For Xi Jinping, the primary objective of purging senior officials and rivals is to eliminate any obstacles to his authority. However, the recent expulsion of loyalists, such as the former Defence Minister, indicates a shift in his strategy, writes Lt Col JS Sodhi…reports Asian Lite News
Two months ago, President Xi Jinping dismissed two former Chinese defence ministers, marking one of the most significant purges during his tenure.
Li Shangfu, a former close aide to Xi Jinping, and his predecessor Wei Fenghe were both expelled from the Communist Party of China due to allegations of corruption.
Over the past 12 years, such purges have become increasingly common in Chinese political life. They serve multiple purposes, including addressing the pervasive corruption undermining Chinese institutions; however, their primary function is to signal to other officials that similar consequences could befall them should they act in ways that displease Xi Jinping.
It is important to note that purges are a fundamental strategy employed by leaders of Communist totalitarian regimes.
Li_Shangfu
Prior to Xi Jinping, Joseph Stalin had perfected the technique of eliminating officials perceived as threats to his authority.
Similarly, China has a longstanding tradition of purges, notably under Mao Zedong, with Deng Xiaoping being one of the most significant figures to be ousted during that era. Deng later ascended to the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and amended its constitution to limit the presidency and general secretary to two terms.
In contrast, Xi Jinping has altered this rule, reflecting the numerous changes that have occurred in China over the past decade. To fully grasp the implications of purges, it is essential to identify the prominent individuals who have been adversely affected by these actions.
Whom Xi Jinping purges
To comprehend the individuals targeted by Xi Jinping’s purges, it is essential to examine the CPC’s recruitment and training mechanisms. The party systematically cultivates its future leaders, politicians, and bureaucrats from a young age, drawing heavily from Confucian principles.
These trainees often come from families with deep Communist roots, with many being third-generation members whose fathers and grandfathers were active in the party. Xi Jinping himself is no exception, as his father, Xi Zhongxun, was unjustly purged by Mao for 16 years, forcing Xi Jinping to spend his childhood in relative obscurity for someone of his stature.
Notably, he did not attend the elite schools operated by the CPC. This background likely contributes to his distrust of those who held power before his tenure and his desire to surround himself with loyal supporters. To consolidate his authority fully, Xi Jinping has found it necessary to place his allies in key decision-making positions.
Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, waves to journalists at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Oct. 23, 2022. (Xinhua/Pang Xinglei/IANS)
Purging other officials on various criminal charges has proven an effective means of creating vacancies and opportunities for his loyalists to ascend.
By taking these actions, Xi Jinping has effectively suppressed any potential opposition or dissent within the CPC, resulting in the removal of several notable figures. One such individual was Bo Xilai, who was once regarded as one of China’s most promising politicians before his abrupt downfall.
At 64 years of age, Bo served as the Party Secretary of Chongqing and was a member of the Politburo. He faced serious allegations, including corruption, abuse of power, and complicity in the murder of British businessman Neil Heywood by his wife, Gu Kailai.
In 2013, Bo was sentenced to life imprisonment, marking one of the most sensational political scandals in recent Chinese history.
Another significant figure was Zhou Yongkang, previously considered one of the most powerful individuals in China. As a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Zhou was convicted in 2015 for bribery, abuse of power, and leaking state secrets.
His trial was unprecedented, as it was the first time a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee had been prosecuted in the history of the People’s Republic of China. Zhou also received a life sentence, further illustrating Xi Jinping’s strategy of consolidating power by eliminating potential rivals and dissenters within the party.
Similarly, numerous CPC officials, including Ling Jihua, a close associate of former President Hu Jintao, Xu Caihou, the former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Sun Zhengcai, a Politburo member once regarded as a potential future leader of China, have been sentenced to lengthy prison terms under Xi Jinping’s regime.
In addition to these high-profile cases, Xi Jinping has also targeted prominent figures from various sectors, including actors, industry leaders, and mid to senior-level military officials, who have faced purges during his administration.
Wei Fenghe
What objectives purges serve
For Xi Jinping, the primary objective of purging senior officials and rivals is to eliminate any obstacles to his authority. However, the recent expulsion of loyalists, such as the former Defence Minister, indicates a shift in his strategy.
These purges are advantageous for both Xi Jinping and the CPC, as they hold individuals accountable for their transgressions. Furthermore, such actions serve a populist function; when wealthy Chinese figures are removed, the public often perceives it as a form of justice being enacted by the authorities.
Prior to Xi Jinping’s leadership, the CPC was regarded as an untouchable entity in Chinese politics. Xi Jinping has effectively embodied the party, viewing rivals who could otherwise contribute with equal loyalty as threats that must be eradicated.
Nonetheless, a critical question arises: In a system centred around a single individual, how can these purges be rationalised as a pursuit of justice? There may come a time when the discontent stemming from these purges among CPC officials leads to Xi Jinping’s downfall, particularly as the fragile state of the Chinese economy exacerbates this crisis.
(Lt Col JS Sodhi, Retd, is the Editor of Global Strategic & Defence News, and the author of ‘China’s War Clouds: The Great Chinese Checkmate’. The views expressed are personal)
President Xi Jinping’s overarching objective is to attain a “high-standard socialist market economy in all respects” by 2029, with Xi Jinping Thought acting as the guiding light….reports Asian Lite News
The Third Plenum – a meeting of Central Committee members held from 15-18 July to clarify China’s long-term economic and social policies – illustrated how Chairman Xi Jinping is holding unwaveringly to his vision for China. It also demonstrated how he is ignoring calls for any course correction.
A total of 199 members and 165 alternate members attended this plenary session of the 20th Central Committee, held nine months late. Xi’s overarching objective is to attain a “high-standard socialist market economy in all respects” by 2029, with Xi Jinping Thought acting as the guiding light.
Since 1982, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has usually convened seven plenums every five years. Whereas the first and second plenums in each five-year term focus on senior party leadership appointments and restructuring of governmental institutions, the third plenum typically introduces major policy initiatives for the next 5-10 years.
This Third Plenum was the first since November 2013 and, reflecting China’s increasing opacity, the CCP offered no explanation as to why it was delayed for so long. The party also simply announced refinements of existing measures, rather than any major shift in strategy. Markets reacted glumly to Xi’s unwavering trajectory, with Chinese stocks promptly suffering their largest decline in six months.
Neil Thomas, a Fellow on Chinese Politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis, pointed out how draft decisions in 2013’s plenum invoked 2,564 comments and 539 revisions, equating to a 21 per cent acceptance rate for modifications. On the other hand, the 2024 plenum’s draft drew 1,911 comments and just 221 revisions, a remarkably lower 12 per cent acceptance rate.
Thomas thus concluded, “Cadres are less willing to speak, and Xi is less willing to listen… There is less internal policy discussion; cadres sent 25% fewer comments.” The academic added, “In 2013, Xi chaired several plenary meetings of the drafting team.
This year, he just reviewed drafts, gave instructions and read notes from team interviews with other leaders. Xi seems increasingly secluded from lower-level officials and less interested in policy debates.”
The CCP, in an 18 July communique, patted itself on the back. “At the session, the Central Committee gave a highly positive assessment of the success and achievements we have made in comprehensively deepening reform since the beginning of the new era, and studied the issue of further deepening reform comprehensively to advance Chinese modernization.”
