During the interview, Balls repeatedly interrupted Sultana, accusing her of not answering the questions…reports Asian Lite News
British Muslim MP Zarah Sultana has accused Good Morning Britain presenter Ed Balls of attempting to patronize her during a Monday morning interview about the recent far-right riots in the UK. Labour’s Sultana engaged in a heated debate with the presenter and former politician, emphasizing the importance of labeling the far-right violence as “Islamophobic.”
“The sneering contempt of ‘journalists’ will never stop me from calling out racism and Islamophobic hate,” Sultana wrote on X.
During the interview, Balls repeatedly interrupted Sultana, accusing her of not answering the questions.
“If you want to answer the questions, you can but you don’t have to,” Balls told Sultana.
In a tense exchange, co-presenter Kate Garraway asked Sultana why it was important to use the term “Islamophobic” alongside “racist” and “thuggery” to describe the events. Balls interrupted again, stating: “They definitely said racist over the weekend.”
As Sultana explained how protesters attacked a mosque over the weekend, Balls interjected once more, saying: “But Keir Starmer has condemned that,” to which Sultana replied: “I’m just finishing the question if that’s OK.”
The incident has sparked online criticism, with some calling the episode “unacceptable and deeply uncomfortable,” and accusing Balls of being “reckless” for his repeated interruptions of the MP.
Balls and ITV faced scrutiny for interviewing his wife, UK Home Secretary Yvette Cooper, on the same program, raising questions about the impartiality of the interview.
The UK has been grappling with a wave of far-right violence, including attacks on hotels housing asylum seekers.
The unrest follows a stabbing rampage at a dance class in Southport that left three girls dead and several injured, fueled by false online rumors that the 17-year-old suspect was a Muslim immigrant.
An interview by Asad Ahmad at this year’s India Week UK with one of the most influential figures in the global business landscape, Mr. Pankaj Munjal. As the Chairman and Managing Director of Hero Motors, Pankaj Munjal has propelled the company to extraordinary heights, establishing it as a leading player in the automotive industry. Under his visionary leadership, Hero Motors has not only maintained its dominance in the market but has also expanded its global footprint, embodying innovation and excellence.
This insightful conversation took place during this year’s India Week, held from June 29th to July 6th in the United Kingdom. India Week is an annual celebration that showcases the rich tapestry of Indian culture, business, and innovation. It serves as a platform for fostering stronger ties between India and the UK, highlighting the dynamic contributions of the Indian diaspora and providing a stage for thought leaders and industry pioneers to share their insights.
Join us as we delve into the mind of Pankaj Munjal, exploring his perspectives on the future of mobility, his experiences at the helm of Hero Motors, and his vision for the intersection of technology and transportation. This interview promises to offer a wealth of knowledge and inspiration, reflecting the spirit of India Week in celebrating the profound impact of Indian ingenuity and leadership on the world stage.
Q; Pankaj Munjal, you’re of the wealthiest individuals in the world and chairman of Hero Motors, a giant business which is growing globally, how do you feel?
Pankaj Munjal: I don’t consider myself that rich, but I work hard. Yes, I’m on the shop floor, working diligently.
Q – You come from a family with a brand name that holds a special place in people’s hearts in India. You must be very proud of the company Hero, started by your father. Does this pride also bring pressure to maintain the brand’s reputation and loyalty across India and now globally?
Pankaj Munjal: I wouldn’t call it pressure, but rather a goal. We have set a standard and now aim to raise the bar, continuously working towards that. It’s a big brand name with significant responsibilities, certainly.
Q: People familiar with the Hero name might think you’ve moved from one success to another. However, it hasn’t always been smooth sailing, has it? The mopeds you once produced that didn’t go as planned. Rather than seeing it as a negative, you turned it into a positive. Can you tell us about that and your philosophy?
Pankaj Munjal: I’ll go back a bit. My father came from Pakistan with nothing. He and my uncle built an empire from scratch, working tirelessly to serve the customer. Throughout our journey, we faced many failures. I could write a book on them. But those failures were steps to growth. Obstacles are part of the journey to success and wisdom.
Q: How do you prevent obstacles or failures from stopping you, and instead turn them into successes? What’s your magic touch?
Pankaj Munjal: My father was a tough man, like a guru. I couldn’t look him in the eye. He always said, “Die to win, die to achieve.” You don’t have to die, but you have to live with your goals. If you face a challenge, strive to work hard, find ways, and win. That’s the path, and you keep moving forward. When you look back, you see the journey and the distance travelled.
Q: You speak of big principles. Despite being a billionaire, you seem motivated by more than money. Is it fair to say you’re driven by serving people and running a business well rather than by wealth?
Pankaj Munjal: You can’t chase money, except in a casino. You can chase a goal, new product development, change management, satisfaction, and technology. Money follows these milestones. There’s a company in Europe losing money significantly. I spoke with the owners, and we worked out a plan. If it goes through, it will be the biggest deal of my lifetime. That’s how you build wealth for all.
Q: You still have the same zest for success and building your companies as your father did. Is that fair?
Pankaj Munjal: The zest is greater now. We have a large team—33,000 people. There’s a lot to do, and we’re growing. I’m excited to say that on July 9th, We opened a tech centre here in the UK. We make bikes, motorcycles, gearboxes, braking systems for cars, and now we’re venturing into tech, design, and engineering in research and development. That’s the next level.
Q: That’s a significant investment. You’ve also invested heavily in the UK with bases in Maidenhead and Manchester, and now this tech centre. Why have you chosen Britain for investment?
Pankaj Munjal: I like the food and the people here. In other countries, you feel like a foreigner. Here, it feels like home.
Q: You don’t feel foreign here?
Pankaj Munjal: It feels very nice and comfortable here. Rationally, we did a lot of studies. We considered France and Germany, where we also have growing investments, but the UK feels like home. The cultural fit is seamless and has worked well for us.
Q: What’s the focus for Hero Motor Company now? Your father started with bicycles, and now you’re the chairman of Hero Motor Company. What’s your focus?
Pankaj Munjal: I see two worlds: the Western one, which is advanced and satisfied, and another that is hungry and developing. We aim to build a bridge between the two with a seamless supply chain. That will take us to the next level. The group will double in size, with London as the base.
Q: Some businesses were concerned about money flowing into the UK after Brexit. Has it made the UK more attractive, less attractive, or has it not changed at all for you as an investor from India?
Pankaj Munjal: There are many pluses and minuses. From the UK, we can reach the US, EU, and India. Duties and barriers exist everywhere. It’s fine; there will be pluses and minuses.
Q: Would Brexit have affected your decision to invest in the UK if we were still in the EU?
Pankaj Munjal: I don’t think it would have had a big impact. There are always pros and cons, and we make decisions based on them. These things change, but our core business remains our focus. That’s our DNA.
Q: You’ve built a strong team globally. Are you ever tempted to leave everything to them and relax, given how hands-on you are?
Pankaj Munjal: I tell my wife I’m the fireman. I’m chairman of many boards, and sometimes I don’t see those companies for weeks or months. Where there’s a fire, I have to be there. I’m the glue that keeps things together. We’ve made many successful investments and fixed many issues. I’m the fireman, managing all the fires from my dashboards.
Q: Does retirement interest you?
Pankaj Munjal: I don’t think I will ever retire!
Q: Imagine you’re on a beach in a few months, with a lovely sea and sky, and a cold drink in your hand. Is that a perfect holiday or a nightmare?
Pankaj Munjal: I’d have Wi-Fi and my phone, checking the red and yellow curves and talking to the team. And I don’t drink!
Q: You have a young team around you, focusing on social media and growth. Does the next generation give you confidence for the future?
Pankaj Munjal: The team must have young blood and fresh ideas. We work with diverse cultures, each with different approaches. Japanese want a 10-year plan, Americans seek quarterly innovation. Ideas rule the world, and that’s what we develop. We’re now into tech that reads drivers’ habits, alerting if they’re not focused. That’s our direction.
Q: You sound like India’s Elon Musk, pushing boundaries in technology. Any desire to venture into space?
Pankaj Munjal: I stick to my core. If it’s within our core, I’ll pursue it. Otherwise, I won’t. We’ll strengthen our core and become world leaders in what we do—bicycles, motorcycles, braking systems.
Q: You’re advancing in electric scooters and batteries. India faces significant pollution issues. Are you bringing these cutting-edge transport models to India?
Pankaj Munjal: India is already the world’s number one in electric scooter consumption. We’re building bridges between supply chains and product development. India has arrived, and we need the UK connection to go further.
Q: That’s what the UK offers you?
Pankaj Munjal: And good golf courses.
Q: What advice would you give to someone aiming to build a global brand?
Pankaj Munjal: My father’s philosophy guides us. Focus on one line of business and become a world leader in it. For any startup, find your edge and stick to it.
Q: If your moped business hadn’t bounced back, what would you be doing now?
Pankaj Munjal: It was embarrassing, my father shut the business. We had debts and workers to pay. I went to the factory and told everyone we were out of business, but no one left. We reached out to companies like BMW and Bombardier. Bombardier asked us to make gearboxes, and we signed a contract the next day. When sinking, grab any rope to climb. That’s what we did, and we never looked back.
Q: How would you describe the relationship between India and Britain?
Pankaj Munjal: We haven’t signed a free trade agreement yet. Goods should flow freely, benefiting both sides.
Q: Are you hopeful this might happen?
Pankaj Munjal: I’ve been hopeful for a long time.
Q: Looking at Anglo-Indian trade, are you optimistic?
Pankaj Munjal: Very optimistic and bullish. Indians love English whisky, bread—everything. We have an unmatched bond with the UK.
Historian Prof. Audrey Truschke discusses the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) report on the Gyanvapi Masjid that a ‘ large temple’ existed under the present Mosque before the construction of the Mosque.
Audrey Truschke is Professor of South Asian history at the University of Rutgers, Newark. She is the author of three acclaimed books, Culture of Encounters: Sanskrit at the Mughal Court, 2016, Aurangazeb, 2016, and the Language of History : Sanskrit narratives of Indo Muslim rule, 2021. She is currently working on a single volume history of India, ‘ From Mohenjo Daro to today to be published by the Princeton University Press.
In an Exclusive interview with Abhish K. Bose, Prof Truschke discusses the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) report on the Gyanvapi Masjid that a ‘ large temple’ existed under the present Mosque before the construction of the Mosque.
Excerpts from the interview
Abhish K Bose: As a historian who is working in the contemporary period and influenced by ideals such as communalism, democracy, ethics and other values emerged in the last two hundred years or less, how can you ascertain the objectivity of chronicling history of the medieval period when none of these belief systems existed, and what prevailed then was archaic thinking, which has no connection with the contemporary ideas or ideals?
Audrey Truschke : My goal in studying history is to understand the past, not to judge it. Modern ideals are just that, modern, and so often not especially relevant to excavating the ideas and casualties of prior periods. Except that, in the present day, many of us value an honest account of the past. In that sense, my core motivation as a modern historian is decidedly modern, even as it is not shared by many other modern people who, instead, embrace an approach of mythologizing the past.
(Photo: IANS)
Abhish K. Bose : How do you respond to the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) finding made in its latest survey report on the Gyanvapi Masjid in Benares. The (ASI) report has claimed that a “large Hindu temple” existed there prior to the construction of the existing Mosque and that parts of the temple were used in the construction of the Mosque. The narrative is similar to the tone of the narrarive spread initially at the time of the controversy surrounding Babri Masjid. As a historian of the medieval period what are your inferences on the (ASI) findings on the said Mosque ?
Audrey Truschke : I do not find the ASI to be a reliable source of information or analysis at present. In the case of Benares’s Gyanvapi Masjid, they are asking the wrong question. The critical question is not: Was there once, hundreds of years ago, a temple there that premodern people destroyed? Indeed, this is something few, if any, historians contest. Rather, the key question is: Should 21st-century Hindu supremacists destroy a mosque that has stood for centuries as part of their ongoing agenda to oppress Muslims and undermine Indian democracy?
Abhish K. Bose : Based on your research on the Medieval period and rulers how do you recall the Muslim rulers relations with the hindu community? Has the hindu community benefited or became disadvantaged as a result of the Mughal rule?
Audrey Truschke : It is difficult to characterize the relationship of all Indo-Muslim kings with all Hindu communities, both because it varied and because Indian kings did not tend to think about a Hindu community in the singular. One especially influential set of alliances featured the Mughals and Rajputs. The Mughals relied on many loyal Rajput lineages in military and cultural ways; those Rajputs benefited enormously, financially and otherwise, from their investment in the Mughal state. Collectively, the Mughals and Rajputs fashioned what we sometimes call “Mughal ruling culture.”
Abhish K. Bose : Your works ‘ Aurangazeb’ ‘ The Man and the Myth’ and ‘ culture of encounters ‘ refers to the cultural exchanges and bonhomie in between the Mughal rulers and hindu community in the medieval period such as learning of Sanskrit by the Mughal rulers for understanding Indian ethos, and the Mughal rulers like Aurangazeb protecting Hindus from Muslim aggression. While this is the scenario why the Indian historiography highlighted the Mughal rulers only as plunderers of Hindus and destroyer of temples? Is it the lapse of historians or the lapse of the readers in understanding the history?
Audrey Truschke : Professional Indian historians are on the same page as historians worldwide in understanding the nuances of Hindu-Muslim relations during Mughal rule. But India seems to have a growing number of people at present who are popular historians at best and, more honestly, Hindutva propagandists. They churn out books (and, maybe more often, blog posts and Twitter threads) with false information, plagiarism, and misleading claims that participate in the ongoing Hindu nationalist agenda to malign Indian Muslims, past and present.
A priest offers prayers at ‘Vyas Ji ka Tehkhana’ inside Gyanvapi mosque in Varanasi, after District court order, in Varanasi, on Feb 01, 2024.(IANS/X/@Vishnu_Jain1)
Abhish K. Bose : As a historian specializing on the medieval period what are your views on the claims by the hindu right-wing over the disputed Mosques in different parts of India?
Audrey Truschke : Legally and ethically, Hindu supremacists should not destroy any premodern mosques moving forward. Realistically, they’re probably just getting started as they further transform India into an ethno-nationalist state where minorities face rising oppression and violence.
Abhish K. Bose : The currently prevailing demarcation of historical periods was a colonial-era innovation designed to dignify colonial rule, among other things. What are some of the gains and losses of this way of separating historical periods, for understanding our historical present?
