India has said that although connectivity is very important, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the countries should be respected…reports Asian Lite News
India has again opted out of supporting China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), becoming the only country in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) refusing to endorse the project.
The New Delhi Declaration after the conclusion of the summit, which took place on Tuesday under India’s chairmanship, stated that Russia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan reaffirmed their support to the BRI. The SCO summit concluded under India’s presidency earlier in the day. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and heads of state of other SCO nations virtually took part in the event.
According to the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the Delhi Declaration stated, “Reaffirming their support for China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) initiative, the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Russian Federation, Republic of Tajikistan and Republic of Uzbekistan note the ongoing work to jointly implement this project, including efforts to link the construction of the Eurasian Economic Union and BRI.”
“They spoke in favour of implementing the Roadmap for gradual increase in the share of national currencies in mutual settlements by the interested Member States,” the statement also said.
India has earlier as well refused to support Xi Jinping’s flagship programme for trade and connectivity. During the previous SCO meets as well, India has not changed its stance on the BRI and has become the country not to endorse the project.
“The Member States intend to broaden and deepen cooperation for sustainable socio-economic development and to improve the well-being and living standards of the people in the SCO region,” the SCO New Delhi Declaration said, adding, “They consider it important to ensure the implementation of the SCO Economic Development Strategy 2030 adopted by interested Member States, other joint programmes and projects aimed at promoting cooperation in such priority areas.”
Meanwhile, virtually addressing the SCO meeting of heads of state on Tuesday, Xi reiterated Beijing’s stand of enhancing BRI and talked about “high-quality Belt and Road cooperation” with development strategies of various countries and regional cooperation initiatives, state news agency Xinhua reported.
Addressing the 23rd SCO summit, Xi Jinping said, “Efforts should be made to further promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, speed up the development of port infrastructure and regional and international logistic corridors, and ensure stable and smooth functioning of regional industrial and supply chains”.
“Ten years ago, I proposed the Belt and Road Initiative, and on its tenth anniversary, China will hold the third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation,” Xinhua quoted Xi as saying.
However, India has said that although connectivity is very important, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the countries should be respected.
“Prime Minister clearly said in his remarks that connectivity is important for SCO member states. But connectivity has to be respectful of sovereignty and territorial integrity. India’s position on the BRI has been clear,” Foreign Secretary Vinay Kwatra said while addressing the briefing of the Ministry of External Affairs on Tuesday.
The summit, chaired by PM Modi, was joined by Chinese President Xi Jinping, his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and other leaders of the grouping.
India’s chairmanship of SCO has been a period of intense activity and mutually beneficial cooperation between Member States. India has hosted a total of 134 meetings and events, including 14 Ministerial-level meetings. India remains committed to playing a positive and constructive role in the organization and looks forward to a successful SCO Summit as the culmination of its Chairmanship.
The rotational presidency remains with India until September 2023. (ANI)
As Xi promotes his twisted form of obstreperous China-centric security designed to usurp the West, the Asia-Pacific region especially will increasingly become a battleground of ideologies….reports Asian Lite News
When China’s President Xi Jinping floated the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, it was unclear what it actually entailed. Perhaps Xi did not know either, for there was not even consensus on its name – it was originally labelled the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, and then One Belt, One Road.
The BRI became a blue-ribbon project for Xi. Thus, his and, by extension, China’s prestige became dependent on its success. Now, ten years on, China has had to tighten its belt and divert the road in new directions to keep the whole concept alive. Consequently, China announced three new initiatives in 2021-22 and, although still rather vague, these are directed at gaining greater influence over the Global South, accelerating the perception of US decline, and promoting China’s warped perspective of international order.
As Xi promotes his twisted form of obstreperous China-centric security designed to usurp the West, the Asia-Pacific region especially will increasingly become a battleground of ideologies.
China is the world’s largest private lender, yet nearly 60 per cent of Chinese overseas loans today are held by countries considered financially distressed. To put this in context, in 2010 this figure was just 5 per cent.
China’s BRI plight has been magnified by COVID-19 and the Ukraine war. Indeed, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine accounted for 20 per cent of China’s overseas lending over the past two decades. China’s lending boom has truly ended, plus struggling countries like Pakistan are asking for debt restructuring.
The BRI peaked in 2018, five years ago. Although China is globally pushing its own take on security, development and digital governance, China is also, to a certain extent turning its focus inwards, returning to a centuries-old practice of retreating within its borders.