However, members were cognizant of growing challenges: “It was stated that the present and the near future constitute a critical period for our endeavor to build a great country and move toward national rejuvenation on all fronts through Chinese modernization.”
China’s position is “serious and complex,” it said. Indeed, COVID-19 precipitated am existing crisis, including weak consumption, a slowing economy and unequal wealth distribution.
Xi highlighted five foci at the plenary session. The first was the “leading role of economic system reform”. Of course, “reform” in Chinese vocabulary has a vastly different connotation to its meaning in the West. Chinese “reforms” do not mean altering direction but, rather, minor technical adjustments. After all, major shifts in strategy would be an admission that the CCP had been mistaken, something anathema to authoritarian systems.
Economically, the communique stated, “We must better leverage the role of the market, foster a fairer and more dynamic market environment, and make resource allocation as efficient and productive as possible. We will lift restrictions on the market while ensuring effective regulation, striving to better maintain order in the market and remedy market failures.”
Perhaps surprisingly, the communique glossed over the need to raise domestic consumption. Household consumption in China, expressed as a percentage of GDP, plummeted after 2019.
China wants to lure back Western companies too, as net inflows of foreign direct investment collapsed. After reaching their acme in 2021, by 2023 China had suffered a 90 per cent drop in investment to just USD33 billion. This amount represented a 30-year low.
However, Xi did not offer any positive recommendations as to how this situation could be reversed. Instead, China articulated rhetorical goals of “fostering a first-rate business environment that is market-oriented, law-based and internationalized, and protecting the rights and interests of foreign investors in accordance with the law”.
With China surreptitiously supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine, Western restrictions are only likely to increase. Furthermore, spooked private companies are reshoring in their home countries or moving operations to the likes of India, the Philippines, Thailand or
Vietnam.
Naturally, tight party control undermines many policy goals. By imposing strict control over intellectual property and implementing national security and espionage laws, many foreign companies are being dissuaded from doing business in China. Paradoxically, simultaneous to declaring greater openness to foreign investment, the CCP announced tighter party control over the market! Private companies must act “in accordance with the law” and align with party interests, a stance that offers no reassurance for foreign investors.
A second focus highlighted by Xi was “comprehensive reform” that aligns policies in other domains with high-quality development. The phrase “new national system” is now popular, referring to distribution of national resources with stronger centralized control, and allocating capital to sectors with strategic significance. This is to achieve geopolitical, rather than economic, goals, and it represents China’s recipe to counter Western sanctions and boost domestic technological progress.
A third focus of Xi is “integrating development and security”. China is attempting to juggle economic policies with modernization of its armed forces and national security. The communique stated: “We must maintain the party’s absolute leadership over the
people’s armed forces and fully implement the strategy of strengthening the military through reform to provide a strong guarantee for realizing the centenary goal of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 2027 and achieving basic modernization of national defense and the armed forces. We will improve the systems and mechanisms for leading and managing the people’s armed forces, further reform joint operations systems, and deepen military-civilian reforms.”
There is a section on “advancing the national security system and the modernization of capacity,” with Xi putting the safeguarding of national security in a more prominent position. Arran Hope, Editor of the China Brief at The Jamestown Foundation, observed:
“The addition of this section and its emphasis on the inseparability of the two suggest that security is increasingly factored in as an underlying economic consideration.” Such a stance ends hopes of any rebalance toward development.
Hope added, “Beyond reiterating requisite phrases, such as the PLA’s ‘centenary goal’ and emphasizing the need for political loyalty within the PLA, much of this section is taken up by instructions for the military-industrial complex, especially for equipment development and procurement.”
The Third Plenum pledged to “speed up the development of strategic deterrence forces,” a reference to nuclear weapons. In its 50-page final summary of the Third Plenum, China said it would accelerate “strategic deterrence forces, develop new-domain forces with new combat capabilities, while … [strengthening] traditional combat forces”.
Three years ago, Xi ordered the PLA to “speed up the creation of a high-quality strategic deterrence and joint combat system”. This has seen a rapid build-up in nuclear warheads, ballistic missiles, missile silos and missile-carrying submarines. The US Pentagon
estimated that China had boosted its nuclear warhead inventory to 500 in 2023, compared to 400 just a year earlier.
At the plenum, expulsions of Li Shangfu (former minister of national defense), Li Yuchao (former PLA Rocket Force commander) and Sun Jinming (former PLARF chief of staff) from the party were confirmed. Their seats were filled by alternate members.
Perhaps oddly, new Defense Minister Dong Jun was not elevated to the Central Military Commission. At the same plenum, former foreign minister Qin Gang’s resignation was accepted, his being a fate less stern than that of his defense ministry colleague.
The fourth focus underlined by Xi was “building institutions and mechanisms to support comprehensive innovation”. This emphasizes education, human capital and science and technology reforms. The party is pinning hopes of economic revival on leveraging new, emerging technologies as the world enters the next round of techno-industrial revolution. Already, almost 70 per cent of local government industrial investment funds are being directed towards science and technology manufacturing.
China also calls this approach “new quality productive force”. Instead of trailing others, China wants to lead, all the while insulating its supply chains and growth potential from Western threats. Countries like the US have imposed export controls on technological components to China. Bloomberg predicts that technology industries could account for 23 per cent of China’s GDP by 2026, even as the real estate sector slumps from 24 per cent to 16 per cent.
The fifth and final focus according to Xi is “strengthening party leadership”. Xi was reaffirming his determined belief that centralized power improves government performance.
Thomas of the Asia Society Policy Institute drew this conclusion: “Xi thinks his main problem is poor execution. Side notes say the party already has a relatively clear picture that Xi controls top-level design of reforms, but now the party should concentrate on their overall promotion and supervision of implementation.”
Additionally, Thomas shared, “Xi is now firmly in control of central decision-making, but he still feels that local officials, state bureaucrats and business executives are not doing what he tells them to do.” In January, Xi complained that cadres were holding back his agenda because of their “inadequate understanding”, “old-fashioned concepts” and “insufficient ability”. In other words, Xi thinks there is nothing wrong with his policies, but that the problem lies in their execution by underlings.
Unsurprisingly, the session placed Xi on a pedestal. “We must thoroughly study and implement General Secretary Xi Jinping’s new ideas, viewpoints and conclusions on comprehensively deepening reform and fully and faithfully apply the new development philosophy on all fronts,” the communique urged.
Willy Wo-Lap Lam, a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation, identified three noteworthy themes: high-tech innovation, taxation and re-collectivization of rural land. Although the communique only briefly mentioned tax reform, there are indications that Beijing will broaden tax categories, especially for consumption or sales taxes. For example, a greater share of sales taxes will go to local governments to help relieve their fiscal difficulties, which now amount to an astounding RMB100 trillion (USD13.8 trillion) of debt. Moneyless local authorities are already subjectively extracting levies and negotiating tax levels with businesses as creative ways of recouping funds.
The phrase “deepening reform of the land system” briefly appeared in the communique too, with growing concern about plots of land left fallow after millions of farmers flocked to cities. Lam therefore speculated, “Xi appears to be contemplating some degree of land recollectivization. This would not support the high-tech economy that Xi is focused on, but it could be construed as a magic bullet, boosting agriculture’s contribution to the economy while simultaneously mitigating the unemployment problem by mobilizing more young men and women in the cities to return home to work in the agricultural sector.”