Audrey Truschke : In my next book (which is currently under peer review), I do not demarcate South Asian history into standard periods. This will throw off some readers, and that’s part of the point. If we are ever to move beyond bad colonial-era ideas about South Asian historical periods, well, we must move on and challenge ourselves and others to see things in new ways.
Abhish K. Bose : The focus on demolition of Hindu temples some times excludes all other aspects of the historical past. Can you provide some context for understanding such events? Temples were symbols of power and wealth and not exclusively of religion or spirituality; Hindu kings also demolished Hindu temples of rival kings etc. Why are demolished Hindu temples so important to a certain kind of nationalist history-writing?
Audrey Truschke : Hindu nationalists rely on a grievance machine to fuel their ever increasing hatred of Muslims. Indian history poses many problems for Hindu nationalists in this regard, including that it does not furnish many examples of persecuted Hindus that might produce such grievances. So, they invent persecution, mischaracterize and exaggerate the few crumbs they can find, and otherwise engage in bad faith arguments. In brief, Hindu nationalists are obsessed with temple demolitions because it fuels their modern prejudices; it has little to nothing to do with history. Also, there might be a bit of projection involved. After all, Hindu nationalists are some of the great iconoclasts of our times and have destroyed many places of worship in contemporary India.
Abhish K. Bose : You are currently working on a historical account from early Indus valley civilisation to the contemporary period. Could you share a little bit on the book you are working?
Audrey Truschke : My current book project is a single-volume overview of South Asian history. It is aimed at undergraduates and educated popular readers. Among other things, I strive to bring in a diversity of Indian voices, meaning more women, lower castes, and lower classes than have many prior historians.
Professor K.P. Kannan, a former Fellow and Director of the Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum is currently a Honorary Fellow there. He is also the Academic Chairman of the Laurie Baker Centre for Habitat Studies in Trivandrum. He was a member of the International Panel on Social Progress, a collective initiative of social scientists from different parts of the world, which prepared a global report on Society in the 21st Century in June 2018 (published by Cambridge University Press).
Professor Kannan has had several UN assignments, the most important of which was as an Expert Member in the Technical Secretariat of the World Commission on Social Dimension of Globalisation constituted by the ILO in Geneva (2002-03). During 2005-09, he was a Member of the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector (NCEUS) appointed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that prepared a number of major reports on the informal economy and informal workers in India. In 2008, he was conferred the first VV Giri Memorial Award for his contributions in the area of social security for workers in the informal sector. He was awarded a National Fellowship by the India, the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) during 2016-18.
Professor Kannan has authored, co-authored, or edited twelve books as well as several research papers. His books include Poverty, Women and Capability: A Study of Kerala’s Kudumbashree System, LBC, 2023; Interrogating Inclusive Growth: Poverty and Inequality in India, Routledge, 2014; and The Long Road to Social Security (edited jointly with Jan Breman),OUP, 2013. In an interview with Abhish K. Bose he discusses the economic inequalities prevailing in India reminiscent of the post partition period and a number of issues which deals with the political economy of the country.
Excerpts from the interview
1. In India, economic inequalities have aggravated between the ultra-rich and the poorest, reminiscent of the 1940s -the partition and its miserable aftermaths. Given that equality is basic to the health and vitality of democracy, what dangers do you perceive the present trend as harbouring for the survival of democracy in India? Please examine this issue also because economic inequality, or developmental differential, plays a part in Hindu-Muslim alienation, which has intensified of late in India.
KPK: Increasing economic inequality is one of the sharp outcomes of the neoliberal economic policies followed by most countries in the world since the collapse of the Soviet Union. India is no exception. By mid-1970s India managed to bring down its pre-independence economic inequality to some extent by its mixed-economy policies and state interventions. But this trend got reversed since the initiation of neoliberal economic reforms since 1991. Economic inequality is certain to affect the democratic process as we are witnessing today in the form of the role of money in elections. When it is also accompanied by the rise and strengthening of crony capitalism it exerts an undue influence in economic and social policies. At the same time, one should also remember that India is a land of manifold inequalities as in hierarchical social structure, gender inequality, as well as spatial inequality manifested as rural-urban inequality in economic and social development. My own work in documenting the intersectional nature of economic inequality from the point of the ordinary people is contained in Interrogating Inclusive Growth: Poverty and Inequality in India (published by Routledge in 2014). The social dimension of increasing economic inequality is not limited to the Hindu-Muslim divide but an increasing gap between each of the disadvantaged groups compared to what I called the ‘Socially Advantaged Group consisting of upper caste Hindus, Jains, Zoroastrians, Sikhs, and Christians. The increase in social inequality as between the bottom groups of SC and ST and the socially advantaged is the highest. The only field where social inequality has reduced somewhat is in education taken as average years of education. For my research in this area of social inequality see, K.P. Kannan (2019), India’s Social Inequality as Durable Inequality: Dalits and Adivasis at the bottom of an Increasingly Unequal Hierarchical Society, Working Paper No. 488, Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram (Also published as a chapter in Reclaiming Development Studies: Essays for Ashwani Saith,edited by Murat Arsel, Anirban Dasgupta, and Servaas Storm (published by Anthem Press, 2021).
2. In his latest book ‘ India is broken’ economist Ashoka Mody argues that the socialist policies of Nehru and Indira Gandhi governments paralyzed economic growth which hinges on the presumption that socialism continues to hamper India’s economic prospects. Has commitment to socialism weakened the foundation of democracy in India by clogging development with excessive concern for the poor? To what extent can the ills of the present state of India be blamed on Nehru?
KPK: I do not agree at all with the view taken by Ashoka Mody. He is a distinguished member of the alumni of the Centre for Development Studies as well as a colleague for some time. Jawaharlal Nehru was not just the first Prime Minister of India but a towering architect of modern India even before independence. Not only he represented a secular and modern vision for independent India but also built it on the foundations of the best principles and practices of Indian civilization such as the plural nature of its religious heritage, an innate ability to fuse foreign civilizational cultures into its own, free thinking as represented in its multiple philosophies. At the same time, India was a vanquished economy at the time of independence having been drained of its resources for more than one-and-a-half century by British colonialism. The Great Bengal Famine and several famines and droughts during the colonial period is but one manifestation of this draining. Added to this was the economic, social, and psychological disruptions of Partition as well as the limited foreign exchange that was not readily available to the country. It was also a time when a huge majority of people looked up to the Soviet Union as a model for economic and social emancipation. But Nehru and his team were strongly committed to a democratic polity and enshrined it in the Indian Constitution the value of which is now being increasingly realised even by the critics of his times. He knew the multi-structural nature of the Indian society and economy and wanted to develop it through the instrumentality of national planning. But he and his team also realised the practical limitations and adopted a mixed economy approach in which certain basic sectors of the economy called the ‘commanding heights’ were to be led by the state through the establishment of a public sector. It was neither explicitly socialist or capitalist but social democratic or what was then called ‘a socialistic pattern of society.’ This approach pulled the country out of its deep economic backwardness manifested by a growth rate of well over three percent per annum compared to less than half-a-percent during the five decades before independence.
Beginning with 1962, the Indian economy went through a difficult period burdened by the war with China and then Pakistan, death of Nehru and the break-up of the Congress, war with Pakistan in 1971, droughts, and a higher rate of population growth than expected in the planning framework. The relative decline is clearly post-Nehru. Added to this is the semi-authoritarian style of Mrs Indira Gandhi and the emergence of political cronyism. Chief Ministers were picked from cronies within the Congress Party and it also finally resulted in weakening the Centre-State relations. By early 1980s western capitalism was clearly winning with its agenda of neoliberal economic reforms that suited the interests of the increasingly powerful finance capital. The final nails in the coffin of national economic development of many developing countries were thrust with the implosion of the Soviet Union and the formal establishment of the World Trade Organization declaring an all-encompassing process of globalization. China had already changed its tack with sweeping economic reforms embracing the market principles as directed by its state. India too had to follow with the collapse of the sources of cheap oil from Iraq as well as the market for trade in the former socialist bloc.
Jawaharlal Nehru signing the constitution
Given this understanding, I do not see any reason to put the blame on Nehru and the Nehruvian vision that encompassed not just the economic realm but also social, political, and international relations. It was a Middle Path, let us say Budha’s Middle Path. The relevance of this middle path is now increasingly becoming a necessity as the world is moving away from the neoliberal globalisation because it has not helped the rich western capitalist countries to continue their economic and, by extension, political hegemony over non-western countries. I think we will be compelled to rediscover the Nehruvian vision and its path as time goes by and the challenges before India becomes tougher and tougher both internally and externally.
3. Is Indira Gandhi responsible for the increasing political and economic corruption in post-Nehru India? What about the Total Revolution movement led by Jaiprakash Narain? What about the active agents in the public sphere such as the media, religious institutions, and judiciary in countering the increasingly corrupt practices?
KPK: As an academic, I do not subscribe to the view that the increasing corruption of politics and economics in India is solely to the due to personality of an individual. At the same time, if the individual is a powerful leader, he or she has the capacity to change the situation for the better. On the other hand, if it suits the logic of clinging on to power the leader will not hesitate to indulge in corrupt practices. That is the lesson of history. The struggle for power within the Congress led to the emergence of Indira Gandhi as an undisputed leader within her party and that led to a series of negative consequences to the polity and economy in the short as well as long run. The JP movement gave a lot of hope in the initial stages given the track record of Jaiprakash Narain but his followers were a motely crowd of clearly communal right-wing parties, parties oriented towards socialism with a core agenda for social justice (read caste based social justice) and others with an agenda for power-grabbing. It was inherently unstable and it was no surprise that they disintegrated within a short span of time paving the way for the return of Indira Gandhi and her Congress Party. She provided stability and determination as well as a concern for the poor that was addressed through populist policies of welfare benefits but not long-term institutional changes and/or a concerted programme for education and employment creation.
During the Emergency (1975-77), most of the media as well as other formal institutions did not provide much of a fight. However, the judiciary always kept a window of hope by not wholly following the agenda of the leader. Resistance was there among several groups as well as some intellectuals and some media institutions. People at large perhaps realised the gravity of the situation in suspending all civil rights and decided to act when national election was announced. And they used this democratic weapon, given to them by the Indian Constitution, to great effect
I do not think religious institutions got very much worried by the Emergency or the semi-authoritarian style of government of Indira Gandhi. In history religious institutions usually sided with state power unless they are attacked.
4. Before economic liberalisation, especially during the period of Nehru, the Indian economy is characterised as working under a dirigisme regime i.e. with positive intervention by the state in economic policy and planning having a lot of control. It also necessitated control of foreign exchange rate and its movement. Is this approach that led to what some call ‘Hindu Rate of Growth’?
KPK : As I said earlier a newly independent India did not want to take sides in a bipolar post-second World War era. It wanted to preserve its national sovereignty in both political and economic matters. At the same time, it did not believe in shifting itself off from either side of the Cold War leaders viz., United States and Soviet Union. As in the case of many other large developing countries it also adopted an import substitution strategy about industrialisation. That is how it laid the foundations for a heavy industry in many critical sectors that many now seem to forget. It required control and interventions in foreign exchange rate and its flow given the paucity of foreign exchange. This was the case with most developing countries. Only some small developing countries such as Taiwan, South Korea and Pakistan decided to align with the western block led by the United States that gave them access to foreign capital, external market for their products, development aid and so on. Some countries like South Korea and Taiwan had political compulsions to be a subordinate ally of the United States. But they used the opportunity to work hard, organise their economy for innovation, etc under military dictatorships and economically grew fast and became prosperous as appendage economies. Some countries like Pakistan and Philippines failed given their inefficiencies in internal economic system.
It was Professor Raj Krishna, an eminent economist, who called the below 4 percent economic growth as ‘Hindu Rate of Growth’ because it was not enough for India to solve its basic problems. This is because the capacity of the Indian economy to save and invest was so low (around 5 percent immediately after independence) and it grew slowly but steadily to around 20 percent by the mid-1970s. But this growth rate acquired the meaning of a ‘sloppy or slow performing economy’ by its use widely in the media. In terms of the historical experience of economic development before 1945, three to four percent was a high-performing one. As I said earlier this so-called Hindu Rate of Growth was much higher than what it was before and it laid the foundations for a faster rate of growth subsequently. We could have certainly done better but in a democracy every change must be a negotiated one, not one ‘ordered’ by the top as in the case of China. China decided to enforce a ‘one child per family’ policy and it enforced it ruthlessly. When India tried a milder version during the Emergency it got backfired because people saw it, rightly so, as an intrusion into their personal freedom. China could mobilize the savings in the economy into the coffers of the state and increase its investment rate. This does not mean that democratic India’s record in economic development was better than China. Many other factors also played their role in China’s experience such as raising the educational, skill and health levels of the people, abolishing private ownership of land, and pursuing a policy of full employment till the end of the 1970s. It then used this ‘broad base’ to get special treatment from the United States to access their technology and market but adopting an anti-Soviet Union policy in the realm of international politics. This opportunistic set of policies by aligning with the capitalist west led by the United States has not yet been adequately acknowledged and analysed in the development literature.
Blaming the pre-neoliberal economic reform period as ‘Hindu Rate of Growth’ is like blaming the parents by their currently educated and rich children for not being fast enough in enriching the family. What they forget is the sacrifices of the parents with limited means in educating the children and creating better opportunities for them to get educated in the newly expanded public provisioning of education and health that become the basis for the richer children to get access to both domestic and foreign opportunities for employment in the private sector.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi speaks during the discussion on the Motion of No-confidence in the Lok Sabha during the Monsoon Session of Parliament, in New Delhi, on August 10, 2023. (Photo: IANS/SANSAD TV)
There is also a danger in glorifying the higher rate of aggregate economic growth when it is accompanied by increasing inequality. That means the disparity between the poor and the rich are widening although the poor may be benefitting a small increase in income in absolute terms. This kind of growth – inequalizing growth – is a sure recipe for increasing social tensions and conflicts as we are now witnessing. Despite high aggregate growth, the backlog of poverty, low education and health status, inadequate employment let alone decent employment are the order of the day in our country. Even the rich countries are now witnessing the consequences of their increasing economic inequality. For them globalization has largely meant shifting of jobs by their capital to low-wage countries and an increase in private capitalist accumulation. This has given rise to the emergence of right-wing political movements who locate the problem in migration especially of those who do not look like them. It also becomes a fertile ground for authoritarian leadership. Democracy itself is being threatened as in many countries that we usually called ‘advanced’ or ‘developed’ such as the United States and several countries in the European Union. The old communist left has lost its credibility because it never subscribed to the will of the people through a process of multiparty democracy. The left represented by social democracy in Europe did sustain longer the old left but now face an existential threat from right wing political parties.
