-e-No commented that the planned project is to stymie the importance of Iran which is the heart of trade in the region. “US President Joe Biden is trying to achieve his three strategic goals with one plan; it means competing with China, bypassing Iran, and undermining its economic interests, as well as bringing Saudi Arabia closer to the Zionist regime of Israel. Some G20 countries, such as Saudi Arabia, while claiming diplomatic efforts to get closer to Iran, are promoting projects to bypass Iran,” it wrote.

A Delhi-based senior analyst told India narrative that the announcement of the economic corridor has generated intense angst in Iran and that no official has made any comment on it. He also admitted that once any progress will be made on the route, Tehran will provide more leeway to China that already plans to expedite its plethora of projects in the country.

According to other Persian newspapers like Kayhan, and news agencies Tasnim and ISNA, Iran should expedite projects with China and Russia and open alternative routes using the Suez Canal before Arabs succumb to US pressure to sink deep into the economic corridor.

One of the major Chinese projects in Iran is development of the East-West International Transport Corridor in the Maku Free Zone. “It has the capacity to create a framework for a powerful communication network from China to the Baltic and Scandinavian countries, and considering its geographical location, the Maku Free Zone actually plays the role of a four-way land in this route and in China’s One Road-One Belt Initiative (BRI),” said Hossein Garousi, head of the Maku Free Zone Organisation.

Iran’s ties with China — part of a broader shift toward the East — have strengthened particularly since the United States withdrew from the nuclear deal and reimposed sanctions on Tehran in 2018. China reportedly continued importing Iranian oil despite US sanctions. In 2021, the two countries signed a 25-year strategic agreement to strengthen economic and security cooperation.

“Iran is very important as a source of energy, but also as a provider of security in the region. In the future, Iran and China are going to be very closely interdependent,” Nasser Hadian, a professor of political science at the University of Tehran told the Iran Primer on the possibility of Iran-China relations getting a whip of the wind.

One more project that may grab attention in both Chinese and Iranian planning is the development and use of Chabahar port.

Located on the edge of the Indian Ocean, it is the only deep-sea port in Iran with direct ocean access. Its geographic proximity to countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, as well as its status as a key transit center on the burgeoning International North-South Transport Corridor, gives it the potential to develop into one of the most important commercial hubs in the region.

Chabahar is also one of the few places in Iran that is exempt from US sanctions, which significantly simplifies trade procedures with other countries.

With India and China competing to invest in this harbor, Iran is trying to play the two rivals off each other to boost its own international standing. India and China have their own plans for Chabahar and bilateral relations with Iran. While the scope of Sino-Iranian interaction in Chabahar port remains limited at this point, evidence of intensified Chinese activity with Iran suggests that it is attempting to compete with India for greater influence in the region.

However, a Professor of Tehran University’s Academy of International Relations told India Narrative that it would not be in Iran’s interest and neither its diplomatic morals will allow it to shun India in favour of China as far as total control of Chabahar is concerned. “Iran needs both China and India to form a coalition against Western hegemony while seeking to affirm a more active role in Central Asian and Middle Eastern affairs. And given heightened Chinese and Indian investment in Chabahar, I don’t see any turning back on commitments. Besides, Iran is now a member of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS and thus is bound by more obligations. However, as we say, international relations are driven by national interests. So, let’s keep our fingers crossed.”

(India Narrative)

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Baloch Groups Fear China Will Build Two Military Ports In Pakistan

Baloch organisations say China is interested in building military ports at Jiwani and Sonmiani while the one at Gwadar is most likely to remain a part for commercial purposes, reports Rahul Kumar

So, how many ports is China building in Pakistan’s conflicted province Balochistan? Surprisingly, it could be as many as three and all in Pakistan’s poorest province of Balochistan.

For the world, it is the Gwadar port that is in the spotlight. However, Baloch organisations say China is interested in building military ports at Jiwani and Sonmiani while the one at Gwadar is most likely to remain a part for commercial purposes.

The Jiwani port lies barely 35 kms from the Iran border to Pakistan’s west while Sonmiani lies in the opposite direction as it is located in the Baloch industrial township of Hub, close to Karachi — one of the biggest commercial ports in Asia.

India Narrative speaks with Jamal Nasir Baloch, the head of Foreign Affairs department of the Free Baloch Movement (FBM) — a political party seeking to regain independence for a Baloch nation usurped by Pakistan in March 1948.

Baloch says: “China is keen to construct a naval base in Jiwani which is sandwiched between Iran and Gwadar, and also build a submarine base in Sonmiani in Balochistan near the commercial port of Karachi”. He adds that Gwadar, which has been speculated to be a military port for China in global eyes, is likely to remain a commercial port.