No rival clique challenged Xi during the plenum, and his position remains unassailable. Lam thus concluded, “If Xi’s proposed reforms for the economy do not have the desired effects, and the deep structural issues are not resolved, the balance of power within the party could finally start to shift. For now, however, Xi remains the undisputed core of the party and of the country.”
Xi is also guaranteed to remain as General Secretary and commander-in-chief for a fourth five-year term, from 2027-32. Incidentally, there was speculation that Xi’s wife, Peng Liyuan, might be elevated to the Politburo. However, her accession failed to materialize.
After this Third Plenum, Thomas offered this prognosis, “Xi is clear on where he wants China to go. It is unclear what could change his mind – perhaps an economic collapse that decisively discredits his policies, though that seems unlikely. Likelier is gradual stagnation that exacerbates social instability and political uncertainty. For now, we must search for actions rather than words.” (ANI)
Delegates to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China - Xi Jinping.(photo:Xinhua/IANS)
Taiwan, an independent democratic island with security ties to the US, has long been a target for China’s ‘reunification’ ambitions…reports Asian Lite News
Xi Jinping assumed the presidency of China in March 2013, succeeding Hu Jintao as the primary leader of both the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the People’s Republic of China.
Over the subsequent 12 years, Xi has navigated China through a tumultuous period, significantly altering the global perception of the nation.
Although China is an authoritarian state, it had established mechanisms to prevent the concentration of unchecked power in a single individual, a response to the challenges encountered under Mao Zedong’s leadership. These mechanisms included a maximum two-term limit for presidents and a system of checks and balances within the Party’s upper echelons.
Presidents would typically begin grooming their successors as their terms concluded.
However, these practices have been consistently ignored in Xi Jinping’s case. He amended the party’s constitution to extend his tenure beyond two terms, appointed loyalists to key positions and emerged as the most powerful leader in Communist Chinese history (even Mao faced resistance from civil war-era military generals). Reflecting on these developments, it is crucial to consider how Xi Jinping’s decade-long rule has impacted China.
The starting of failures
When Xi Jinping assumed the role of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and President of the country, it was during the period of China’s ‘peaceful rise’; that the nation was thriving economically and emerging as a global manufacturing hub.
Liberal internationalists believed that as market forces penetrated China, democracy would inevitably follow. However, a realist perspective of international relations ultimately prevailed.
The China that Xi Jinping inherited was flourishing and becoming a constructive global force.
Upon taking office, he began to use this development and the rise of China as instruments for asserting dominance.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) serves as a prime example; it was China’s first major international infrastructural project, launched in 2013 to establish a multimodal network of infrastructure projects across various countries.
A decade later, the BRI has not evolved into a cohesive, concrete initiative. The world’s largest economies have opted out of participating in the BRI.
Low- and middle-income countries that initially joined the initiative began complaining about the debt trap, where high interest rates imposed by Chinese banks forced many countries to cede control of projects to China.
The Hambantota port project in Sri Lanka is the most prominent example of this debt trap.
Additionally, the BRI did not materialise into a multimodal network but rather remained a means for China to establish influence over individual countries.
The failures of the BRI also affected China’s domestic political landscape.
The BRI was closely tied to Xi Jinping’s paramount “Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation” project. This initiative aimed to revitalise the Chinese economy, which had been decelerating since the global financial crisis. Under Xi’s leadership, the Chinese economic miracle that began during Deng Xiaoping’s era began to slow down. X’s domestic and foreign policies are primarily responsible for this downturn.
Series of policy mishaps
Xi Jinping and his loyalists, who secured positions within the inner circles of the CPC following Xi’s anti-corruption purge of numerous party officials, are held responsible for several policy failures.
Among the most notable are the rising tensions with neighbouring countries such as India, Vietnam, and the Philippines, with China being accused of aggressive actions along their borders.
Additionally, China engaged in direct confrontations and diplomatic coercion with various states, including Australia and smaller European nations, where its ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’ harmed its carefully cultivated long-term relationships.
It is widely known that China has unresolved disputes with annexed peripheral regions, including Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong.
Over the past decade, following Xi Jinping’s unprecedented security crackdowns, these borders have been tightly controlled. As a result, an estimated one million minority Muslim Uyghurs were detained in camps in Xinjiang, and in Hong Kong, Beijing enacted a sweeping national security law in response to significant anti-government protests in 2019.
Xi has also significantly increased the public security budget for Tibet from nearly 160 million Yuan to more than 300 million Yuan over the last 10 years.
Taiwan, an independent democratic island with security ties to the US, has long been a target for China’s ‘reunification’ ambitions.
Recently, China has become more aggressive along Taiwan’s border.
According to a report by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence, Chinese air incursions have surged, with the number of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft entering Taiwan’s air defence zone daily, increasing from around 15 in 2021 to around 70 in April 2023.
On the economic front, China’s economy has continually slowed since Xi Jinping assumed office. Since his tenure began, there has been an increasing crackdown on the private sector.
Chinese capitalism is predominantly state-run, raising security concerns in many countries.
The purge of prominent industrialists, such as Jack Ma, has created significant challenges for Chinese entrepreneurs and wealth creators.
China remains one of the most unequal countries in the world.
The economic slowdown since the Covid-19 lockdown has also led to increased unemployment, alongside a persistent decline in private sector investment and consumer confidence in the Chinese economy during Xi’s reign.
In conclusion, contemporary China under Xi Jinping faces numerous domestic and international challenges. The lack of solutions to these issues has led Xi to adopt a hawkish approach towards neighbouring countries, hoping to stir nationalist sentiments among Chinese citizens.
While this strategy may be effective in the short term, in the long run, more than one billion people will demand answers from Xi Jinping. Ultimately, history is likely to judge him with a degree of scepticism.
External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar will lead the Indian delegation at the SCO summit…reports Asian Lite News
Chinese President Xi Jinping will attend the 24th summit of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Kazakhstan’s capital Astana from July 2 to 6, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced on Sunday.
Xi will also pay state visits to Kazakhstan and Tajikistan at the invitation of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan and President Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan, spokesperson Hua Chunying said.
Meanwhile, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar will lead the Indian delegation at the SCO summit, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) announced on June 28.
The SCO summit will take place from July 3-4 in Astana, the capital city of Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan took over the SCO presidency from India, which was the president last year. India hosted the SCO summit virtually in July 2023. This year’s host is Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who has proposed, among other initiatives, the establishment of a joint investment fund.
During the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-2021, the SCO summits were held virtually.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a political, economic, and security group that was established in 2001.
The current members of the SCO are China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Iran became a full member in 2023, under the Indian Presidency of the grouping. Belarus is an observer state and is next in line to gain full membership.
The SCO is focused on regional security, counter-terrorism, and economic cooperation among its member states. The organisation covers over 60 per cent of the Eurasian landmass, 40 per cent of the world population, and 30 per cent of global GDP. (ANI)
Chinese President Xi Jinping, also general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, sits down with representatives of teachers and students at a symposium and delivers an important speech during a visit to Renmin University of China in Beijing, capital of China, April 25, 2022. (Xinhua/Ju Peng)
Sources that had functioned within the higher echelons of the Chinese Communist Party say that under the direction Xi Jinping, a Master Plan has been drawn that is to be ruthlessly (described as “resolutely” in the documents accessed by former cadres) implemented once Xi’s objective of the unification of Taiwan with the PRC takes place, writes Prof. Madhav Das Nalapat
Sources that were within the higher echelons of the CCP say that under the direction of Xi, a Master Plan has been drawn up that is to be ruthlessly implemented once his objective of the unification of Taiwan with the PRC takes place.