A new democratic left is emerging in many large and middle Latin American countries. But that kind of hope is not currently evident in Asian countries. Africa is a mixed bag with more countries under authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. At the same time, I think there are enough reservoirs of political energy as well as economic capacity across countries for creating a more representative, secular, and equitable governance and development thinking and programme of action.
My hope is that strengthening such a new path will produce a new democratic movement with more participation, decentralisation, gender and social justice and environmental sustainability based on basic principles of fairness, public morality and ethics that could become a new Middle Path.
5. India followed an active non-alignment foreign policy as envisioned by its first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru till the end of the twentieth century. But the shift towards a pro-western – largely a pro-US – shift is evident for sometime now. In economic realms it is much stronger than in foreign policy. Do you think such a shift will end in subservience to US interests?
KPK: There is no doubt that India’s embrace of neoliberal economic policies has landed it in the lap of the US-dominated economic world order. But it is neither an inevitable or a desirable one. That is why it is increasingly asserting its ‘independent’ positions and policies. In politics, especially those relating to national security and external economic opportunities, the Indian regime finds itself compelled to protect its national interests. Hence its neutral stand on the Russian-Ukraine conflict. Even when the head of the government sides with Israel, corrections and caveats are issued immediately not to give up its earlier position. There is also the question of accessing advanced technologies – both civil and military and sometimes dual – that the US and its allies have been averse to giving to India. In defence, the Russian willingness to not only supply final products but also share technologies has been a time-tested experience. The Indian regime is aware of that it has not been successful in attracting the expected level of foreign direct investment as opposed to foreign portfolio investment that seek immediate profits through the stock market. The Indian regime also knows that the dominance of the US dollar in international payments is more of a constraint than a facilitator of its national economic development. Its aspiration for a higher stake in multilateral financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank has not received a favourable response from the US-led western block. Given these realities, my sense is that there are limits to any Indian regime’s proclivity to align strongly with the Western countries. This will result in a relatively independent foreign and economic policy in tune with national compulsions.
6. Do you expect India attaining any worthwhile alleviation, in the foreseeable future, of the mounting unemployment distress that is spreading unrest among our educated youth? How is the AI challenge, already looming large over the world, likely to affect us in this respect?
KPK: The biggest challenge to raising the pitiable standard of living of close to two-thirds of Indians is the lack of decent employment that ensures them a living wage, employment security and access to social security. Despite the high aggregate growth performance of close to four decades, 90 (or a little more) percent of employment is informal in nature i.e. insecure employment. Half or a little more than half of the total employment in India is classified as ‘self-employment’ with earnings that are often below the average wage of casual workers. India’s poverty is largely of the working poor especially those who toil in villages as well as in urban informal sector. The exodus of such insecure workers during the nation-wide lockdown was just one manifestation of this employment insecurity.
Added to this is the declining participation of women in the workforce. Despite increasing their average years of education, reducing the number of children per couple, willing to work in jobs that are traditionally appropriated by men, women in India are an excluded lot as far as access to employment is concerned let alone accessing decent jobs. Much of the ‘jobless growth is a product of the introduction of advanced technologies because of international competition and the compulsions to increase labour productivity. But this should have compelled the national governments to rethink their ‘growth at any cost’ policy by focusing on employment creation as an objective. This is feasible in a country of vast areas and people and the developmental deficit in education, health, housing, rural infrastructurenot to speak of the urgent need for ecological regeneration and environmental sustainability. This question was addressed by the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector (known as NCEUS) that was appointed by the former Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh in 2004. The final report of the NCEUS argued for an employment policy that, by default, will address several basic problems being faced by the un- and under-employed as well as those in informal employment. I would remind the readers to examine this report titles The Challenge of Employment: An Informal Economy Perspective published by the Academic Foundation, New Delhi in 2009.
Given the pace of technological change India would find itself difficult to opt out of working and adapting the new technologies including AI but employment and social consequences need to be studied, understood, and analysed for designing a larger economic vision and approach to pursue a strategy of ‘employment with growth.’
7. Why does corruption remain endemic and impossible to eradicate in our society? Without containing corruption, is it possible for India to do justice to her true potential or do justice to the common man? The AAP, which got started with much fanfare about eradicating corruption, is now perceived to be getting infected. What measures would you suggest to contain corruption in India?
KPK: Corruption is like cancer. It will slowly but steadily corrode the basic values in a society and affect the welfare of most of the people. The minority of beneficiaries will benefit in the short run but will produce outcomes that will be disastrous to the development and welfare of the country. Corruption is a part of the concept of ‘rent-seeking’ to extract benefits in multiple ways by people who have the power and opportunitybut not entitled to such extraction. If the top layers of the regime indulge in rent-seeking in various ways, it will rapidly infiltrate into the lower levels. Neoliberal economic reforms have given way to an increasing trend in rent-seeking than before. And that is why the media is now talking of the increasing tendency towards crony capitalism.
Given our corrupt feudal past as well as a corrupt colonial bureaucracy, the bureaucratic system has institutionalised its own version of rent-seeking by small and big corruption in realms where there are opportunities for using their power.
Only a people’s movement will check the corruption and other forms of rent-seeking in the society. The parties that emerged out of such movements seems to have lost their credibility even before they got entrenched in the political system. But public action must continue through multiple ways and means. Public morality, personal integrity awnd honesty and ethical politics should not be consigned to academic studies and philosophical discourses. There is no short cut to public action.
In this interview with Abhish K. Bose, Prof. Suryakant Waghmore shares his opinion on various issues such as the dominance of upper caste in political institutions, the undercurrents made by the Mandal Commission’s report in Indian politics among other issues.
Suryakant Waghmore is a professor of Sociology at the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT-Bombay. He earned his Ph.D. in Sociology as a Commonwealth Scholar from the University of Edinburgh (2011). His areas of research interest broadly revolve around civility and democracy in India. He is the author of Civility against Caste (Sage 2013) and co-editor of Civility in Crisis (Routledge 2020). He was awarded the New India Foundation Fellowship (2022) to work on his book on Caste and Cities (2024). His other forthcoming publications include a co-edited volume Civil Sphere in India (Polity 2024) and second edition of Civility against Caste (Routledge 2024). He was previously professor and chairperson at the Centre for Social Justice and Governance, TISS (Mumbai), and has held visiting faculty positions at Fudan University, University of Hyderabad, Stanford University, and Göttingen University. He regularly writes columns in national newspapers like Indian Express and provides consultancy to NETFLIX on sensitive and compelling representation of marginal groups.
In this interview, Prof. Waghmore shares his opinion on various issues such as the dominance of upper caste in political institutions, the undercurrents made by the Mandal Commission’s report in Indian politics among other issues.
Excerpts from the interview
1. The share of upper caste legislators in all the legislative assemblies and parliament has been declining and that of the lower castes rising. The 1990s saw a doubling of the percentage of OBC MPs – from 11 percent to 22 percent whereas the proportion of upper-caste MPs dropped from 47 percent in 1984 to below 40 in the 1990s. It produced a shift in the balance of political power in governments and legislatures, reshaping the very character of democratic politics. Upper castes are still very influential. Even though upper castes are vastly outnumbered by castes below them but they still hold sway over institutional domains and control the levers of power. Why is this happening?
The politics around Mandal and politicisation of OBCs challenged the dominance of pure castes in North India. Congress as an upper-caste party was decimated and Mandal parties like JDU, RJD and SP made their presence felt with more OBC politicians gaining political power. The antagonism between OBCs and pure castes was however temporal in North India. The limited economic and political mobility of OBCs has attracted more to Hindutva and the discourse of kshatriya-hood of OBCs has helped in status claims. The seduction of Hindutva amongst OBCs is also driven by their proximity to Brahmanism.
Several movements in colonial and post-colonial times like the Arya Samaj and RSS have invested heavily to construct Hindu solidarity and material mobility amongst ‘impure’ castes and this has led to their substantive inclusion in Hindu sociality.
Despite the mandalisation of politics in North India, OBCs are more of politically scattered castes and do not constitute a significant politicised collective and non-brahmin ideological leanings like south-west are still to turn into popular political sentiment. What we have therefore is individual-caste parties or family-centered parties like SP that develop pragmatic political patronage and alliances with other castes and Muslims.
Decades of cadre-based mobilisation of RSS on the other hand has achieved a significant presence of OBCs in RSS and BJP. Leaders like the incumbent CM of Madhya Pradesh, Mohan Yadav and even PM Modi in several ways signify democratisation of Hinduism and making of Hinduism as a civil religion. Such democratisation is paradoxical — OBCs may have political power but their interests have ideologically merged with the sacrificial ethics of Hindutva. We do not need pure castes at the helm anymore as OBCs too can help achieve the radical aspirations of Hindutva.
2. Thirty years after Mandal social justice politics has been dissipated with the rise of the BJP as the dominant pole of Indian politics, the backward caste politics had indeed hindered the march of Hindutva in the 1990s, with Mandal upstaging religious politics which had been catapulted to centre stage by the Ayodhya movement. Turning the politics of social justice on its head, the Hindu right crafted a broad-based identity politics to undercut Mandal which appeared to have outlived its utility for a critical mass of the socially marginalized, bringing the OBC vote to the BJP. Isn’t it a strategic lapse from the part of the Congress in not carrying forward the legacy of the lower caste social justice spearheaded by Mandal which could have stem the growth of the BJP?
Yes, the gains of social justice movement made by Mandal may seem to have been reversed. But the actual opposition to Mandal was from Congress and not Hindutva or BJP. So, Mandal/social justice and Hindutva are not necessarily at odds. There are voices against reservations in RSS but that is a general pure-caste sentiment and not an official position of RSS.
While Mandal movement achieved decimation of Congress in Bihar and UP, Mandal and Mandir are not necessarily antithetical as is imagined by some votaries of Mandal movement and caste census.
Mandal movement was never anti-caste it was merely pro-reservation. As Congress lost ground, BJP mobilised around a broader axis of Hindu solidarity while othering the Muslims. The economic mobility achieved by OBCs under neo-liberal India along with anti-Muslim common sense that has been cultivated for over a century amongst the Shudra castes, came in handy for success of BJP. Congress may claim legacy to Gandhi and Gandhian politics but Gandhi’s religiosity also laid grounds for success of RSS and BJP.
Congress in past two decadesis increasingly wearing a pro-OBC coat, but this strategy does not necessarily have deeper commitment to politics beyond religion and caste. BJP on the other hand is rooted in the politics of Hindutva and other policies of universal welfare along with politics of polarisation help itconsolidate support from above and below.
3. Historically, the Congress was built as a centrist catch-all party, but to remain a catch-all party became very difficult once powerful cleavages based on caste (after Mandal) and religion (related to Ayodhya) has build up, gaining momentum and popular acceptability. This resulted in a major confrontation between the upper and backward castes, displacing the Congress from its position of dominance in north India, most notably in Uttar Pradesh. This had a cascading effect too on the party’s political fortunes in other states. The party never recovered from this transformation of India’s politics which challenged the pluralist foundation of the political system by shifting the discourse towards identity politics. Do you think that without enunciating a strategy to counter the identity politics can Congress win in the elections?
Congress succumbed to Mandal under pressure from Mandal movements. Its centrism had otherwise survived patronage of dominant castes in North India. The marginal castes and communities gained minimally from the Congress structure. What is understood as the pluralist foundations was fragile and something that corroded immensely with the rise of BJP. A major problem with Congress is that it is not a cadre-based party like BJP. Sadly, no party can match the commitment and passion that RSS cadres bring to BJP. There are fewer patronage-based groups withing BJP as compared to other parties. Congress can make scattered gains due to anti-incumbency and other residual factors but BJP is continually strengthening its foundations after every election due to its ideological clarity and nationalist rhetoric.
In Karnataka Congress was successful because of the Ahinda movement of Siddaramaiah and other leaders. There is some anti-caste ideological basis for Ahinda which helps Congress in Karnataka. We hardly see this in other states. In UP, Congress may not succeed if it fails to tie up with BSP. Similarly, in Maharashtra VBA and MIM may affect chances of Congress. BJP has multiple enemies in the civil sphere but they are all splintered groups, sometimes competing within themselves.
Since Congress lacks cadre-based organisation, sacrificial ethics (sewa) and ideological clarity, it has to bank on alliances. All of this makes BJP seem more principled as other parties continue to be largely family-basedentities. If Congress plans to turn into a ‘Bahujan’ party, they will have resort to bahujanist icons, culture and mass mobilisation from below and I do not foresee that possibility.
4. Isn’t the key issue for the Congress is defining its response to Hindu nationalism? While the Congress is largely agreed on the necessity of combating communal ideas, politics and policies, it has swung between making ideological compromises with majoritarian nationalism and plotting a frontal battle against it. Are the contradictory pulls exerted by these divergent approaches are partly responsible for the impasse plaguing the party since its spectacular defeat in 2014. From 2014 onwards, the Congress is wary of an engagement with these big issues mainly because it fears losing popular support by being seen as anti-Hindu; hence, most leaders are unwilling to come out openly against majoritarianism. What is your response?
We are a nation steeped in religiosity – poor and the privileged alike are deeply religiousand Congress despite its claim to secular credentials has had religious and even communal roots. Neither Nehru nor Gandhi was comfortable with antagonising Hindu and Muslim radicals, change has always been a slow process therefore. It is not surprising that Kamal Nath was bowing in front of Baba Bageshwar and Hindutva in Madhya Pradesh as part of Congress campaign against BJP. Similarly, BJP has its roots in Arya Samaj, RSS and even Congress.
Our Constitution too carries these paradoxes — it bans cow slaughter (Article 48) along with providing social justice provisions (Article 340) and scientific temper is part of our fundamental duties (Article 51A). All of this may seem like irony of sorts but these complex power processes also make our democracy a stunteddemocracy that thrives on unreason and incivility.
BJP has trumped Congress at politics of caste and religion. By posing Hinduism as the greatest religion of all times and simultaneously framing Hinduism as a civil religion to mobilise Hindu solidarity beyond caste, BJP evokes a formidable sentiment of Hindu citizenship beyond caste. It is not anti-caste but it is ‘violently’ pro-Hindu and anti-Muslim. The only substantive politics that Congress and its intellectuals are banking on is mobilisation of OBCs against BJP, this is a difficult proposition in North India as BJP has successfully accommodated the Shudra castes in its party structure. A demand for caste census may polarise temporally but not necessarily help in the long run, and the politics of OBC representation needs to find some substantive universal discourse of sacrifice and recognition.