Islamabad had given away Gwadar to the Chinese State-owned China Overseas Port Holding Company (COPHC), the builder of the Gwadar port, under a 40-year lease in 2017.  COPHC had been building the port under President Xi Jinping’s ambitious initiative to link China and Pakistan through a vast network of roads, railway, pipelines and power projects under the $62 billion China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Baloch says: “We believe that Gwadar port is for the benefit of China which wants to protect its energy interests by bypassing the Malacca Strait. Therefore, to be able to protect its energy and commercial interests in Gwadar, China wants two more — a naval base in Jiwani and a submarine base in Sonmiani”.

Both the ports will be on either side of the Gwadar port, lending it the security Beijing needs to secure its energy supplies from the Gulf region, just in case regional powers in South Asia and South-East Asia block the Malacca Strait with support from Western powers.

Baloch says that it was in 2018 that more than a dozen Chinese PLA officers met officers of the Pakistani Army in Jiwani. “China regularly sent batches of military officers to Jiwani and took soil samples as well”. The plans were to build a wall and cordon off the entire peninsula after relocating the local people from Jiwani.

Regarding China’s submarine base in Sonmiani, which lies to Pakistan’s east, Baloch says this lagoon is suitable for an underground submarine base as it offers added protection. “It is a naturally secure area”, he emphasises.

Sonmiani is also important because it is close to Balochistan’s industrial town of Hub and boasts of the Sonmiani flight test range from where Pakistan has been test-firing its nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.

Baloch adds that despite the initial research and travel by Chinese military officers, China stopped the construction in both Jiwani and Sonmiani after Beijing noticed a financially-strapped Islamabad slide towards the West.

“But we think that the stoppage of work on the ports is only temporary. China is waiting for stability to return to the Pakistani foreign policy so that it can reassure itself that Islamabad is tilting back towards Beijing. Thereafter it will begin work on the two military ports”, Baloch stresses.

The FBM activist says that the Baloch believe that the West will not be able to prevent Pakistan from gravitating towards China because most of the Pakistani Army officers, except the senior-most officers, hate the US. Another reason for his confidence is that China has been making efforts to bring Iran and Pakistan  closer against the Baloch community — currently the only opposition to Chinese ports and CPEC investment.

With the Baloch community scattered on both sides of the border, called the Goldsmith Line, and maintaining close ties, the two nations are weary. Moreover,  the Baloch armed groups have provided stout resistance to the Pakistani Army, killing dozens of  soldiers in almost daily, and sometimes audacious, attacks.

Underscoring that all three ports are being built by China in Balochistan against a simmering local sentiment, Baloch says, “China has provided drones for attack, forensic support as well as surveillance tools to the Pakistani security forces against us. Just think, why is China investing so many billions in a place where there is no drinking water or power supply but ample hostility?”

(The content is being carried under an arrangement with indianarrative.com)

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Peking Snubs Pakistan

Pakistan has little to rejoice after the visit of Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng. Pakistan government’s declining capability and credibility in tackling internal security challenges is not reassuring for Chinese leadership. Signing of six minor deals in major areas of cooperation indicates China’s preference of remaining in game while being cautious at the same time

For some years now, Pakistan is seen braving many setbacks in its bilateral cooperation with China. Expecting much-needed impetus through the long-awaited visit to the country by Chinese President Xi Jinping, the Pakistani government continued updating its wish list. First announced in 2020, the high-profile visit kept on getting postponed on different pretexts since then. Finally, China granted a visit to Pakistan when its Vice Premier He Lifeng visited the country from July 30 to Aug 01, 2023.

Despite being ridiculed in domestic media, the government remained hopeful of the long-term impact of the visit on strategic ties with China. However, the outcomes of the ‘high-profile’ visit appear far off from strategic or long-term. Most of Pakistan’s expectations were tied to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which is considered the symbol of iron brotherly ties between the two countries. However, the clouds of security concerns and lack of political clarity proved to be too dark for increasing the cooperation in a meaningful manner. The absence of movement on various projects under CPEC over the last few years clearly indicates the effect of these two factors on expanding the sphere of cooperation.

Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng, the special representative of Chinese President Xi Jinping, attends the Decade of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) celebration event in Islamabad, Pakistan. (Xinhua/Ahmad Kamal)

During the visit, He Lifeng held some important meetings with Pakistani leadership including Pak Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, President Arif Alvi, the Army Chief Gen. Asim Munir, Minister for Finance Ishaq Dar and Planning Minister Ahsan Iqbal. Apart from that, he also attended events commemorating a ‘Decade of CPEC’ and a ‘PLA Founding Day’ event at Pak Army Headquarters at Rawalpindi. Shehbaz Sharif thanked the Chinese leader for the recent Chinese financial help, which came at a very crucial time. However, a glimpse into the list of agreements signed during the visit does not look as if the iron brother ties have taken any leap. Overall, the two countries signed six pacts to enhance cooperation in diverse fields. These included agreements on joint cooperation committee of CPEC, the establishment of an expert exchange mechanism within CPEC, the upgradation of ML-1 railways, a feasibility study for realignment of the Karakoram Highway Phase II, MoU on the Industrial Workers’ Exchange Programme through diplomatic channels and export of dried chillies from Pakistan to China. The nature of these deals cannot be considered to be adding significant strategic value to the bilateral cooperation.  