As a consequence of the firm response of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to PRC efforts at further expansionism at the cost of Indian territory, and the bravery and quality displayed by the Indian Army during the 2020 Galwan clash, chances are rising that it will be Taiwan and not India that would be facing a kinetic assault from China. Since 1949, it has been the declared ambition of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that the island nation of Taiwan would be integrated into the PRC in the manner that Xinjiang and subsequently Tibet was.
Despite the immense strategic implications of the absorption of Xinjiang and Tibet, in practice, since the 1950s there has been little blowback from major concerned countries at such an expansion by force of China’s borders. Despite the fact that the takeover of Tibet resulted in the territory controlled by the PRC acquiring a long border with India, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru accepted the change without demur. In 1959, the Dalai Lama was forced to flee to India as a consequence of efforts to convert him and the high religious status he held into accomplices in whatever was decided by the CCP for Tibet. As a consequence, the traditional culture of Tibet was maintained and protected within India even while being systematically obliterated on the other side of the boundary.
Especially since the 1980s, Taiwan has transformed from an autocracy to a democracy of exceptional quality. As a consequence, the CCP is planning to ensure that any trace of democracy gets wiped out, should the PRC leadership succeed in their mission of integrating Taiwan into the PRC. Given that the Taiwanese people have over the years been more and more open against unification with China, such a process is expected to be lengthy and ruthless. After the Hong Kong protests during 2019-20, the CCP leadership believes that stamping out any trace of democratic behaviour is an existential matter for the party. The fear at the top was that the “democracy virus” would spread to the Mainland from Hong Kong, especially in cities such as Shanghai and Beijing.
Hong Kong is a lesson in what happens to promises made by the CCP. Believing in the 1997 Basic Law, efforts were made by the population of Hong Kong from the 1990s until 2019 to make the governance system of the HK Special Autonomous Region conform to the processes of democracy in a way that was absent in the past. From 2016 onwards, such moves were met with harsher and harsher state repression, until by 2019, any trace of the implementation of the 1997 UK-PRC agreement on Hong Kong was snuffed out. Given its size and much deeper democratic roots, Taiwan is slated to experience much more elevated levels of repression than HK, which are to be carried out in order to extinguish any trace of the practice of democracy in the island.
DISILLUSIONED CADRE EXPOSE XI’S TAIWAN PLAN
Contours of planning for the Day After a takeover of the island nation by the PRC have become known as a consequence of the increasing distaste within the CCP cadre to General Secretary Xi Jinping’s arbitrary methods. Hundreds of thousands of CCP cadres have fled the country since 2012, although some of them are covert agents of the State Security Bureau of the PRC. From their inputs, it has been possible to piece together a profile of what is being planned for Taiwan from the “day after” the island nation gets overrun by the PLA and loses its freedoms.
Sources that had functioned within the higher echelons of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) say that under the direction of General Secretary Xi Jinping, a Master Plan has been drawn that is to be ruthlessly (described as “resolutely” in the documents accessed by former cadres) implemented once Xi Jinping’s objective of the unification of Taiwan with the PRC takes place. In the meantime there have been thinly concealed efforts at keeping the fires of conflict burning in other flashpoints of the world in order to distract the US and its allies from focusing on the threat faced by Taiwan. Going by the information provided by former higher cadres, by 2021 nearly two million Taiwanese residents have been put on the database of the relevant wings of the CCP governance mechanism. This is the number of Taiwanese citizens considered by CCP security agencies to be “unreliable”. They have been marked for “re-education” on the model long practised by the PRC. As many as 280,000 have been identified as “Anti-State Elements”. These include those who have been especially vocal about the fact that Taiwan is an independent state, and should remain so.
They have been marked for confinement in camps until their “re-education” is completed. Almost 40,000 democracy activists and leaders are to be immediately sent to prison, while hundreds have been marked for execution as “Traitors to the (Chinese) State”, some after a show trial, others summarily. Such is the fate awaiting Taiwan should the PRC succeed in carrying out Xi’s vow that “unification will take place during my term” in office. A foretaste of such planning has been the way in which openly pro-democracy Taiwanese nationals visiting China since 2021 have had their entry cards destroyed in their presence. Several have been confined to cells for days before being put on the next ferry home.
CCP DISINFORMATION WARFARE INCREASES
Expectedly, the CCP has sought to conceal its intentions through a blitzkrieg of information warfare, including through popular CCP-controlled apps such as TikTok, that are very popular in Taiwan. As part of such a campaign of presenting a benign face towards the people of Taiwan, Xi Jinping had this month hosted a former President of Taiwan in the PRC, and given protocol and respect that has thus far been unprecedented where meetings between Taiwanese and Chinese leaders are concerned. Not very subtly, his effort was to show that far from disrespecting the island nation and its democratically elected politicians, the CCP leadership considers them as “family”. The message sought to be conveyed is that a takeover will be benign, a coming together of close relatives long separated. The factual situation has been revealed by former senior cadres who were part of the CCP governance mechanism but left out of fear that they would soon be next in line where the lengthening list of victims of the repression initiated in the PRC, especially since 2015, is concerned. Should a takeover happen, even those now favoured by the CCP as being genuine “compatriots” would find that the manner in which they get treated changes significantly. That this would be the case is by now well understood by a majority of the population in Taiwan, although a diminishing number still place their trust in CCP disinformation.
XI ACTS NICE TO CONVEY BENIGN IMPRESSION
Ma Ying-jeou served two terms as President of Taiwan, and during that period, implemented several steps designed to bring the two economies closer together. In his final days in office, Ma faced a “Sunflower Movement” that opposed his efforts at getting passed a Services Agreement with China. It must be added that Ma has been a believer in peace, and in his view, at heart so is his “old friend” Xi. In April, the former Taiwanese President spent eleven days in the PRC. This was the second visit made by him to the neighbouring country, and for the second time he had a face to face meeting with Xi Jinping, the first such meeting being in Singapore in 2015. The April 2024 meeting was noted across the world for its optics and possible significance.
CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, the Head of State, Party, Military and Government’s 45-minute meeting with former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou in Beijing, was held weeks ago in the Great Hall of the People rather than in the Taiwan or Fujian Room, as had been the norm when discussions between Chinese and Taiwanese policymakers take place. Unexpectedly, Xi made no reference to contentious issues such as cross-strait relations during the meeting, confining himself to pleasantries. Nothing gets done by a CCP leader without careful scripting, and it was clear that the intention behind the Xi-Ma meeting was to attempt
to show the Taiwanese people that the other side are (in the words of Xi at the meeting), “family members”. The implication was that a takeover of Taiwan by the PRC, or what is termed “reunification”, would be a cordial affair, a “family reunion”, again in the words of Xi. Former President Ma has his ancestral roots in China, as do many other Taiwanese. However, unlike the overwhelming majority of his people, Ma remains sentimental about the other side of the Straits, and made no effort to conceal his joy at the warm welcome he received during his second visit to China, the first being to pray at the graves of his ancestors last year. During their first meeting at Singapore in 2015, Xi had told Ma that “we must meet again”, and this time as well, he expressed the same “you are always welcome” attitude.