5. The frequent conflation of Hinduism and Hindutva has benefited the ruling party. It’s important to expose this conflation and tell people about the misuse of Hinduism for political purposes. In this line of thinking Hinduism is under attack whenever Hindutva is questioned. Ordinary Hindu need to be told that Hinduism is not under attack. Hindutva and Hinduism are different. Hindutva is a political ideology, while Hinduism is a religion. But political mobilization through this strategy may be difficult. This difference has meaning for the people who are well informed and understand Hindutva politics. It is true that the RSS-BJP take advantage of this confusion but to confront them on this issue won’t be easy. What will be the best possible course corrective measure to help convince the ordinary hindu regarding the differences in between hindutva and Hinduism? Is it an impossible goal?
This is not so simple. At times, Hindutva and Hinduism may seem synonymous to modernising Hindus or worse, Hindutva may seem better than Hinduism. The Shankaracharya of Puri slammed Bhagwat for his criticism of caste and varnashrama dharma and insisted these were a gift of Brahmins to India, something that the West should be taught to emulate. This clash of ideas between the Shankaracharya and Sarsanghchalak of RSS makes fresh to one’s mind the distinction between Hindutva and Hinduism that the known postcolonial scholar AshisNandy had thought of. While Nandy hoped for an end of Hindutva at the hands of Hinduism, the former has not only survived but grown leaps and bounds.
Caste constructs the Hindu habits of heart and they affect the formation of civil religion. A modern and free individual beyond caste is almost impossible and broader civic solidarity based on equality beyond religion and caste hierarchy my seem an anathema in Hinduism. Hindutva can be seen as a reformist movement too very much like Gandhianism and other reform movements. It mobilises religion for public goals and national purpose. Hindutva while constructing Hinduism as a civil religion also consistently re-writes meanings of Hinduism and its rituals, makes it incorporative, inclusive towards impure castes and simultaneously generate Hindu pride (not just caste pride) that is anti-Muslim.
The politics of enumeration in colonial times led to several smaller faiths, sects and cults being framed as part of Hindu religion. BJP has been making productive use of the labour of (majoritarian) Hindu reform movements to give a futuristic shape to Hinduism as a national religion where the majority embodies the nation and margins are meant for non-Hindu minorities. The pure and privileged gain more from politics and policies of Hindutva but the marginal castes too are increasingly drawn into the nationalist Hindu conscience.
6. How is the ideological machinery of the RSS overtly and covertly eliminates Congress ideology from India and Hindutva -ise India apart from changing history and eliminating curriculum ? What are the processes that they underwent so as to realise this?
We do not have enough studies on this and the problem is much larger here as far as education is concerned. Was the curriculum and history syllabus under Congress able to instil scientific temper and progressive public culture amongst Indians? The answer must be largely negative. Education is not seen as a social good and has mostly been viewed as a commodity. The utility of education is to get one economic and social mobility not to create a humane society. Children learn ‘culture’ at home and such culture is deeply rooted in ritual and superstition. In most of the world and India too education does not necessarily reform society, a lot depends on social movements and culture of publics.
We are at a juncture where even most educated argue that Ramayana and Mahabharata are not mythological texts. RSS and Hindutva have made most of our family and political culture, and the very nature and meanings of education in India by mixing religion and education so as to produce ‘cultured’ Hindu citizens who privilege rituals over reason and bigotry over compassion.
7. The RSS and the BJP were fervent adherents of the Varna system till the 1970s. However, they have effected a change in their position on it later. What are the exigencies that compelled RSS – BJP to effect a shift in their stance. Could you explain?
Even Gandhi was a supporter of Varna system. He changed considerably after facing the likes of Ambedkar but such change had limits. RSS and BJP thrive because they have changed and evolved too. Their cadres have worked to build support amongst adivasis and even outcastes. The have systematically cultivated Hindutva amongst Yadavs to counter the rise of regional caste parties like SP and RJD. The religious or social estrangement that shudra castes may have faced within Hinduism is being continually reversed by politics of Hindutva
Historically we see a mix of ideas in RSS, as far as caste and varna is concerned, there were some radicals like Savarkar who hoped that Hindus will become one race beyond caste as they inter-marry. What critics do not see is the labour RSS-BJP have put over last century to accommodate Shudras into the Hindutva fold and several OBCs have climbed the ladder within the party and the organisation. Caste is not a thing of past but RSS and BJP have a way beyond caste and their position has continually evolved to promote Hindu unity over caste separation. The persistent othering of Muslims in everyday life and politics has helped RSS-BJP in forging political unity amongst Hindus beyond caste.
Arvind Datar SA is a Senior Advocate in India whose practice is focused particularly on constitutional, commercial, taxation and regulatory laws, mainly before the Supreme Court of India. He also appears as counsel before various High Courts, statutory tribunals and in bilateral investment treaty and international commercial arbitrations.He started his legal career in 1980, as an Advocate in the Chambers of Mr. N. Natarajan, Senior Advocate, and Mrs. Ramani Natarajan. He later joined the office of M/s. Subbaraya Aiyer, Padmanabhan and Ramamani, where he practiced income tax and central excise/customs laws.Mr Datar set up independent practice in 1984 and appeared primarily before the Madras High Court on its original, appellate and writ sides. During this time, he was predominantly engaged in matters relating to income tax and central excise, customs and company law.He was designated as Senior Advocate by the Madras High Court in 2000.Mr Datar routinely appears before the Supreme Court of India in matters relating to constitutional, corporate, commercial, tax and regulatory laws. He also appears as Amicus Curiae appointed by the Supreme Court and various High Courts, to assist the court in matters on questions of constitutional and taxation laws. In this interview with ABHISH K. BOSE, Arvind P Dattar shares his opinion on the Constitution of India and other topical issues.
Excerpts from the interview
Abhish K Bose: Bibek Dibroy, Chairman of the Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister demanded that India needs a new constitution. In a newspaper article he maintained that “India no longer possess the Constitution India inherited in 1950. It has been amended, not always for the better, though since 1973 we have been told its ‘basic structure’ cannot be altered”. Mr Dibroy said that the current Constitution is largely based on the Government of India Act of 1935 and observes that it is part of colonial legacy. Does this point of view reflect the intent to formulate a new Constitution in the ruling dispensation? What are the likely motives underlying this proposal.? How do you respond to Dibroy’s views?
Ans. (i) It has become unfortunately fashionable to criticizing the Constitution on the ground that it is a part of a “colonial legacy”. The criticism is entirely misplaced. No doubt, the Constitution is based on the Government of India Act, 1935 but critics like Mr. Debroy should do more research before making such unjustified criticism.
(ii) It is often forgotten that there was a separate Drafting Committee to prepare our Constitution and which first met on August 20, 1947. It held meetings for 141 days. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar was the Chairman of this Drafting Committee. The initial draft was prepared by Sir B.N. Rau and had 243 Articles and 13 Schedules. Out of 11 Sessions of the Constituent Assembly, which began on November 26, 1949, four Sessions lasting for 114 days were devoted to the drafting of the Constitution alone. Members of the Assembly tabled a total of 7650 amendments and 2473 of them were actually moved and considered and the final draft of the Constitution was prepared with 395 Articles and 8 Schedules. The Drafting Committee consisted of intellectuals of the highest order. It is an insult to their memory to label the Constitution as a colonial legacy. The present Constitution is a result of intense debate and consideration and not a cut-copy-paste job.
(iii) It also cannot be labelled as a colonial Constitution, but it is,in fact a truly international Constitution. Our chapter on fundamental rights has adopted several provisions from the U.S. and other Constitutions. Part-IV on Directive Principles is derived from the Irish Constitution. Therefore, no serious student of the Constitution can call it as a colonial Constitution.
A Constituent Assembly of India meeting in 1950. B.R. Ambedkar can be seen seated top-right.
(iv) It is important to remember the speech of Dr. Ambedkar made on November 25, 1949, where he said that, after independence we will not have the excuse of blaming the British for things going wrongs because after independence and we have nobody to blame but ourselves.
(v) None of those who are criticizing the Constitution being part of a colonial legacy are able to point out even one provision which has been an impediment or a hurdle in achieving our core constitutional values of implementing the Directive Principles.
Abhish K. Bose: Article 14 of the Constitution that deals with fundamental rights states that “ the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection of the laws within the territory of India”. However, the laws including the Citizenship Amendment Act and other moves to exclude the religious minorities from the ambit of Constitutional guarantees are in violation of the letter and spirit of the article 14. On what ground can the CAA pass muster, given that Article 14 stands in the Constitution? What are the remedies enshrined in the Constitution if and when the State acts in contravention of Article 14, especially given that the judicial system in India is coming under increasing executive displeasure for its impartiality, case in point being the menacing statement by the former Minister of Law Mr. Rijuju that the Supreme Court is behaving like an opposition party?
Ans. (i) It is not only Article 14 but also other Articles that are equally important. I do not wish to comment on the statement about excluding religious minorities from the ambit of constitutional guarantee. In any Act, whether it is the Citizenship Amendment Act or any other law, violates the rights of minorities or the right to religious freedom given to all Indian citizens (including the majority), it will be struck down by the High Courts or the Supreme Court. Despite all odds, it is ultimately the judiciary which will ensure a protection of our fundamental rights and core constitutional values.
(ii) I do not wish to comment on the statement of the former Law Minister, Shri Kiren Rijiju.
Abhish K. Bose : According to the constitutional scholar, Prof Granville Austin, the Constitution of India has three distinct strands; namely, protecting and enhancing national unity and integrity, establishing the institutions of democracy and fostering social reform. Do you think that the enduring characteristics of these core features of the Constitution are in peril of being eroded at the present time?
Ans. (i) The enduring characteristics of our Constitution were in peril of being eroded earlier as well. Indeed, the enduring characteristics were actually eroded in the Emergency. The judgment in the case of Kesavananda Bharati rendered 50 years ago ensures that the basic features are not altered. Further, the core features of the Constitution can also be eroded at the Central and State level by daily defaults in governance. If the district judiciary and the local administration are not strengthened, our Constitutional guarantees will be in peril. For example, if vacancies in the lower judiciary are not filled, resulting in delay in considering bail applications, there is an erosion of the right to liberty of thousands of citizens.
Abhish K. Bose : Legal scholar G Mohan Gopal maintained that the Sangh Parivar is trying to establish the Hindu Rashtra by co-opting the judiciary. The evidences he adduced to reach this conclusion are instances of the overt or covert affinity to Hindutva ideology that Judges display in the professional and personal stances. How widespread is this trend in lower courts? If the Judges choose to have recourse to sources other than constitutionalist principles in adjudication, what happens to the commitment to ‘justice’ stated in the Preamble to the Constitution? What, if any, are the remedies available to citizens when justice for them happens to be short-changed due to ideological considerations or the self-abasement of officers of the judicial system before the Executive? Do you expect that the right to appeal against an unfair verdict could become meaningless if this trend gains ground?
Ans. (i) I have not seen the evidence adduced by Prof. Mohan Gopal. I have no knowledge of this trend in lower courts. It is dangerous to make far-reaching statements without empirical data particularly when India has 28 States and 140 crore people.
(ii) The present fourth question (Q. No. 4) proceeds on several surmises, conjectures and assumptions and it will not be proper on my part to answer this question unless the factual data is scrutinized,and concrete instances examined.
Abhish K. Bose : While a segment of the Judges are favouring theocratic influences in judicial pronouncements, shouldn’t prophetic voices become louder from among the legal fraternity to safeguard the Constitution? Given that judges tend to be conservative and un-confrontationist, do you expect this to happen in India? As of now, individual voices from the legal fraternity are heard sounding concerns in this regard. Do you expect this to die down?
Ans. (i) Once again, the fifth question is also based on assumptions. Which is the segment of judges favouring theoretical influence? Who are these judges and in which State is this happening? There are several judges, particularly in the High Court and the Supreme Court who have stood up and upheld constitutional values.
(ii) It is also wrong to label all judges as “conservative and non-confrontational”. It is important to note that judges have a duty to only interpret the law even if they do not agree with the policy of the ruling Government. Judges, in fact, have to be conservative and non-confrontational; they cannot be radical and have confrontations with the legislature. The role of the judiciary is only to interpret the law.
Abhish K. Bose : Corruption in judiciary is a matter of concern. The incident at the Kerala High Court, in which a lawyer allegedly received bribes from accused persons for getting favourable verdicts over the claim that the money is to be given to the judges handling the cases may have caught your attention. Apart from deviation from the Constitutional principles, corruption, including the lowering of judicial professionalism, in the judiciary is causing widespread concern. In your opinion, how widespread is this infection in the judiciary? What are the provisions to be put in place, according to you, to ensure that the corruption rampant in the society does not spread into the Judiciary?
Ans. Corruption is a matter of concern in all branches of life. There are allegations of corruptions in the judiciary and it is an issue which has to be tackled. There is no data as to how widespread this problem is in the subordinate judiciary or in the higher courts. The way to reduce and ensure that judiciary remains corruption free is to select the best possible judges at all levels. In particular, we must choose judges solely on merit and regardless of their political and other inclinations.
High Court of Kerala
Abhish K. Bose : Is judicial activism justify itself on occasions when the Executive fails to discharge its functions, as in the case of the on-going violence in Manipur where the State machinery seems to have broken down utterly. Do you think the Supreme Court, which is the custodian of the Constitution, was too slow in intervening in this matter? Also, do you think the Supreme Court should handle this matter more proactively and effectively? If you do, in what ways?
Ans. (i) I do not have details of the problems of Manipur. As I have not studied the Supreme Court orders on the Manipur issue, I should not offer comments. I can only say that it is not fair to expect the High Court and the Supreme Court to provide solutions to all problems facing our country.
(ii) India is a vast country and there are frequent clashes or problems relating to law and order. Will it be right on the part of the Supreme Court to start being proactive in all such cases? These are situations that should be handled only by the executive. The courts should be concerned only with non-compliance with statutory norms.
Abhish K. Bose : How do you view the role of the press, deemed the pillar of democracy? Has the journalist fraternity abandoned, barring rare exemptions, their duty to speak truth to power, in their eagerness to secure and enjoy the hugely profitable patronage of the powers that be? In the wake of the Executive’s determined bid to co-opt the media, and the mounting resentment of freedom of thought and expression, how can members of the media fraternity be expected to stay true to the integrity of their profession? Why is press freedom not an electoral issue, given that it is an issue of enormous significance for the health of democracy?