Moreover, the Pakistani government’s declining capability and credibility in tackling internal security challenges is not reassuring for the Chinese leadership. Signing only basic deals in major areas of cooperation indicates China’s preference for remaining in the game while being cautious at the same time. Beijing’s inclination in increasing the scope and speed of implementation will be clear only once the new regime takes over in Islamabad after a few months. Meanwhile, China is expected to keep on pressuring the Pak government regarding the safety of its nationals and assets, which have been repeatedly targeted by the insurgents.

Pakistani President Arif Alvi meets with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng (C), the special representative of Chinese President Xi Jinping, in Islamabad, Pakistan. (Xinhua/Ahmad Kamal)

Apart from the volatile security situation in Pakistan, the precarious economic situation here is leading to lowering Chinese faith in the country’s capacity to deliver. While Beijing continues to step in to avert possible debt defaults by Pakistan, the helping hand appears to be increasingly reluctant. The recent rollout of $2.4 billion support by China amid the economic crisis in Pakistan came after a lot of wavering. The ever-ballooning circular debt is also not helping further investments in the power sector of CPEC. The experiences of Chinese Independent Power Producers (IPPs) in getting their dues clear in Pakistan is making the new investors wary about fresh investments. The intentional inadequacy in deliverables of the latest visit by the Chinese Vice Premier may be seen as a symptom of this wariness.

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Debating CPEC’s Success: Fact or Fiction?

Even as both Beijing and Islamabad repeatedly professed that the project has been a game changer adding thousands of jobs and boosting livelihoods of the locals, analysts said that these may be just claims….reports Asian Lite News

No independent or third party assessment has been undertaken for the 10 year old China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) – the flagship of multi-trillion Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Even as both Beijing and Islamabad repeatedly professed that the project has been a game changer adding thousands of jobs and boosting livelihoods of the locals, analysts said that these may be just claims.

Haroon Sharif, the head of Pakistan’s Board of Investment in 2018-19 told Voice of America (VOA) that the statistics provided by the government were merely the claims of the government, not based on third-party assessment.

“The figure could be only credible when it is based on the third-party independent economic assessment,” Sharif said.

Recently, Ahsan Iqbal, Pakistan’s Federal Minister for Planning, Development and Reform, however, said that the project has been implemented in record time due to total commitment of the leadership of both countries.

In May, Chinese newspaper Global Times claimed that till 2022, the CPEC created 236,000 jobs, and the number of Pakistani workers reached 155,000. Data tells a different picture with Pakistan’s unemployment rate having only gone up. In January, Pakistan’s local newspaper Dawn noted that around 6.205 million people or 8.5 per cent of the total workforce of 73 million may remain unemployed in 2022.

In fact, since 2013, China’s loans to Pakistan have increased multi-fold. In June 2013, China’s loans to Pakistan stood at about $4 billion. The amount at present is estimated at $30 billion. Much of the loans have come under the CPEC. China is Pakistan’s largest bilateral creditor.

The initial budget for the project was $62 billion but over years, the cost has escalated, dampened with delays and other executional hindrances. However as Beijing battles its own economic challenges at home, Chinese loans are now gradually drying up.

Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif who took charge last year blamed the previous Imran Khan government for delays though took no step to change the course.

According to Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt (Cadtm), of the total amount, Pakistan owed around $10 billion the Chinese banks Between July 2021 and March 2022, over 80 per cent of Pakistan’s bilateral debt service went to Beijing, it said, adding that though Islamabad and ruling elite view CPEC as a game changer, experts and local economists have different insights.

Geopolitica.info noted that China has reportedly ceased to provide Pakistan with a steady stream of funds due to delays in CPEC projects caused by Islamabad’s bureaucratic corruption, internal politicking, and heightened security threats in Balochistan and Sindh provinces.

The foreign policy website said that except for putting the blame on the former government for the CPEC slowdown, Sharif and his ministers have not taken any action to resume work on several stalled projects. “Given Pakistan’s dire economic situation, it appears unlikely that CPEC projects will be completed on schedule, and a failure of this magnitude could put the whole China’s Belt and Road Initiative at risk,” it added.

Bottomline: if CPEC was a success story as presented by both Islamabad and Beijing, Pakistan’s economy wouldn’t be tattering. The cash starved nation has just managed to avert a sovereign default after receiving a $3 billion bailout package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Without a credible third party 360 degree assessment of the CPEC, no one would know the real story or impact of the much hyped mega project.

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