CHINA FACTOR IN TAIWAN POLITICS
Following the January 2024 victory of the DPP for the third time in the Taiwanese Presidential elections, the disinformation machinery of the PRC has been on overdrive in an effort to convince the population of the island that they would have nothing to fear from what would be (in view of the antipathy of 90% of Taiwanese to the idea) necessarily a forced absorption of Taiwan into the PRC. In 2019, the way in which the 1997 UK-PRC agreement on Hong Kong was torn to shreds by Xi Jinping helped ensure a second term for President Tsai Ing-wen, who is committed to retaining the freedoms of her country and ensuring that they do not get erased by a PRC takeover. In the last Presidential election, over 40% of the voters stood by the DPP and its candidates William Lai and his Vice-President pick Bikhim Hsiao, despite repeated threats from the Chinese side that a victory for the party would mean war. Another 23% voted for the Taiwan People’s Party, which promised to keep Taiwan free by skilful diplomacy with the Chinese. Scarcely a quarter of the population voted for the KMT, despite the fact that few even in the KMT favour unification with the PRC, knowing as they do the repressive nature of the state machinery on the other side.
KMT Chairperson Eric Chu had chosen New Taipei City Mayor Hou You-yi in 2023 as the party’s Presidential candidate in order to cut into the voting base of the DPP. Mayor Hou is what is termed a “native Taiwanese” and is moreover from the south of the island, where the DPP predominates. The choice of a native Taiwanese, that too from the south, an individual who had served as the Chief of Police during the tenure of President Chen Shui-bian of the DPP, upset the “Mainlander” faction of the KMT, and they succeeded in selecting Mainlanders with pro-China leanings as both the Vice-Presidential candidate of Hou and as the top pick of the party for the legislature. The consequence was that the KMT ticket changed colour in public perception from “light blue” (moderately friendly to China) to “dark blue” ( very friendly to China and open to unification). The switch in perception ensured that the KMT lost votes amongst a population that was more than 90% opposed to unification in any form. Much of the youth vote went to another party, the TPP, but not enough to enable it to secure more than eight seats in the Legislative Yuan. As the KMT became the largest party in the national legislature, and because the TPP abstained from voting, the KMT’s legislature party leader Han was elected Speaker on a minority of votes. Should DPP and TPP come together for the purpose of unseating Han, the DPP would get the Speakership and the TPP the Deputy Speakership, although as yet such a pairing does not appear to be in the works.
OPTION OF WAR ON THE TABLE
A drumbeat of reports have been appearing across the world that Xi Jinping does not want war, and that he would avoid kinetic action. Such a conclusion flies in the face of the reality that by 2027, conditions in the PRC are likely to make Xi’s position shaky, and he may calculate that (1) the US and its allies would no longer have the will to defend Taiwan if attacked by the PLA, and that (2) resistance by the nation could be crushed, were its allies to not step forward and defend its sovereignty. The CCP is also (3) banking on the conflict remaining confined to Taiwan, rather than expanding elsewhere within the Indo-Pacific. Xi is relying on the lack of appetite within the public in NATO member states to get involved in a conflict in Asia, unlike the enthusiasm they have shown where a European state, Ukraine, is concerned. The democracies are on notice, and the example of the 1930s in Europe shows the folly of believing that authoritarians under pressure, who have made no secret of their ambitions, will abstain from conflict should they decide that the same is needed to protect their position. Should President Biden sign into law the TikTok bill and the Tibet Bill, both of which have bipartisan support in the US Congress, such a step by the White House would give greater confidence to US friends and allies that the US in the 2020s is not what the UK was in the 1930s, sleeping at the wheel while the other side planned for war. Tik Tok has had a corrosive effect on US society, encouraging contempt for democratic institutions and politicians, while portraying China in rosy hues.
India and Japan in particular will be watching to see what President Biden’s reaction to Tik Tok as well as the Tibet and Taiwan legislation would be, given that under Modi, India is taking unprecedented steps to combat PRC expansionism, and in recent days Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan is coming closer to the line taken by his predecessor Shinzo Abe, who together with Modi will re-invigorate the Quad. Despite some missteps, overall the Quad is expanding its scope and capability, and is regarded as more than a match for the PLA where the defence of the Indo-Pacific is concerned.
Why Xi Jinping's iron grip will only tighten during the upcoming 20th Party congress in China
President Xi Jinping seems the type of man who stubbornly digs in his heels the tougher the opposition gets. Unfortunately, he is taking China down a road that many may not agree with, but who are powerless to resist…reports Asian Lite News
For the first decade of his authoritarian rule over China, Chairman Xi Jinping could do no wrong. Such was his popularity and position of strength that he was allowed to overturn recent conventions by reinstalling himself for a third term in power, and to position acolytes in the upper levels of power. Yet the gloss is starting to wear off as the realities of economic woe and international backlash bite.
Willy Wo-Lap Lam, author of the book Xi Jinping: The Hidden Agendas of China’s Ruler for Life, and also a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation think-tank in the USA, held a seminar exploring Xi’s legacy on January 22. Lam assessed that Xi “thinks he is the second, if not the first, most important leader in the communist party pantheon. He definitely thinks that he has outdone Deng Xiaoping in terms of contribution to the party. So he thinks of himself as the 21st-century Mao Zedong.”
Lam predicted Xi likely would not seek to reign beyond a fourth five-year term, although at that time he might remain a power behind the throne by retaining the chairmanship of the all-important Central Military Commission.
When the hard-nosed Xi came to power in 2012, there were two major factions in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Lam pointed out: “The big thing is, Xi managed to elbow aside, to at least partially demolish, these two major factions in the party.” Indeed, by the time of the 20th Party Congress in September 2022, around 80-90 per cent of its members belonged to the “Xi family army,” underscoring the hugely successful Machiavellian-style political intrigues in which Xi seems to have particular aptitude. However, he is not adored by all in the CCP.
Lam explained: “I think Xi Jinping in his 11-year career has made a much larger number of enemies than Jang Zemin and Hu Jintao. But the fact of the matter is, Xi Jinping was so successful in his first ten years… His most potent enemies now, I think, consist of rebel elements of the so-called second-generation princelings.”
Xiâs loyalists from Fujian and Zhejiang factions take charge of Chinaâs national security
However, Hong Konger Lam said that none of these rebels or remnants of factions such as the Shanghai Gang have been able to pool their resources together and coalesce a united front against Xi. Even as China’s relationship with the USA has dipped to its worst since Henry Kissinger’s visit to China in 1971, “There might be people who are glad that such negative events are happening so that they have enough ammunition to use against Xi. But for Xi Jinping himself, he doesn’t pay much attention to economics or geopolitics.”
Nonetheless, Lam noted “there have been very strange events in the past half year”. He gave the example of two state ministers and top leaders of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) disappearing.
Indeed, the following members were expunged from the party in one fell swoop at the 7th Session of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC) in late December 2023: Lieutenant General Zhang Zhenzhong (deputy chief of staff of the Joint Staff Department and a previous deputy commander of the PLARF); Lieutenant General Zhang Yulin (deputy minister of the Equipment Development Department [EDD]); Rao Wenmin (EDD representative to the 14th NPC); Vice Admiral Ju Xinchun (naval commander of the Southern Theater Command); General Ding Laihang (commander of the PLA Air Force until September 2021); General Li Yuchao (Commander of the PLARF); Major General Lu Hong (Director of the EDD, PLARF); Lieutenant General Li Chuanguang (chief of staff and deputy commander of PLARF); General Zhou Yaning (former commander of the PLARF).