Ans. (i) There is a serious threat to the freedom of the press both electronic and digital. It is unfortunate that any criticism of the Government is not tolerated. It is unfortunate, that several journalists have had to face charges of sedition and were also booked under UAPA. The Supreme Court had to grant interim orders stating that no further action will be taken in cases relating to sedition. Sadly, this is not just an issue in India but freedom of the press is under threat in several countries.
(ii) It is important that our leaders realize that any criticism in the Press should be taken as valuable feedback and become the basis for course-corrections. A press that is expected to only sing praises of the Government will cause long-term damage to any republican democracy. Historically, suppressing or discouraging dissent has always been counterproductive.
Professor TT Sreekumar, a distinguished academic currently associated with the School of Interdisciplinary Studies at the English and Foreign Language University in Hyderabad, has an extensive teaching history. His experience extends to prestigious institutions such as the National University of Singapore and the Division of Social Sciences at HKUST, Hong Kong. Renowned for his contributions to the field, Professor Sreekumar authored “ICTs & Development in India: Perspectives on the Rural Network Society” (Anthem Books, London, 2011), highlighting his expertise in development and technology studies. Beyond his academic endeavours, he is a prolific writer and columnist in Malayalam, his mother tongue, having penned over 500 articles and authored or edited 18 books mostly concerning literature, society, history, culture and politics of Kerala, where he was born. His engagement with civil society organizations in India underscores his commitment to societal impact. Additionally, he is known for his insightful fortnightly column “Naalam Kannu” in the Madhyamam Daily, further cementing his status as a much respected voice in contemporary discourse.
In this long conversation with Abhish K. Bose Dr Sreekumar discusses the diverse challenges faced by the Kerala society, its renaissance, the social context of the emergence of Communism, its civil society, growing islamophobia among other issues.
Excerpts from the Interview
Abhish K. Bose: Given that the Kerala Renaissance movements achieved significant progress in overcoming entrenched caste-ist superstitions and promoted human dignity, yet the vestiges of these deep-seated beliefs continue to linger in Kerala’s society, evident in the resurgence of communal tensions at even minor provocations, can we consider the Kerala Renaissance to have been an incomplete social transformation, falling short in fully addressing and eliminating the enduring societal afflictions that transcend time and affect various communities?
TT Sreekumar :The term ‘Renaissance’, applied to the socio-cultural transformations that occurred in Kerala in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, was retrospectively coined in the 1970s to elucidate the ‘Kerala model.’ The Kerala Model refers to the unique socio-economic and developmental approach adopted by the successive governments in Kerala, characterized by high human development indicators. This model is distinguished by significant achievements in health, education, and social welfare, despite having a lower per capita income compared to other Indian states.Central to the Kerala Model is the state’s emphasis on equitable access to healthcare and education. Kerala boasts one of the highest literacy rates in India and a robust public health system that provides widespread, affordable healthcare. These achievements are underpinned by a long history of social reform movements, which have contributed to a more egalitarian social structure compared to other parts of India. The term Renaissance began to applied to these set of social reform movements as a teleological explanation of the Kerala model.
These movements, primarily anti-caste in nature, have historical roots predating colonialism, as evidenced in texts like ‘Thirunizhal Mala’ (13th century) , ‘PachalloorPathikam’ (14th century) and southern ballads (13th-18th centuries) which contain anti-caste and anti-Brahmanical sentiments. The intersection of internal anti-caste dynamics and external colonial influences catalyzed these social movements.Initially led by Dalits, these movements did not see significant participation from the upper castes, including the Nair Sudras, until the 1920s. The Nair Sudras, historically aligned with the Nambudiri Brahmins and forming a hegemonic group in Kerala, began embracing social equality ideals when their dominance was challenged by subaltern movements. However, this adaptation was more about retaining Sudra hegemony than genuine reform. Even today, this hegemonic alliance remains influential, dominating socio-economic spheres and manipulating policies, including reservation benefits, to their advantage.
The legacy of this alliance is evident in the rhetoric surrounding the Kerala Renaissance, which they claim to be the rightful heirs of. Despite this, caste-based discrimination, including honor killings and caste abuse, persist in Kerala. Discussing these issues is often seen as undermining the renaissance narrative, despite their prevalence. This hypocritical stance overlooks the fact that these movements were deeply rooted in Kerala’s history and utilized the opportunities presented by colonial modernity to advocate for social justice.The Sabarimala agitation, a recent example of this hegemony, showcased the alliance’s ability to mobilize and maintain social dominance. This movement, ostensibly about religious tradition, also reflected the underlying social power dynamics at play in Kerala. The agitation illustrated how the rhetoric of renaissance and social reform can be co-opted to maintain existing power structures, even when they contradict the principles of equality and justice that these movements originally stood for.
How does the current state of Communism in Kerala compare with that in China and Vietnam, considering the unique historical context of Kerala’s social transformation following the collapse of its matrilineal system, a process which some scholars liken to the social upheavals preceding the emergence of Communism in China and Vietnam? Additionally, in light of Kerala’s prolonged exposure to Communist governance, what factors contribute to the ongoing and evident social disparities within the state?
It is important to recognize that the matrilineal system in Kerala was not uniformly practiced across the region. Primarily, it was the Sudras and a section of the Ezhavas who adhered to this system, with its presence also observed in some subaltern communities. However, the prevalent notion that Kerala was entirely matrilineal is a misconception, largely stemming from the ideological dominance of the Nair caste. This misconception overlooks the diversity of social structures within Kerala and erroneously generalizes the practices of a particular caste as representative of the entire region. Such a perspective fails to accurately reflect the complex tapestry of cultural and social practices that have historically existed in Kerala.The transition from the matrilineal system in Kerala, predominantly practiced by Sudra Nairs and a section of the Ezhavas, played a crucial role in the state’s social dynamics. This system’s collapse was not an isolated phenomenon; rather, it was intricately linked to the wider social consciousness fostered by the subaltern classes’ reform movements. A progressive segment of Sudras and Nambudiri Brahmins, embracing the principles of caste equality and social justice, initially joined the Indian National Congress, transitioning later to Congress Socialists and Communists. They championed workers’ and peasants’ rights, transforming caste-based justice demands into class-based ones.
Dr TT Sreekumar, Professor at the School of Interdisciplinary Studies, The English and Foreign Languages University, Hyderabad.
In Kerala, the disillusionment with the matrilineal system, particularly among leaders, intersected with the influence of Dalit and subaltern movements. These leaders, while initially inspired by these movements, eventually appropriated their agenda, shifting the focus from a caste-based to a class-based approach. This strategic shift, while integrating Kerala into the broader Communist narrative, undermined the potency of anti-caste struggles. The emergence of Communism in Kerala in the 1930s, following the disintegration of the matrilineal social system, presents a distinct context compared to the historical backdrops of China and Vietnam. While the social upheavals in these countries, marked by civil war and the dismantling of Confucian bureaucracy, acted as precursors to Communism, Kerala’s path was different.This evolution in Kerala, however, presents a contrast to the large-scale class mobilization in China and Vietnam. The Communist mobilization in Kerala, influenced by sporadic struggles, was significant but did not mirror the extensive peasant and worker mobilizations led by Communist parties in China and Vietnam. The social hegemony of the Sudra-Nair alliance in Kerala remained largely unchallenged, unlike the systemic and revolutionary transformations in China and Vietnam.
Kerala’s experience as a sub-national entity within South Asia further differentiates its path from those of China and Vietnam. The state implemented substantial land reforms, yet these reforms, like those in communist China and Vietnam, were marked by inconsistencies, particularly in the exclusion of Dalits from land entitlements. Furthermore, Kerala’s trajectory, within the democratic and constitutional framework of India, diverges significantly from the authoritarian contexts of China and Vietnam. This difference has led to notable opposition in Kerala to neoliberal policies initiated by both leftist and centrist governments, a response that is distinct from the more controlled economic environments in China and Vietnam.The persistence of social disparities in Kerala, despite prolonged Communist influence, can be attributed to a complex interplay of historical, social, and political factors. The Communist movement’s adaptation of class-based politics, while influential, has not fully dismantled the entrenched caste-based social structures. Additionally, Kerala’s democratic context, allowing for a diversity of political and economic ideologies, has resulted in a multifaceted and sometimes contradictory approach to development and social justice. This complexity reflects the unique socio-political landscape of Kerala, distinct from the more uniform communist systems in China and Vietnam.
Considering the land reforms bill enacted by the coalition of Communist Party and Indian National congress aimed to reduce social disparities in Kerala, where a significant portion of land was controlled by higher caste members, to what extent do you believe these reforms achieved their intended visionary goals?.
The land reform bill implemented by the Communist Party- Indian National Congress- Muslim League coalition in Kerala was a significant step towards addressing social disparities, particularly in the context of land ownership predominantly held by higher caste members. However, evaluating the effectiveness of this reform reveals several complexities.Firstly, the initial formulation of the land reforms by Kerala’s first Communist ministry in 1957 was structured in such a way that its benefits were primarily directed towards the relatively well-off and middle-class tenants, predominantly from the Sudra, Christian, Muslim communities, and to a lesser extent, the Ezhava community.This outcome was facilitated by Kerala’s unique ‘relative class position’ within its feudal structure. Unlike many other Indian states with powerful landlords and zamindars, Kerala’s Sudra and Nambudiri landlords held more of an ideological hegemony and a somewhat limited monopoly over land. This made the land reform process comparatively feasible, especially with the post-independence constitutional framework and the prevalent anti-feudal, anti-caste sentiments and struggles in Kerala directed toward caste hegemony.However, a major oversight of the reform was its exclusion of Dalit and other subaltern castes, who were not the primary tenants of the land. These communities were largely marginalized in the reform process, receiving only limited housing allocations through a lengthy and procedural system. This oversight was exacerbated by the limited availability of land and the large number of tenants from Christian, Nair, and Muslim communities, which led to a land ceiling of 15 acres per family. Additionally, plantations were exempted from the land reform, further limiting its scope.
The reforms of the 1970s resulted in a predominance of small farm sizes in Kerala. While studies in Indian agriculture suggest that smaller farm sizes do not necessarily lead to decreased productivity, in Kerala, resistance to mechanization and demands for higher wages led to a reduction in productivity. This outcome was in stark contrast to the national agenda, where land reform was more successfully implemented in Kerala than in many other states.The unresolved issue of Dalit land ownership remained a critical concern, leading to demands for a second wave of land reforms to provide cultivable land to the landless Adivasis and Dalits. This demand became a focal point for Dalit and Adivasi land rights agitation in Kerala. The land reform in Kerala, while part of a broader national agenda and relatively successful in certain aspects, did not fully address the deep-rooted social disparities and left key issues, particularly concerning Dalit land rights, unresolved.
Recently, Kerala has witnessed the emergence of distinct women-led movements, such as ‘PenpillaiOrumai’, and others representing a cross-section of society. Could these initiatives signify women’s collective efforts to dismantle the patriarchal constraints within the state? Furthermore, do these movements hold the potential to effect a paradigm shift in the state’s political dynamics?
The ‘PenpillaiOrumai’ movement, which emerged from the women plantation workers in Munnar, Kerala, is a testament to the burgeoning assertion of women from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds against the prevailing patriarchal order. This movement stands out for its grassroots-level mobilization that brought to the fore the gendered dimensions of labor and exploitation. It signifies a shift from traditional feminist activism to a more inclusive and intersectional framework that takes into account class, caste, and gender.
However, the feminist movement in Kerala faces staunch opposition, not only from entrenched patriarchal norms but also from Savarna anti-feminist ideologies and the anti-feminist sentiments of religious fundamentalists spanning all faiths. These opposing forces create a complex battleground for feminist activists.The feminist movement in Kerala, as explored by scholars like Dr. J. Devika, is not a uniform force but a constellation of various strands and ideologies that have evolved over time. It presents a fragmented landscape within the civil society of Kerala, with no single entity holding sway over the feminist discourse. This heterogeneity is crucial, as it reflects the movement’s responsiveness to the multiplicity of issues and contexts within the state.The resilience of the patriarchal system in Kerala means that the struggle for gender equality is multifaceted and enduring. Feminist and queer movements, along with other new social movements, need to forge solidarities and continuously open new fronts against patriarchal institutions and the subtle patriarchal underpinnings that pervade state policies, political discourse, and civil society practices.
In this context, movements like ‘PenpillaiOrumai’ are not just isolated events but part of a larger wave of feminist activism that has the potential to reshape the political landscape of Kerala. The collective efforts of these movements could challenge and possibly alter the patriarchal status quo, leading to a reconfiguration of power dynamics within the state. The success of these movements in bringing about substantial political change will depend on their ability to maintain momentum, to unite a broad coalition of support, and to strategically navigate the complexities of Kerala’s social and political milieu.
As a scholar with a profound understanding of Kerala and its civil society, you must have noted the impact of the BJP-led Sabarimala agitation, triggered by the Supreme Court’s verdict on women’s entry, on Kerala’s societal fabric. This movement sounded the alarm on the intents of fascism and its advocates. Is it within the capacity of Kerala society to withstand future fascist incursions and reaffirm its commitment to the principles of the Renaissance? Can you contemplate the potential harm that fascist tactics might wreak upon the Renaissance ideals and the socio-political ethos of Kerala?
The Supreme Court’s verdict on women’s entry into Sabarimala is pivotal, asserting the primacy of constitutional morality over public morality. This distinction is vital for discerning the ethos of civil society. Hegel, in his ‘Outlines of the Philosophy of Right’, posits that individuals in civil society pursue their own objectives, often disregarding external considerations. Public morality may encompass ideological, religious, or secular ideologies. In contrast, legal ethics transcends these notions, serving as the arbiter of social conflicts and thereby regulating civil society.Chief Justice Dipak Misra underscored the supremacy of legal/constitutional morality. The court decreed that it is this constitutional morality which must steer the judiciary in appraising the legitimacy of a custom. Nonetheless, this stance is not without its complications. In a society with predominant religious views, the constitution may inevitably reflect some of that influence, potentially overlooking the rights of minority identities. Despite these intricacies, the core principle of the Supreme Court’s stance is commendable.
This leads to a dissenting view, as expressed by Justice Indu Malhotra, who contends that legal/constitutional ethics ought not to govern issues strictly of religious and faith-based nature, advocating for faith as the sole criterion. However, within the broader narrative of Kerala’s social history, and particularly in the Sabarimala discourse, the application of legal/constitutional ethics is crucial for advancing societal progress and upholding the principles of equality and justice enshrined in the constitution.In the early 1980s, the political terrain of Kerala saw the intensification of Hindutva politics. Capitalizing on the disaffection with the Emergency period and the impatience with the emergent neo-democratic resonances in regional politics, Hindutva proponents endeavored to establish a stronger presence within the political arena of Kerala. Despite a conducive environment for its proliferation, Hindutva politics struggled to gain traction, largely due to the burgeoning ideological force of neo-socialism within the state’s society.