This list is staggering in terms of the breadth and depth of those that Xi is rooting out. Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy and National Security at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis, noted: “The biggest takeaway is these officers’ connection to [former Defense Minister] Li Shangfu, and their ties to the PLARF, Equipment Development Department and the space program. This amounts to one of the largest purges in the PLARF and EDD in decades, all tying back to Li.”
Lam noted that Li Shangfu’s disappearance had nothing to do with an alleged illicit affair with Phoenix TV anchor Fu Xiaotian. Censors allowed juicy titbits to remain on social media, but this was designed to distract the populace from the real reason, whatever that might be.
Morris continued: “Something major must have occurred to precipitate this kind of purge. Two likely scenarios are a major corruption scandal or an intelligence leak. A third unlikely scenario, but which cannot be completely ruled out, is a political rivalry to Xi’s power base within the PLA (i.e. a soft coup).”
By elevating the Second Artillery Force to the PLARF as a full service of the PLA, Xi also succeeded in creating an entirely new faction involving China’s aerospace defence sector, where vast amounts of money have been pouring in. With so many from the PLARF caught in Xi’s net, perhaps some connected individuals grew aspirations beyond what the Chinese leader thought prudent.
With all these recent arrests, Lam spoke of a “partial demise” of this faction, one in which China’s military-industrial complex is heavily implicated. Technocrats like Wu Yansheng, (chairman of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation [CASC]); Wang Changqing (deputy manager of the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation [CASIC]); and Liu Shiquan (chairman of the Board of CASIC). The churn seems to spread further and further, and yet the CCP does not feel the need to explain any reason for all these detentions. Another to be axed is Wang Xiaojun, former president of the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology.
Such is the trauma, that Xi has delayed the 3rd Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee. Lam opined, “Xi Jinping is still scratching his head about the people who will replace the now disgraced” members. In a speech at the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection on January 10, Xi emphasized that after ten years of unremitting anti-corruption, the struggle has “achieved an overwhelming victory and has been comprehensively consolidated”. However, he immediately contradicted himself by saying “the situation remains grim and complex…We must have a clear understanding of the ‘new situations and new trends’ in the fight against corruption, as well as the ‘conditions that create corruption problems’.” In other words, corruption remains a serious problem, and victory is far from Xi’s grasp.
China flag.
If nothing else, these shocking revelations raise serious questions about Xi’s ability to select and manage high-level personnel in the PLA and CCP, most of whom he personally promoted. This disappointment will surely amplify Xi’s sense of paranoia.
“So now, all these strange events in the past few months, they beg the question on actually how good Xi is in his ability to manage high-level, top-echelon targets,” Lam pointed out.
China’s economy has caught the contagion too, further deepening Xi’s woes. A recent survey by Chinese online recruitment platform Zhaopin found that 32 per cent of white- collar workers reported a wage decrease in the past year. This is just one symptom of a stumbling economy. There are rumors the central government is ready to pump in RMB2 trillion of funds to prop up local administrations in China. According to best estimates, more than 50 per cent of current expenditure of local governments is used just to service interest payments on debts previously run up.
Lam said Xi is “by no means a stupid person,” and that he realizes foreign direct investment (FDI) is very important for the economy. With China now experiencing negative FDI (i.e. foreign companies are withdrawing money) as the Chinese market loses its luster, it desperately needs foreign money. “Xi doesn’t know that much about geopolitics,” Lam said, but Xi’s leadership has to be given some credit for its sweet talk and numerous assurances to multinational companies.
The Jamestown Foundation academic continued: “Regarding the Global South, they were successful in the first ten years of the Belt and Road Initiative when China still had sufficient US dollar reserves, but now the country is desperately short of US dollars.” He said China’s oft-quoted figure of RMB3 trillion in reserves consists mostly of investments from multinationals and loans made by the Chinese government. Lam said the Chinese government could probably mobilize only 10 per cent of this amount, and much of this has already been spent in propping up the yuan.
There are no ballot boxes in communist China, so only two methods exist to evaluate the government’s legitimacy. One is the living standards of ordinary people, and the other is nationalism. Because GDP cannot be maintained at 6-7 per cent annually to generate a sufficient trickle-down effect to ensure ordinary Chinese benefit from an improved share of the economic pie, lower growth levels will see the bulk of people’s money taken out and confiscated by the privileged classes.
The CCP greatly fears popular protests, for it does not truly represent the people. Militias are now being established within state-owned enterprises and even in private companies, their role being to maintain law and order within the vicinity of their enterprises. This reluctant militarization is being imposed by the CCP, and it forms yet another plank in Xi’s symbiosis between peacetime and wartime as he urges the nation on to greater “struggle”. Lam said the current militarization of the Chinese population under Xi is occurring at “a very disturbing pace”.
With the economy failing, the only form of legitimacy left is nationalism, Lam explained. “So Xi is now putting undue weight on nationalism, ‘the great renaissance of the Chinese people’.” Indeed, Xi is simultaneously putting greater emphasis on his alliance of like-minded autocratic states. In a process that started about a decade ago, Russia has become a key brother of China for the first time in its history.
Lam continued: “Xi Jinping is obsessed with this old Mao Zedong slogan, ‘The East is rising, and the West is declining.’ He is unrealistically bullish about the so-called axis of autocratic states: China, North Korea, Russia, Iran, Pakistan and so forth.” He said Xi remains optimistic that such an axis of autocracy will grow bigger, and one day outdo the US-led alliance in international affairs.
This is one reason why Vladimir Putin cannot be allowed to conquer Ukraine, for it will only embolden Xi. Referring to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and what it means for Chinese intentions for Taiwan, Admiral Samuel J Paparo, commander of the US Pacific Fleet, recently told a Senate Armed Services Committee: “Instead of seeing the Ukraine conflict and deciding this is too hard, [the Chinese] intention…is to take note of the actions of Russia in order to effect a short, sharp conflict that presents a fait accompli to all of the world.”
Admiral Paparo added that China “is doubling down on their ability to shrink strategic, operational and tactical warning and act quickly”. He noted that Russia’s failure is “a deterrence in the Western Pacific and directly reassures partners”. Thus, “The most decisive thing we can do at the moment is to pass the supplemental [budget] that would fund capabilities for Ukraine to defend itself.”
Problems are mounting for Xi and for China because of the direction he has taken the country. Yet, “Xi Jinping is not interested in acknowledging a successor,” Lam shared, even though there was once speculation that now disgraced ex-foreign minister Qin Gang was being groomed as the next leader. “Xi is convinced that he will live forever, he’s convinced that he has the magic bullet or whatever.”
His self-belief may even stem from a religious ideology, as Lam quoted a Chinese source who alleged that Xi is actually a Buddhist. Xi spent 15 years in Fujian, and this source claimed that Xi became a convert during that time. Allegedly, every time he returns to Fujian, he visits a Buddhist temple there. Whatever the case, Xi seems the type of man who stubbornly digs in his heels the tougher the opposition gets. Unfortunately, he is taking China down a road that many may not agree with, but who are powerless to resist. (ANI)
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin clarified that the move does not mean Beijing officially recognises the Taliban government
Chinese President Xi Jinping on January 30 formally accepted the credentials of the Taliban-appointed Ambassador, becoming the first head of state to do so, a media report said.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin clarified that the move does not mean Beijing officially recognises the Taliban government, RFE/RL reported.
“Diplomatic recognition of the Afghan government will come naturally as the concerns of various parties are effectively addressed,” he said, the report said.
The Taliban, however, celebrated the move as a major diplomatic victory.
“China understands what the rest of the world needs to understand,” chief Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said, urging other countries to expand bilateral relations with his government, RFE/RL reported.
China’s move is a boost to the Taliban-led government, which has not been recognised by any country since the extremist group seized power in 2021.
(Credit X@QaharBalkhi)
Beijing’s expanding diplomatic ties with the Taliban government could prompt other countries in the region, including Iran and Russia, to follow suit, RFE/RL reported.
Ibraheem Bahiss, an Afghanistan expert at the International Crisis Group, said Beijing’s decision suggested that the Taliban is making headway in its strategy to gain official recognition from regional countries.
Countries in the region are growing “more and more skeptical about the Western consensus that the Taliban should stay confined to pariah status on the world stage”, he wrote, RFE/RL reported.
San Francisco was just another link in a long chain of events that are resulting in a multiplying of frictions between Beijing and Washington, writes Prof. Madhav Das Nalapat
CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping has been facing growing uneasiness with his leadership style within the senior ranks of his party. This is the consequence of (a) economic turmoil in China in an era of attempted decoupling of industry and commerce from that country, (b) the consequent steady fall in property prices and (c) rising unease within the CCP at Xi’s intrusive control over the party machinery and its personnel, including his whimsical appointments and punishments. These appear to be fuelled mostly on the basis of personal loyalty. In such a situation, it was imperative for Xi to travel to San Francisco for the APEC conference to convey the impression globally and domestically that the Sino-US relationship is re-entering a stable and friendly phase.
The problem facing Xi is that in past periods, it was possible for the CCP’s top leadership to use honeyed words to successfully camouflage the PRC’s hostile actions against a target country. Equally helpful in such a cover up was that several such operations were done through foreign cutouts rather than directly. Such camouflage has begun to fray with the ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza, where the pro-Russia and Hamas-friendly tilt of the PRC is clear even to the many western apologists of the CCP. Six weeks after the start of the conflict between the Israeli Defense Forces and Hamas, a war that began with the latter’s terror attack on Israel, it has become impossible to ignore which side the CCP is on, evidently to ensure that US attention got focused away from the Taiwan straits.
In Ukraine, Beijing’s pro-Moscow stance shows although sometimes language used by its spokespersons denote a more neutral hue. The war in Ukraine and now in Gaza have, not coincidentally, been seen as helpful to the Central Military Commission staff officers tasked with preparing plans for a steady snuffing out of Taiwan’s sovereignty. At present, Taiwan is a country in all but name. CMC planners have been tasked by Xi Jinping to work on a plan of action that will result by 2027 in Taiwan becoming another Hong Kong in all but name. Economic headwinds in China have led Xi to focus on achieving military success to ensure a fourth term, and the biggest prize would be the de facto takeover of Taiwan by the PRC.
In the PLA strategy of invasion by stealth, practically the whole of Taiwanese air and sea space has by now come under the control of the PLA, all that is as yet left being land. Artificial Intelligence is being used by CCP infowarriors to attempt to create a perception in young Taiwanese in particular that any kinetic resistance to the PLA would be ineffective. Images from both Ukraine and Gaza added to those created by AI are being disseminated in CCP-controlled social media platforms to create a defeatist mentality among the Taiwanese. Unfortunately for Xi, the opposite is taking place. As more facts tumble out about the repressive, control freak nature of the CCP top leadership, the greater is the antipathy within the Taiwanese public to becoming another Hong Kong, a city which Xi has made autonomous in name only.
TAIWANESE REJECT UNIFICATION
Global distaste for the bullying of Taiwan by the PRC is mounting, and barring a shrinking number of citizens mostly in their 70s and 80s, Taiwanese citizens oppose any form of control of their country by the PRC. They regard themselves not as PRC citizens but as Taiwanese, in the same way that those of Chinese descent in Singapore consider themselves to be Singaporean and not Chinese in the political sense of that term. The DPP, the ruling party in Taiwan, has nominated a popular and personable advocate of an independent Taiwan, William Lai, as its standard bearer in the Presidential elections due early next year. Even the KMT, which in past decades was dominated by individuals who favoured eventual unification with China, has nominated a Taiwanese rather than what is termed locally as a “Mainlander” (i.e. an individual descended from those who arrived from China in 1949 or later) as its standard bearer.
KMT Presidential candidate Hou You-yih, was in the past Chief of Police during the Presidential term of pro-independence DPP leader Chen Shui-bian, and recently went on a very successful tour of the US. Being “dark blue” (or in other words, favouring eventual merger into the PRC) now makes any politician toxic to most voters, which is why the KMT is now dominated by those who are “light blue” (or in other words, those who favour the status quo rather than either get absorbed into China or make a unilateral declaration of independence).
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen is a lifelong believer in democracy and in the right of her people to be free from external control. She has been careful to avoid giving any excuse to the CCP to intervene in the island country, which is why the unilateral aggressiveness of the PRC under Xi has raised global concerns and boosted support for Taiwan in a manner not seen in the past. In effect, by the actions of the CCP, Taiwan has been set on a course to join Japan and South Korea in being a military ally of the US. Despite the influence of the Sino-Wahhabi lobby in Washington, President Biden has repeatedly signalled his intent not to permit distractions in Ukraine and Gaza to prevent the US from intervening kinetically in any situation involving a land invasion of Taiwan by the PLA. According to sources in San Francisco, this was conveyed emphatically to Xi as well.
INVESTORS LEAVE THE PRC
The shifting of tectonic plates altering US-PRC relations from ally to friend to rival to foe have led to a shrinking of appetite among global investors to put more money into China. Since 2019, any foreign investor has to cede full control of data to the CCP so as to operate without hindrance in China. Those who are uncooperative find themselves in trouble with the authorities very quickly. The US, Taiwan and Japan were the mainstay of foreign investment in China, but by 2021, all investors from all three have begun relocating to more welcoming shores, including India. As a consequence, unemployment is rising in China and growth has become sluggish. Property values have been going down steadily, bad news in a country where many tens of millions invest in property as a way of securing their future through later sale at a high price of the physical asset.
Several within the CCP believe the aggressive approach of Xi to be the cause of China’s economic decline, and such a perception is spreading in sync with shutdowns and job losses. Critics of Xi find themselves in prison or bankrupted by arbitrary actions of local authorities. For Xi, it was politically essential to show that it was business as usual between the US and China, so that the outward flow of foreign investment would get reversed. For the Chinese side, the Xi-Biden meeting was about optics, while the meeting between Xi and the top CEOs of the US companies was the substantive business. In the meeting with CEOs, it became clear to the executives who had paid $40,000 to have a Chinese-laced dinner with Xi that the PRC would not change its present course, however much Xi in his meeting with Biden sought to paper over such inflexibility.
Whether it be plunging the US into an opioid crisis through the smuggling of fentanyl, or building up military assets throughout the world through debt trap diplomacy, the CCP would go ahead with such moves, talk of cooperation notwithstanding. At the $ 40,000 a head business dinner, Xi’s contempt for the US and democracy came through in his responses, making several of his fellow diners take more seriously those who had claimed that General Secretary Xi was a throwback to the Mao era who has jettisoned Deng Xiaoping Thought completely in a return to both Maoist rhetoric and attitude towards private investment.