The decades of the 1920s and 1930s were marked by Kerala’s experimentation with political innovation, a legacy that was mirrored in the 1980s and 1990s as the region embarked on another phase of democratic experimentation. This period was characterized by a surge in environmental activism, with heightened awareness and advocacy addressing ecological concerns. Concurrently, Dalit politics revitalized the discourse on caste consciousness, challenging the status quo and transcending the stagnation of preceding years. Feminist activism also gained momentum, seeking to transform public consciousness by vociferously challenging gender disparities, including those within political entities, and stimulating dialogue on essential structural, legal, and administrative reforms for the liberation of women.Furthermore, human rights advocates extended the scope of democratic politics, addressing a spectrum of issues from penal reform to the atrocities of custodial torture. These developments presented a formidable challenge to successive governments, signaling a period of intense political dynamism. The undeniable reality was that Kerala’s society was confronted with an imperative for self-rejuvenation—a transformative process that could only be realized through the acceptance and integration of these vigorous political movements.
It has been mentioned before that Renaissance is not Nostalgia. It is the dependability in approach to democracy and human rights. Renaissance is not a window that can be raised and lowered at will. It is not a one-size-fits-all agreement. Criticism is an integral part of its foundation. If the renaissance is not to remain condensed in history, there must be a politics that can see it continuously. This country has renewed itself under the pressures of old struggles. Its resonances echoed throughout the twentieth century. It was not because he always went to the memories of the Renaissance with a ghostly presence. To maintain the democratic tradition means to be ready for political and cultural reforms. We can find the right answer to the question of whether the Renaissance tradition is sustained by whether there is a fair approach to the concerns, ideals and aspirations of the new civil society.What is being heralded as a ‘renaissance’? What historical processes are embedded in it? Are all those processes similar? In my opinion ‘Kerala Revival’ is an ideological construct. It is not just a mere imitation of Eurocentric historiography. On the contrary, it was deliberately made to confirm the later concept of Kerala model in history. The Renaissance concept is made as a historical testimony to the imaginary creation of Kerala model by putting all the social advancements as a result of British rule and missionary work in the list of a single social process and giving the same face of upper caste reform to all the great Dalit advancements in Kerala.
The Kerala Renaissance is a mega-history made only to validate the Kerala model. Politics is not possible here without pretending to follow the concept of Renaissance heritage and its historical achievements. The caste struggles here are the result of Kerala society being opened up to an outside world that asks ‘caste? What is that?’ Renaissance as a discourse has now become an ideological construct that belies its complexities. It remains to be debated whether it is correct to abstract the efforts of reforming Brahminical ideology, Shudra politics against Brahminicalism, Dalit anti-caste struggles based on the awareness created by the British occupation and missionary work along with the historical forces of caste conflicts in feudal Kerala as part of the same historical process.
In your research on the Muslim community in Kerala, you have observed a noticeable increase in Islamophobia over the past ten years or more. Could you elaborate on the underlying causes of this rise in Islamophobia within the state?
In my explorations of Islamic popular culture and minority politics within Kerala, I have observed a discernible increase in Islamophobia over recent years. While some suggest that this is due to a rise in conservatism and militancy within the Islamic community in Kerala, there is no substantial evidence to firmly substantiate such claims. Instead, it appears that the roots of Islamophobia may lie elsewhere.The phenomenon of Islamophobia in Kerala may, in part, be linked to the socioeconomic transformations experienced by the Muslim community, particularly due to the significant labor migration to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. This migration has not only improved the economic standing of many Muslims in Kerala but has also introduced new cultural and religious influences.
The increasing Islamophobia in the state seems to be fuelled by a resistance to the accumulation of cultural and economic capital within the Muslim community as a result of this Gulf migration. Islamophobia is exhibited in various ways, with one of the most insidious being the selective targeting of specific factions within the diverse Muslim community. Accusations and critiques are often leveraged against groups like SDPI, Jamaat-e-Islami, Salafi organizations, Samastha, and even the Muslim League, under the guise of political critique but often represent a broader sentiment of Islamophobia.Furthermore, the participation of ordinary Muslims in new social movements has been co-opted by state mechanisms and their defenders to disparage these movements as extremist. This has led to a situation where the average Muslim individual can be easily miscast as an extremist, contributing to a pervasive atmosphere of mistrust and discrimination. This insidious form of Islamophobia poses a significant challenge to the social fabric of the state, impeding the collective journey towards a more inclusive and tolerant society.
The rise in Islamophobia in Kerala seems to be precipitated by a resistance to the Muslim community’s augmented cultural and economic influence, which itself is a by-product of these migration patterns. Islamophobia manifests in a variety of expressions, one of which is the strategic targeting of specific sects or groups within the Muslim community. Often disguised as political critique, these attacks typically generalize and misrepresent the community’s diverse perspectives.Organizations such as SDPI, Jamaat-e-Islami, Salafi groups, Samastha, and even the Muslim League find themselves at the center of continuous criticism. This form of Islamophobia is pervasive and often implicates the entire community through the vilification of select groups. Moreover, the involvement of ordinary Muslims in broader social movements can be misappropriated by state proponents to delegitimize these movements by branding them as extremist. This stigmatization risks the Muslim individual being wrongly identified with religious extremism, thereby exacerbating the climate of Islamophobia in Kerala and hindering progress towards a cohesive and equitable society.
Does the current political landscape of the state require a transformative approach to effectively combat the modern-day threats, including the menace of fascism, and to recover from the prevailing political deterioration?
The social fabric of Kerala is currently experiencing significant fissures. A series of troubling events, from harrowing caste-related killings to the surge in students seeking education abroad, are indicative of a deepening political malaise. This pervasive sense of tragedy is rooted in historical grievances and revolutionary zeal, reflecting a collective disquietude about departures from an idealized vision of Kerala—a vision that, while nebulous, is fervently cherished.The interpretation of these societal challenges often leads to a sense of alienation among Keralites, as if they are strangers within their own transforming state. There exists a pronounced tendency to vilify historical epochs, notably those referred to as the Renaissance, and a concurrent inability to comprehend contemporary issues outside the Renaissance paradigm. This dichotomy places considerable stress on the social psyche of the people.Dominant religious ideologies across India that advocate for caste pride, combined with the negation of Dalit autonomy, rising Islamophobia, appropriation of historical narratives, and a dismissive attitude towards history, have been persistently operative in Kerala. Yet, a prevailing reluctance to acknowledge these elements under the guise of Renaissance disdain has been the norm. The societal distress is palpable in the public discourse, marked by a disconcerting realization that casteism is resurging, that honorkillings and human sacrifices are not merely relics of the past but present realities—contrary to the collective denial or ignorance that once prevailed.
In reflecting on the historical trajectory of Kerala, it is imperative to acknowledge the significant yet often overlooked socio-ideological evolution between 1900 and 1950, particularly the ascendancy of upper caste-Shudra ideology. The impact of this ideological evolution on shaping subsequent social dynamics in Kerala is considerable. Despite not achieving mainstream dominance, upper-class ideology retained a firm grasp on the logic governing social processes. Robin Jeffrey’s title “The Decline of Nair Dominance” might be seen as somewhat of a misnomer, as it does not encapsulate the full complexity of the book’s content.The Namboodiri-Sudra hegemony in Kerala transcends economic and cultural dominance, representing an ideological supremacy that cannot be adequately captured by the notion of ‘decline’. In contrast to North India, where Brahminism’s ideology and political power were directly linked, in Kerala, this power was upheld by the Nairs—Shudras. The permeation of colonial modernity and the Dalit movements of the 19th century, which could not be entirely suppressed, prompted the upper classes to adopt the guise of progressivism expeditiously. This period saw many from the upper echelons who earnestly sought social reform.
During the 1890s, this led to a strengthening of upper caste reform as part of the ‘Renaissance’ movement. Literary and scholarly works, from Chanthumenon’s “Indulekha” to Chattambiswami’s interpretations of Vedic texts and ancient Malayalam, emerged as critiques of Brahmanical ideology. By the early 20th century, these upper classes began to consolidate a new form of power under the banner of caste reform, with Brahmins conceding to Shudra leadership within this recalibrated social hierarchy. This shift facilitated the persistence of caste consciousness, conservative orthodoxy, and micro-level Hinduism, effectively circumventing the progress made in the 19th century.The agendas advanced by these movements, which ranged from the near complete marginalization of Dalits to the propagation of Islamophobia, paved the way for right-wing movements. These movements, gaining popular acceptance, have retrogressively steered the Kerala community and imbued it with Hindutva politics, thus undermining the social advances previously made.
In the 1970s, Kerala saw the emergence of various social movements, encompassing environmental, anti-caste, gender equality, and human rights campaigns. These movements infused the state with the ethos of neo-socialism, piercing through the entrenched cultural norms and challenging the influence of the right-wing majority. Retrospectively, Kerala’s contemporary history appears to be characterized by instances where religious conservatism has frequently prevailed.The Sabarimala controversy served as a pivotal moment, reigniting a critical awareness and forcing a reckoning with past periods of inaction, particularly those reminiscent of the early eighties. The entrenchment of right-wing conservatism, which fundamentally opposes democratic values within Kerala—a state with a significant presence of left-wing and Congress parties—demands serious attention and cannot be trivially dismissed or denied.
Does the conversation suggest that reshaping civil society in Kerala is challenging and that the state is ill-prepared to confront the fascist elements within the nation?Does this signify a comprehensive breakdown of institutions and governance in the state? Is the erosion of the Kerala model leading to a cultural, economic, and political crisis within the state?
This should not be interpreted to mean that Kerala has been stripped of the fundamental politics of social justice and the ethical principles that have been the bedrock of its cultural norms. Nonetheless, it is concerning when dominant social tendencies undergo a transformation, and opposing ideologies gain momentum, particularly if such changes are ignored due to a misplaced sense of renaissance triumphalism. The paradox of individuals espousing progressivism while the society collectively leans towards conservatism is particularly alarming.This shift signifies a diminishing of the politics historically associated with the renaissance ideal. It highlights a situation where the defense of liberties is increasingly pursued by individuals in prolonged legal battles, lacking the support of democratic institutions. This situation underscores a pivotal moment in Kerala’s history, where the commitment to progressive values must be reevaluated in the face of rising conservative tides.
Kerala can no longer rely solely on the perceived legacy of a Renaissance to guide its progress. This legacy has evolved into a double-edged sword—a collective agreement that simultaneously undermines itself through pragmatic betrayals. While the narrative of the Renaissance in Kerala has historic validity, it is crucial to acknowledge that ‘Renaissance’ is an ideological construct, not merely a replication of Eurocentric historiography, but a political framework that has underpinned the historical conception of the Kerala model. The socio-political changes spurred by medieval anti-aristocratic movements, British colonialism, and missionary endeavors in South India are diverse and cannot be conflated into a single narrative, yet they were instrumental in forging the narrative of the Kerala model. Kerala’s commitment to the evolving democratic ethos of neo-socialism cannot be sustained by clinging to an overarching historical memory of a renaissance.
Presently, the superficial agreement observed in Kerala’s approach to LGBTQ politics, caste abolition, environmental stewardship, and minority rights often belies an undercurrent of reluctance and resistance. The growing influence of right-wing conservatism is exerting pressure on the general consensus previously established by neo-socialism. It is becoming evident that the state is drifting away from the ethical principles of human fraternity and social justice championed by figures such as Sree Narayana Guru and VaikuntaSwamikal.
The contemporary challenges faced by Kerala cannot be resolved by mere retrospection into the Renaissance era. The vital historical lesson here is the necessity for political and cultural reform, especially in an era where global capital is fostering an opportunistic nexus between neoliberalism and fascism. It is against this global backdrop that the defeat of neoliberal forces and the insidious rise of right-wing orthodoxy becomes imperative. The reunification of democratic forces stands as the sole viable strategy in this context, rejecting the confines of sectarianism.
The aspirations of the new civil society and the realization of neo-sociality’s ideals are fundamental to crafting a new vision for Kerala, transcending the nomenclature of the renaissance. This arduous task spans from penal reform to the re-democratization of institutions, prompting introspection about our integrity and commitment to these values. The potential of constructing a future Kerala that honors its rich historical legacy hinges on the successful internal struggle to reclaim and revitalize the values of neo-sociality.
Oleksandr Svitych is an Associate Professor at the Jindal School of International Affairs. His research interests lie at the intersection of political economy, critical theory, and political philosophy. Oleksandr was born and raised in Ukraine. He pursued higher education in Ukraine, Hungary, and Singapore. Prior to moving to India, he worked in the development sector for a Danish NGO in the Ukraine’s Donbas region. While there, he also ran a taekwon-do club for the local kids of his hometown Sloviansk. While Oleksandr has developed a cosmopolitan outlook, he remains firmly rooted in his homeland. In a bit of serendipity, he happened to move to India just a few days before Russia invaded his country.Besides social sciences, Oleksandr finds meaning in martial arts, philosophy, and his family. They reside in Sonipat, Haryana. In this interview with ABHISH K. BOSE, he discusses the Russia – Ukraine war and the damages of it in the economy of the countries and other related developments.
Excerpts from the interview
Abhish K. Bose: In the book “The Rise of the Capital-state and Neo-Nationalism: A New Polaniyan Moment” you argue that populist nationalism emerged as a reaction to the pro-market structural changes in the political economies of nation-states. You claim that there is a link between free market reforms, declining state legitimacy, and identity-based mobilization. You also saythat discontented voters are pulled toward populist nationaliststo cope with their insecurities generated by the state restructuring. How did these dynamics play out in the case of India? Is this how BJP rose to power in 2014 and 2019?
Svitich: In the book, I draw on the ideas of the Austro-Hungarian political economist Karl Polanyi from his famous book The Great Transformation. Polanyi made several important insights on the relationship between the state, market, and society, backing his claims with rich amount of anthropological and historical evidence. Firstly, there is no such thing as the complete “free market.” The market needs concrete institutional and legal arrangements for it to operate, which historically have been provided by the state. Secondly, the market economy is only one possibility for organizing human activity, albeit it has crowded out other alternatives. In contrast to classical economists, there is nothing natural or “rational”about the desire to barter or strive for profit. Humans can be productive through other motivations, such as social recognition, social standing, occupational pride, or a sense of solidarity. Thirdly, state attempts to promote the free market generate strains in society and lead to counter-movements to protect people’s livelihoods from the market forces. These observations are especially pertinent in the era of neoliberal globalization that we are living in today. In the book, I explore how these dynamics played out in different national contexts and generated populist nationalism – both on the Right and the Left of the political spectrum – as a form of Polanyian counter-movement.