Continuing economic headwinds will show that Xi has failed in his mission of luring back foreign investment to the PRC. Nor has there been success during the meeting of the top leadership of both sides in Xi convincing the Biden administration to lessen restrictions on transfer of advanced technology to China. In view of the risk of kinetic conflict between the two superpowers, such restrictions continue, although as yet behaviour-altering apps such as TikTok have been allowed to continue under Biden.
For President Biden, the very optics of meeting the CCP General Secretary without getting anything more substantive than a repeat of vague commitments often made and subsequently ignored in the past are a vote loser, making higher the prospect of the Democratic Party moving towards another candidate in next year’s Presidential polls. Given that it was Xi who travelled to meet Biden rather than the other way around, most of the population of the PRC are unlikely to be taken in by media accounts of the Xi visit re-opening the way to large-scale sharing of technology and movement of investment into China by the US.
While some headline writers trumpeted the “historic” nature of the meeting, San Francisco was simply just another link in a long chain of events that are resulting in a multiplying of frictions between Beijing and Washington. As events of the first half of the past century show, playing nice with dictators makes not just bad policy but bad politics in a democracy, as President Biden will soon discover.
While he sat down for talks with President Biden, the Chinese leader showed no signs of deviating or tweaking the two centenary goals, which anchor a basic contradiction in the China-US ties, reports Atul Aneja
During the much-awaited talks between Chinese President Xi Jinping and his US counterpart Joe Biden, Beijing and Washington have defined a new roadmap for dialogue.
These talks in San Francisco, on the sidelines of the APEC summit, build on the ice-breaking Xi-Biden dialogue held at Jakarta during the G-20 summit held last November in Bali.
So, what has Xi and Baden achieved in San Francisco? More importantly, has a new initiative been taken that has the legs to transform China-US ties positively and fundamentally? Besides, will whatever has transpired in San Francisco leave a trail towards a new global hierarchy apexed by the G-2—US and China?
It is now evident that China and the US have averted a head on collision, by embedding their relationship with several safety valves to release tensions, which are bound to arise following Beijing’s disruptive assertion to achieve its two centenary goals. During the 19th Party Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2017, President Xi had declared his country’s pursuit of two strategic goals. The first, which has already been achieved officially, was to remove extreme poverty, by doubling the 2010 GDP by 2021. In turn, the removal of extreme poverty would turn China into a “moderately prosperous society.” The second centenary goal, which was bound to draw the US into fierce competition, was to turn China into a leading nation in all spheres of human endeavour. The timeline for achieving the second goal was 2049—a year that aligned with the 100 years of the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The historic project would culminate in a great rejuvenation of China or the achievement of the “Chinese dream.”
Mr. President, we have known each other for a long time.
We have not always agreed. But our meetings are always candid, straightforward, and useful.
Yesterday was no different.
Our nations may be in competition, but that doesn't mean we can't compete responsibly. pic.twitter.com/550epPY91b
While he sat down for talks with President Biden, the Chinese leader showed no signs of deviating or tweaking the two centenary goals, which anchor a basic contradiction in the China-US ties. He pointed out that with its development following its own logic and rules, “China is advancing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation through modernization in its own unique style.” Xi also stressed that “China has no plans to surpass or replace the US, and the US should not attempt to suppress or contain China.”
Yet, the world’s largest and second largest economy showed their firm intent to avoid a military conflict—a position that undergirded a string of conflict-avoidance measures channelled through an intricate, multi-layered military dialogue mechanism.
Consequently, the talks yielded revival of high-level military communication apart from envisaging the China-US defence department working meetings, China-US military maritime security consultation mechanism and China-US military regional leaders’ conversations.
The two sides also agreed to strengthen their partnership to mitigate the Climate crisis, set up an intergovernmental dialogue on Artificial Intelligence (AI), and establish a China-US drug control cooperation working group to contain the availability and usage of the deadly fentanyl synthetic opioid that has spread like a wildfire in the US.
Though San Francisco has opened re-engagement, there are serious underlying problems, caused by Beijing’s rise and pursuit of the China containment strategy by the United States.
For instance, the US is bound to counter China’s intent to exercise its sovereignty over Taiwan under the one-China principle. From a US perspective, Chinese control over Taiwan has deep geostrategic implications, as it will liberate Beijing from the carefully crafted island-chain strategy, which took root after World War-II.
Historically, the emergence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and the onset of the Cold War, led John Foster Dulles, a former US Secretary of State, to develop the “island chain strategy” of besieging China and the former Soviet Union from the sea. Dulles’s doctrine, aired during the heat of the Korean War in the early fifties, had three layers.
Of the three island chains, the “first island chain” was the most important. The lengthy network starts from Kamchatka peninsula in Russia’s Far East and weaves its way into Japan. Then, from the southernmost part of the Japanese mainland, it passes through Okinawa, a part of a larger Ryukyu Island chain which ends with Taiwan. From Taiwan, the “first island chain” heads towards the Philippines and the island of Borneo, before looping towards the tip of the Malay Peninsula. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the first island chain has begun to increasingly focus on China.
But Beijing’s control over Taiwan would breach the first island. With its territorial hold on Taiwan, the Chinese can dock their nuclear submarines in Taiwan’s exceptionally deep waters, beyond the surveillance network of the three island chains, thereby exploding the China-containment strategy. Besides, the Chinese are bound to take exception to the formation of the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) alliance, crafted specifically to contain China in the Indo-Pacific.
The US attempt to militarise the Indo-Pacific QUAD comprising India, US, Japan, and Australia will also breach a détente, possibly emerging between Beijing and Washington following the Xi-Biden talks.
Whitlam’s iconic visit to China to meet Mao Zedong in 1973 marked the first trip by an Australian Prime Minister after the establishment of diplomatic ties…reports Asian Lite News
Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese met Chinese President Xi Jinping here on Monday.
The announcement was made by China’s state-run Xinhua news agency.
Albanese, who arrived in Shanghai on November 5, became the first Australian Prime Minister to visit China since 2016.
In a post on Monday morning, Albanese said: “It is 50 years since Gough Whitlam became the first Australian Prime Minister to visit China. Since he visited the Temple of Heaven in Beijing much has changed.
“But what is constant is that engagement between our two countries remains important.”
It is 50 years since Gough Whitlam became the first Australian Prime Minister to visit China.
Since he visited the Temple of Heaven in Beijing much has changed.
But what is constant is that engagement between our two countries remains important. pic.twitter.com/NInb093o3J
Whitlam’s iconic visit to China to meet Mao Zedong in 1973 marked the first trip by an Australian Prime Minister after the establishment of diplomatic ties.
After a series of trade and security disputes between the two nations, Albanese’s visit is aimed at easing years of tensions, the BBC reported.
“What I’ve said is that we need to co-operate with China where we can, disagree where we must and engage in our national interest,” the Prime Minister told rreporters in Beijing on Monday, ahead of the meeting.
Asked by reporters if Australia can “trust” China, Albanese said his past engagements with Mr Xi have been “positive” and “constructive”.
“But we recognise, as well, that we come with different political systems, very different values arising from that and different histories. But we deal with each other on face value,” the BBC quoted the Prime Minister as saying.