Regarding the case of India, my cautious estimation is that a similar framework can be applied yet it must accommodate the specificities of the Indian society, politics, and culture. In fact, quite a number of researchers have applied Polanyi’s ideasto the Indian context. Some focused on the neoliberal restructuring of the Indian state since the 1990s as an example of Polanyian “great transformation.” Others analyzed a myriad of counter-movements – both at the grassroots and state levels – that these changes generated, ranging from fights to reclaim the land, to labour movements, to farmers’ protests, to environmental campaigns, and so on. Yet others charted the links between the structural changes in the Indian political economy and the rise of right-wing populism, most notably exemplified by the Bharatiya Janata Party.There’s a lot of excellent work on these themes done by scholars like Ajay Gudavarthy, Ashoka Mody, Christophe Jaffrelot, Partha Chatterjee, Rahul Verma, and Sarbeswar Sahoo, to name a few.
There’s a consensus among academics to classify BJP as a “populist” party despite different interpretations of the term “populism.”What is unique about this case is that it illustrates how populism can be combined with religious nationalism to offer an irresistible cocktail for voters. My intuition is that political economy indeed contributed to the electoral success and persistence of BJP. There’s certainly a correlation between liberalisation of the Indian economy and the appeal of BJP’s message to the public. The class politics are alive and well in the Indian society. At the same time, India’s distinct institutional legacies must be factored in – post-colonialism, the role of caste, and statism, for instance. In addition, India has come up withvarious responses to neoliberalization of its economy and society, sometimes quite creative ones.I would therefore refrain from drawing a direct connection between state transformation and neo-nationalism, especially that more data are needed. And yet the general tendencies, on the surface, are remarkably similar to what we observe elsewhere across the globe. In other words, there is roomboth for similarity and contextual specificity in the Indian case.
Q. The war in Ukraine has devastated the country, isolated Russia from the West, and fuelled economic insecurity around the world. The embargoes and sanctions have affected Russian oil trade. Could you assess the financial burden the war brought onto the people of Russia and how it affected their standards of living, including health, education and food? What is your projection for future?
I am not an economist by training, and thus cannot estimate with precision the impact of Russia’ criminal war against Ukraine onto Russian citizens.And all future projections are futile, of course. I am much more informed about the situation in Ukraine. However, based on the information that I receive both from the Russian sources (by virtue of knowing the language) and foreign ones, the Russian economy does not perform well. This should not come as a surprise as the war disrupted Russia’s economic, business and financial ties with the world, as you pointed out, and put pressure on people’s ability to make both ends meet. Still, I’d like to balance this narrative by several crucial observations.
Firstly, there’s enough evidence that Russia is managing to manoeuvre its way around the sanctions regime, albeit not entirely. This is done via either trade and military ties with China and Iran, for instance (and probably will be done via the expanded BRICS club), or intermediary companies to bypass sanctions, or smuggling activities as in Kazakhstan. Secondly, some Russians have certainly benefited from the war, materially speaking. And here I am less interested in the Russian oligarchs whose wealth mushroomed through military contracts with the state. I am talking about the Russian soldiers who choose to fight in Ukraine in the hope to reap lucrative bonuses from the state – and pay off their mortgages. This is a sort of a Russian roulette: you either die or get rich. Thirdly, we should not underestimate the effect of Russia’s obscene propaganda which targets the audiences both at home and abroad. Domestically, the narratives of “national greatness,” “fighting Nazis,” and “defending Russian values” obfuscate economic hardships. This combination of material and symbolic rewards is an explosive mix that helps sustain loyalty to the Putin regime.
Finally, the foreign aspect of Russia’s propaganda and disinformation campaigns is related to your first question on populist nationalism. I disagree with researchers who describe Putin as “populist” in the period before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He is and was part and parcel of the elite, which is the complete opposite of being a populist who blames the elites for leaving the people behind. Now, however, I think Putin can be described as a transnational populist as part of his overall political persona. He taps skillfully into the anti-western and de-colonial sentiments in the countries of the so-called Global South. It is ironic how an authoritarian and an imperialist like Putin flirts with leftist ideas of anti-colonialism and anti-neoliberalism. Unfortunately, his narrative – propagated by Russia’s propaganda machine –does seem to gain traction among former colonies, including India. What needs to be remembered, however, is that Russia is one of the most neoliberal and unequal countries in the world, while Ukraine has been on the receiving end of its imperialist politics for decades, if not centuries.
After the flower-laying ceremony on National Unity Day, Vladimir Putin speaks with representatives of civil society and youth organisations. (Photo via Kremlin)
Q. According to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2022 was a bad year for the Russian economy. It is estimated that in 2022, Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) dropped by 2.1%. Russia’s economy may continue to shrink in 2023. Its GDP is forecast to decline by 2.5% in the worst-case scenario (OECD) or by 0.2% according to the World Bank. Going by the statistics,the economy is going down. Do you agree with this assessment?
I think my response to the previous question largely covers this. I will add that we need to be cautious with “objective” assessments like these ones as they do not, and cannot, completely reflect realities on the ground. Overall, I think it’s prudent to take a middle stance between two extreme positions: the inevitable collapse of Russia’s economy and, vice versa, the infinite strength of its regime.
Q. What was the driving force behind the Russian invasion of Ukraine? What was the political advantage Putin and the Russian elites envisioned when they ordered the aggression? Do you think they overestimated its benefits?
In the question of the driving force behind the invasion, I have tried to cover it elsewhere for the Indian audience, so I will largely and briefly repeat myself. I have also already touched upon this in the previous questions. The main reason for the invasion is Russia’s aggressive imperialism. In fact, Putin has been quite explicit about this, comparing himself to the Russian historic figures like Peter the Great and Catherine the Great who “collected lands.” His pseudo-historical essay on the eve of the invasion makes it abundantly clear that Putin, in the good old KGB tradition, is paranoid about the so-called “project Anti-Russia.” This, in his erroneous view, justifies bullying its sovereign and peaceful neighbours.
Putin has denied the existence and identity of Ukraine for years, treating it as his “sphere of influence” and interfering into Ukraine’s domestic politics long before the country officially adopted pro-EU and pro-NATO trajectories. This is why he was so adamant to blame Lenin, by the way: for him Lenin had committed a grave error by allowing a degree of national self-determination for the Soviet republics. All Russia’s criminal policies in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine seek to erase all traces of the Ukrainian identity – by abducting children, forcing the Russian language, giving away Russian passports, or torturing dissenting locals. This is provided they had not been killed earlier by Russian rockets, missiles, bombs, and drones.
A repeated claim I keep hearing from some researchers, students, and Indian common people, such as taxi drivers or street vendors, is that this is a proxy war between Russia and the US, or Russia and NATO. India’s political establishment seems to share this view, at least rhetorically. More ironically, the overwhelming majority of Indian leftists, including prominent figures like Arundhati Roy, do the same.This is a flawed and a very dangerous stance. Empirically speaking, there’s plenty of evidence that Russia’s alleged security concerns about NATO expansion were not the reason behind the invasion. To mention just one, the 2022 escalation, to remind the readers, was preceded by an 8-year-long Russia-ignited war in the Donbass and the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014. These, in turn, were justified by Putin as a reaction to the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity which ousted pro-Russian president Yanukovych and, in Putin’s view, was nothing but a U.S. orchestrated coup d’état.
The Russia-NATO argument is not only wrong, but is also politically dangerous for several reasons. It denies the agency of Ukraine and Ukrainians. It ignores the fact that empires do not come only from the West. And it fans anti-western and NATO-sentiments instead of mobilizing solidarity with the oppressed Ukrainian people.
Q. Is Russia getting any monetary or other support from any country in the wake of sanctions against it?
I’m not aware of any direct financial support. And if there is one (for instance, from China), the Russian state will do its best to conceal this information from public. Other examples are better known, like receiving military assistance from Iran and North Korea. Also, while China does not openly supply weapons to Russia for its war against Ukraine, it may be secretly selling some components. Finally, in my view, the recent expansion of the BRICS club should be viewed as another opportunity for Russia to steer away from the sanctions regime.
Q. The Russia-Ukraine war has passed six hundred days. As a Ukrainian academic, what do you think will be the lasting vestiges of the war and its ramifications in theUkrainian and Russian economies? How long will it take for both the economies to resuscitate from the damages?
I am a Ukrainian academic by birth but not by affiliation. That said, of course I remain very must invested emotionally and morally into my own country. If you permit, I’ll shift the focus away from the economy (except one comment in the end) as we’ve talked quite a bit about it. Other vestiges of the war will reverberate for years and decades to come: colossal damage to Ukrainians in terms of lost lives, displaced people, destroyed infrastructure, contaminated territory (Ukraine hasthe biggest number of landmines in the world), and polluted environment. And these are just the material effects. On a bit more optimistic note, the war has forged and consolidated Ukrainian national identity. It is also an opportunity to steer the country’s socio-economic development in a more socially just manner. This will become especially important as Ukraine embarks on the path of reconstruction upon. In this regard, there are some important advocacy campaigns and proposals launched by the Ukrainian leftists, such as cancellation of the foreign debt, which I totally support.On the international scale, the war will be a reminder of the fragility about the global security architecture and the need to reform the UN Security Council. It will be also a stark warning about the dangers of “whataboutism” where, in a twisted manner, references to the injustices conducted by powerful nations in the past (such as the US) can be used strategically to fuel the sense of imperial nostalgia, status frustration, andnational greatnessby others (such as Russia).
(Image shared by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Ukraine.)
Q. India has apparently initiated a shift in its foreign policy by favouring Israel instead of Palestine in the Israel-Hamas war. Is this a shift from the country’s conventional foreign policy stand and the stanceit adopted for the purpose of realpolitik? Is this the appropriate stance?
By “shift” you must be referring to India’s abstention to condemnunequivocally Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. There are several reasons why India has taken a clearer stance on the Israel-Hamas war. India still wants to see itself as an ally of the US, which is Israel’s key partner. There is a sizeable Indian diaspora in Israel. Also, condemning the terrorist Hamas is in line with the Indian government’s tough stance on terrorism allegedly emanating from the training camps in Pakistan. Lastly, as highlighted repeatedly in the media, there is a personal affinity between Narendra Modi and Benjamin Netanyahu. In my opinion, the source of this affinity is ideological and comes from similar right-wing majoritarian politics.At the same time, if India clams to be the voice of the Global South, as it has tried to be, it must remember to acknowledge the voice of Palestine in the longer Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Q.What do you think about the future of the Russia-Ukraine confrontation? How long will it last according to your perspective?
I’ll be very laconic here. The war will end with Ukraine’s victory and Russia’s defeat.
Sanjay Hegde is a senior advocate at the Supreme Court of India. He is a leading voice on civil rights. He was one of the two amicus curie appointed by the Supreme Court to assist the Court in the 2012 Delhi gang rape and murder. He was also an interlocutor appointed by the Supreme Court of India to talk to the protestors at Shaheen Bag. On 27 October 2019, Hegde’s twitter account was suspended for posting an anti-authoritarian image.He filed a petition in the Delhi High Court against the suspension of his account by Twitter. In its filing before the HC, Government of India has contended that suspension of Hegde’s account by Twitter violates law on free speech. Earlier, Government had said that it has nothing to do with Sanjay Hegde’s account suspension. In an Exclusive interview with Abhish K. Bose, he discusses a number things including the setback to the victims in the Gujarat riots case, the long detention of Malayali journalist Siddique Kappen and other issues of importance.
Excerpts from the interview
Abhish K. Bose : On June 26, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal filed by Zakia Jafri against the order of the Gujarat High Court, challenging the rejection of the protest petition filed against the Special Investigation Team’s final report on allegations of a “larger conspiracy at the highest level” in Gujarat riots case. How do you evaluate this particular case with reference to the cases of communal riots in Gujarat. Is justice to the victims of communal riots which happened in Gujarat an unrealized deal in India?
Sanjay Hegde – In law, the Supreme Court may have had its reasons for ruling that there was evidence of a conspiracy at high level or not. That is a question of fact and the Court could have come to any conclusion. Towards the end of the judgement when the Court made observations about Teesta Setalvad which were almost an invitation to the government to arrest Ms Setalvad and former Gujarat DGP RB Sreekumar. That was totally unwarranted. It was beyond the scope of the proceedings. In fact they had put a target, upon people who had helped, victims to try and secure justice within the system. This is unprecedented. Justice to victims of communal riots is not an easy thing to achieve, because mobs are sometimes faceless, sometimes leaderless, and a conspiracy at the higher levels may be suspected, but may not be adequately proven in a court of law.
Activist Teesta Setalvad
Based on the records the Court could have ruled either way that there was evidence or not evidence of conspiracy. It should have confined itself to that question. It went further and created offences against those who even tried to seek justice for the victims. That was totally wrong. Communal riots will not happen unless the administration of the day allows it to happen. You may have communal incidents, but for a matter to go on into a full fledged riot which takes days to settle down, that will not happen unless the administration including the police are instructed to allow them to happen. Those who suffer are very often the very poor who cannot actually set the law in motion. So I don’t think that absolute justice for every victim of a communal riot was ever achieved through the Indian legal system in the past. The point however is that very occasionally when there is evidence of a higher up actually leading mobs. There are incidents like that in Delhi riots when Sajjan Kumar got convicted. There may be a sense of closure.
Do you think the situation would have been different if a Congress government was in the centre instead of the BJP government?
The Congress government was in the centre for ten years after the riots occurred and if they did not secure a verdict at that point of time who is to blame?.
The two activists who tried to selflessly help the victims in the riots case Teesta Setalvad and former DGP RB Sreekumar were framed in a case. There is an anxiety regarding their safety?
For the moment they have been set free on bail. I don’t know how long the prosecution in Gujarat will continue but no doubt they have adequate legal advice. What made the cases very difficult at the trial court and the high court stages were the observations of the Supreme court itself in the Zakia Jafri matter and there after a subsequent bench of SC granted them bail. They have indicated that those observations may not be taken in the right spirit by the investigating agencies.
Isn’t the legal hassels which Ms Setalvad and Mr Sreekumar are put through will act as a deterrent for those in similar cases?
What happened to Teesta and Sreekumar might deter others to stand up in future in similar cases and it might even be cited as a precedent.
There are widespread complaints that the Right to Information Act is being sabotaged and information sought by the public is not provided by the bureaucracy citing exceptions. Let us remember Justice Bhagwathi’s words, ” the citizens’ right to know the facts, the true facts, about the administration of the country is thus one of the pillars of a democratic state. But this important role people can fulfil in a democracy only if it is an open government where there is full access to Information in regard to the functioning of the government”. Is the RTI Act in the process of destruction by the state?
I would think that the RTI Act is in the process of destruction. The Act itself is being hollowed out. People who are appointed to the Information Commission are directed to deny information on one ground or other. Recently when an Information Commissioner was retired people put up in social media that he had not allowed a single case. I am not sure whether that is true or not but it indicates the general reception of the Information Commissioner and the perception in the public mind that the Act is now reduced to a dead letter in actual practice.
The biggest issue which the judiciary confronts in India is the huge backlog of cases. The legal dictum that ‘denial of ‘timely justice’ amounts to the denial of ‘justice’ itself is a thorn in the justice system. Timely disposal of cases is inevitable to maintain rule of law and provide the fruits of justice, which is lacking in the current judicial system. Do you agree? Do you have any solutions to tackle this?
The biggest litigant in the judicial system is the government itself and often it is the one government department fighting the another. There should be very good reasons why any government department is compelled to bring things to Court. Unless the government puts the whole house in order, it is difficult to take away to provide ordinary citizens with access to justice. Second point is that there are not enough pre – litigation procedures which would deter matters that would actually brought up before the judge. Judicial time is very valuable. Matters are prosecuted simply because there is not much resort to pre – bargaining, there is not enough deference given to prosecutors and whether it is better to the accused to plead guilty in exchange for a lower sentence thus avoiding a trial altogether. Alternative mechanisms outside the Court are not being used enough. Thirdly, there is no punishment in monetary terms also for unnecessarily dragging matters to the Court. Also there doesn’t seem to be any litigation impact assessment before laws are passed. For instance, many many courts are simply overwhelmed with check bouncing cases. Ideally a bounced check is a civil debt which has not been paid. Rather than treating it as a civil liability with increased interests as a deterrent against non-payment, it has been criminalised and caused a logjam in the system.
It is very easy to pass laws, but it should also be seen whether the practice of those laws will clog the system with further delay. Right now the government is talking about reforming the criminal law and not only intends to change the numbers of the sections, but is changing concepts itself. This is all being done in the name of de-colonization. But the unfortunate part is that if these bills become Acts as they currently stand you will throw away nearly a hundred years of judicial interpretation along with it as far as the old laws are concerned. It is a bit like saying that Railways were brought into India by the British therefore they had a colonial legacy, therefore we must start digging up the tracks and we will have our own railway. The consequence would have been tremendous. You have to change the signaling system, the locomotives and everything. It is just not worth the aggravation. Just like a headline . our executives love grand ideas without any thinking of its implementation.
Malayali journalist Siddique Kappen was arrested and imprisoned on 2020 October while on his way to report on Hathras rape case in UP and the Supreme Court granted him bail only on September 9th 2022 almost two years after the arrest. In the meantime the moves to secure bail for Kappen ended up futile curtailing the fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution. According to the article 32 which guarantees every person fundamental rights says a person has the right to directly approach SC if the rights are violated. Despite approaching the Courts on numerous occasions his case was not considered and he was released only on 2023 February. Isn’t Kappen’s case a travesty of justice in which he was arrested on the way of discharging his job and kept in jail for more than two years in stark violation of the fundamental rights of a person?
Siddique Kappen’s arrest was a travesty of justice and in fact there was nothing against him. The poor fellow happens to share a cab with some people against whom there may or may not have been something. But at that point of time the local government was determined to keep journalists out and any journalist who gets arrested becomes a cause in media. The government and administration came to double down on the accusation, and tried to keep Mr Kappen inside the jail as long as possible so that the public at large thought that there was some case to answer. In fact even what is happening in the matter of News Click is also of the same kind. It is a bit disappointing that Courts did not immediately see through the game or wilfully turned a blind eye to it. Siddique kappen should not have approached the SC under Article 32. Because the matter was pending before the SC, probably the lower Courts were inhibited in passing orders for bail. The SC could have ask some pertinent questions and then sent it back through the process of Courts of first instance. The matter was allowed to linger on, elaborate arguments were made at the SC, which all have to be considered and that added to further delay.
Journalist Siddique Kappan shows a thumbs-up sign after being released from the Lucknow district jail after over two years under the charges including UAPA and Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), in Lucknow. (ANI Photo)
Is there no legal solution to avoid such gross violation of justice similar to that of those meted out to Mr Kappen ?
The solution would be is that the Court of first instance has to have the same confidence and the same authority with which the SC asks questions and they should have a reasonable guarantee that they would not be easily overturned in appeal. Very often the trial courts are assumed to be overawed by the executive especially in cases which have attracted media attention. So there is an undue deference to the prosecution case which could otherwise have been avoided. If prosecution are not asking tough questions at the Courts of first instance the matters tend to prolong within the system. That is not healthy for a democracy.
According to the Supreme Court in the St Xavier’s College Judgment of 1974, a secular state is ” neither anti – God, nor pro God; it treats alike the devout, the agnostic and the atheist. It eliminates God from matters of State and ensures that no one shall be discriminated against on the grounds of religion” . While this is the expressed stand of the SC vis a vis religion and God. Is it proper to invoke or use religious symbols at the functions of the State. The question alludes to PM Modi receiving ‘Sengol’ from the priests on the occasion of the launch of the new parliament building which is exclusively a State function?
India’s secularism is not an anti God version or a strict separation of Church and State on the French model. It employs an equal distance from all religions. It neither favours one religion nor disfavours the other. Now at the opening of parliament there had been a reception to artefacts from various parts of the country. You could have add a Sengol, a cross or some other artefact from the Muslim community or others. If they were equally respected and equally received there may not have been a problem. Right now only receiving the Sengol and installing it ceremonially as a Sengol would run against India’s principles of secularism. If that same artefact was received by Nehru, who treated it as a golden walking stick and sent it to a museum. It was not sacralised. Sacralising artefacts from only one religion, even if it is from the majority community that is problematic.
The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights( ICCPR) provides that ” anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation. However, The Constitution of India does not have a provision to compensate. Take the case of Dr Khafeel Khan who was placed under illegal and unjust detention on two separate occasions, two times for more than nine months each. Is there any provision for compensating the victims of unlawful arrest or detention?
There are provisions, but very rarely used and often these are provisions which can be used only after a successful prosecution by the victim for a malicious prosecution. So you would have to prove that such and such a police officer, knowing the truth, wilfully arrested me with reckless disregard for the truth and therefore he should be prosecuted and punished and should be given compensation. Recently the Delhi High Court has ordered that even for half an hours detention the policemen had been made liable and ordered that fifty thousand rupees have to be recovered from the policemen. But institutionally also, a particular department should be faced with huge penalties . In the United States for instance if there is a wrongful arrest or persecution the police department of that county sometimes becomes responsible. Therefore, when it comes out of the departments budget that makes the police personnels much more careful. Now technology is advanced so that the police men arresting or in routine law and order situations wear body cameras. It may not be a bad idea that such ideas to be enforced in India.
Right to dissent is the very essence of democracy. The Supreme Court of India in a decision pronounced on November 12th, 1974, during the operation of the second proclamationn of emergency, observed. ” Peaceful protests and the voicing of a contrary opinion are powerful wholesome weapons in a democratic repertoire. It is, therefore, unconstitutional to pick up a peaceful protestant and to put him behind the prison bars”. However, many among those activists who engages in disagreement against the State is framed under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act( UAPA) and are languishing in prisons in contemporary India. Has the judiciary’s thinking on approach to expression of dissent underwent a change over the period ?
This again comes down to the question of malicious prosecution. Very often when protests takes place, in order to teach the protestors a lesson the leaders are hold up and very hard sections are invoked. When the UAPA is invoked, getting bail is almost impossible. So I do not think that the judiciary has done enough to protect the protestors who may have been violent in language but absolutely peaceful in their conduct. There has not been too much of a differentiation between speech and actual conduct or actual incitement to violence. I do think that the judiciary has not been as tolerant of the right to protest as it was in previous times. In fact the judiciary might be taking a cue from the administration itself. At one point of time protests in Delhi used to end almost in parliament at boat club. Since the late eighties Mr Tikaiat, laid seige to the boat club with thousands of farmers. The judiciary’s thinking often is that if there is a police designated spot protests should only in the specific place and no other. The full effect of fundamental right to assemble peacefully without arms seems to have been given up to greater police restrictions.
(A journalist having fifteen of years of experience Abhish K Bose was a staffer of The Times of India and The Deccan Chronicle – Asian Age. As a contributor, his interviews and articles have been published in Frontline magazine, The Wire, The Print, The Telegraph, The News Minute, Scroll, The Kochi Post, Outlook.com, The Federal and the Asian Lite international published out of Manchester.)
Chitranshul Sinha discusses about the sedition law in the country in an interview with Abhish K. Bose
Chitranshul Sinha is an Advocate-on-Record of the Supreme Court of India with experience in civil and commercial litigation. He practices Insolvency & Bankruptcy Law, Arbitration, Banking & Commercial Litigation, and general Civil Litigation. He regularly appears before the Supreme Court of India, High Court of Delhi and various other State High Courts, various National Company Law Tribunals, National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, arbitral tribunals and other fora. Chitranshul is the author of ‘The Great Repression – Story of Sedition in India’ published by Penguin India in 2019. He is a member of the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association, Delhi High Court Bar Association and Young International Council for Commercial Arbitration. In an interview with Abhish K. Bose he discusses the abuse of sedition law in the country.
Excerpts from the interview
Abhish K. Bose : The Manipur police has slapped sedition charges on CPI leader Annie Raja. The case was filed in Imphal after Raja raised allegations that the riots in Manipur were sponsored by the state. Along with Raja, two other leaders from the National Federation of Indian Women have also been booked. Ms Raja made the statement after a fact finding team, of which she was a member, visited the state. Do you think the charges against Ms. Raja will stand legal scrutiny? If it does, what is the margin left for the right to dissent in a democracy?
Chitranshul : No, the charges are not likely to stick. However that does not stop the police from arresting or harassing her and others like her. Thanks to the Supreme Court order of May 2022 even if the police register an FIR against her she will be granted bail by the jurisdictional magistrate. Nowadays it depends on who you are for the State to decide whether you have a right to dissent or not. It is easier for the State to curb this right if the concerned people are from marginalised communities.
Abhish K. Bose : Do you think that sedition laws are used to whittle down the scope of freedom of the press? Instances like the action of the Kerala police in arraigning a TV channel reporter for reporting a political allegation by a student leader during a live telecast as well as sedition cases against journalist Siddique Kappan and Stan Swamy may be cited in this context. Do such cases belong to the category, ‘the process is the punishment’? How can media freedom be exercised in the face of this State intolerance?
Chitranshul : Sedition laws are not just used to curb freedom of press, but the larger right to free speech and expression. Today if any reporting is inconvenient for the establishment, it is prosecuted and persecuted as something which is against the integrity of the State. Surely, reporting on a gangrape like Kappan, or making political allegations cannot bring down the State. Importantly, it is not just one political party which is abusing the law. Almost every party is guilty of trying to curb media freedom. Even crude humour against a politician has been turned into a prosecutable offence in some states.
Abhish K. Bose : By invoking sedition charges against political speeches and criticism on government cannot be justified. According to the constitution, it specifies that the provisions of sedition can be used only at speeches or actions that may harm the security of the state. Those speeches which perpetuates social or political discourse doesn’t comes under the purview of this and the alibi of the security of the state cannot be invoked. How can the genuine political speech or writings can be healthily discriminated from the state security alibi?
Chitranshul : The test for invocation of section 124A of IPC is whether the alleged seditious speech or publication has incited violence, or has the tendency to incite violence or public disorder. Considering that the section is part of the chapter which provides for offence against the State, such offence must be targeted at the State, and not merely an individual or political party. While the Supreme Court has laid down the above mentioned public order test for invocation of section 124A, I believe that the Court has not explicitly laid down the parameters of the test and thus has left it open to be broadly interpreted and applied by the police. As long as a political speech or publication does not call for violence or a violent uprising against the State there should be no question of application of section 124A.
Supreme Court of India
Abhish K Bose : Section 124A of the IPC on which the sedition law is based is a colonial era law meant to forestall and suppress anti-Colonial activities by Indians. Shouldn’t it have been revoked or junked with the liberation of India from the colonial yoke? How can its continued use by an Indian government against its own citizens be justified even in the light of patriotism and nationalism?
Chitranshul : Yes, the sedition law does not belong in a democratic country like ours. In fact even Nehru was against the provision, having been its victim at the hands of the British, but he failed to repeal it. Even England, which is the originator of the law, has repealed the law of sedition. Therefore, its continued existence under Indian Law is unjustifiable. However, the government does not seem to agree and the new Bill which proposes to replace the IPC provides for an even more draconian sedition law under clause 150 of the Bill, which has broadened the scope of the law, and increased the period of imprisonment as compared to section 124A.
Abhish K. Bose : The disqualification of Rahul Gandhi as member of the Lok Sabha occurred in March this year after a court convicted and sentenced him for two-year imprisonment on charges of criminal defamation on the basis of the comments in the course of a speech in the context of elections in Karnataka. Do this conviction and its consequential action by the Parliament Secretariat meet, in your opinion, the ends of justice? Or, is this a case of judicial overreach? Is there not a need to review defamation laws so as to make them more responsive to the fundamental right of freedom of thought and expression?
Congress leader Rahul Gandhi at the ‘Ideas for India’ conference in London.
Chitranshul : As the law stands, Rahul Gandhi’s disqualification after having received a 2 year sentence cannot be found fault with legally. But the way that the sentence was imposed without any application of judicial mind or basis for the maximum sentence appears to be contrary to principles of natural justice. Even the Supreme Court while staying the judgment has said as much. While the Supreme Court has upheld the offence of criminal defamation, I believe that the position needs to be re-looked at by the Court. An aggrieved party can always sue for defamation in a civil court and seek damages, so the continuation of the offence of criminal defamation is not justifiable in a country where the limits of free speech when tested on the altar of politics are very high. Otherwise it will be very easy for the party in power to attack the opposition by filing complaints for criminal defamation to give a chilling effect on free political speech.