Chinese President Xi Jinping, also general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, attends a meeting celebrating the 25th anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to the motherland and the inaugural ceremony of the sixth-term government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and delivers an important speech, at the Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Center in Hong Kong, south China, July 1, 2022. (Xinhua/Yao Dawei/IANS)
China’s narrative was that the BRI would increase connectivity and infrastructure. Indeed, China listed five priorities: coordinating policy; improving connectivity; reducing impediments to trade; integrating financial structures; and building people-to-people ties through exchanges/dialogues.
However, it rapidly morphed into a hydra where absolutely any overseas project was subsumed under its umbrella. Around 2016, Chinese investment in rail, road, port and pipeline projects boomed, but China’s economic woes have slowed down such efforts since 2018/19. There is also a noticeable trend from hard infrastructure projects towards digital infrastructure ones.
Indeed, the BRI’s future seems to rest on the Digital Silk Road (DSR), launched in 2015. As another tangent, the “Health Silk Road” projects intensified in 2020 as China exported COVID-19 vaccines and medical supplies.
Initially, BRI investment was directed towards Central Asia and Southeast Asia, before spreading westward and into Africa. Since 2018, Latin America and the South Pacific received a lot of attention. However, South Asia and Southeast Asia ultimately emerged as the main foci.
Earlier this month, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) issued its annual Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment. Meia Nouwens, Senior Fellow for Chinese Security and Defense Policy at IISS, contributed a chapter entitled China’s Belt and Road Initiative a Decade on.
Nouwens discussed the implications for four key regions. Beginning in Southeast Asia, she said this region will remain Beijing’s chief area of strategic importance. China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner since 2009, and the bloc has been China’s largest trading partner since 2020. Maritime routes run through Southeast Asian chokepoints too, encouraging China to push railways as an alternative.
Key recipients have been Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines and Vietnam. Naturally, China wants Southeast Asia to be non-aligned, to serve as a bulwark against American influence.
However, China is not doing itself any favours with continual harassment of Philippine and Vietnamese commercial and law enforcement activities in the South China Sea. Western countries are leery of adopting Chinese 5G telecommunication networks, but this is not the case in many developing countries.
Nonetheless, as China exerts tighter control over domestic private-sector technology companies, this will complicate their ability to execute projects overseas. The USA’s stricter regulation of semiconductor and microchip technologies will also complicate China’s ambitions.
According to Nouwens, fear of economic dependency, ethnic tensions, project build quality and corporate social responsibility remain troubling issues for China. Ethnic tensions often result from beliefs that Chinese-led projects benefit migrant workers rather than the local population. In Indonesia, for instance, Chinese guest workers rose from 17,515 in 2015 to 30,000 in 2018.
Considering the South Asia region, unsurprisingly it is Pakistan that has received the lion’s share of BRI investment, absorbing more than half the money. China’s heavy investment in road, rail and pipeline infrastructure through the Himalayas as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is not paying economic dividends, however.
Indeed, it is far more expensive to transport products overland through Pakistan than by traditional sea routes. For instance, if shifting 200,000 barrels of crude oil per day via the Burma-China pipeline, and 250,000 barrels daily through the Pakistan-China pipeline, China would lose approximately USD1 billion per year compared to the traditional seaborne tanker route.
Another estimate predicts that shipping oil from the Persian Gulf to China’s east coast would cost USD2 per barrel, whereas it would cost USD15 per barrel via the Pakistan overland pipeline. Nouwens commented, “The BRI in South Asia has achieved its intended goal of exporting Chinese industrial overcapacity abroad. From 2010-18, for example, the value of Chinese industrial goods exports to Pakistan increased from USD3.1 billion to USD8.2 billion. Nevertheless, South Asian BRI projects have faced security, political, economic, geographic and governance challenges.”
Furthermore, “Chinese investments in the region have not necessarily created more favourable conditions for Beijing’s influence. Chinese investment in South Asia has been one factor encouraging India to align more closely with the West, notably through the Quad.”
As for Central Asia, boosting ties there is helping China develop its own poorer western provinces. From 2016-21, annual China-Europe freight train journeys snowballed from 1,702 to 15,183.
Nonetheless, most trade between China and Europe still travels by sea (95+ per cent in Germany’s case), and the Ukraine war has led to a 34 per cent drop in volume via the northern rail corridor.
In the South Pacific region, Australia, New Zealand and the USA are very concerned about Chinese interests encroaching, especially since a 2018 uptick. One example is last year’s Solomon Islands-China security agreement. Nonetheless, this oceanic region attracts only a tiny proportion of BRI funds, with the largest beneficiaries being Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.
Nouwens concluded, “Despite Chinese loans and grants to the sub-region, China and the BRI have made only a minimal impact in recipient Pacific Island states. There has not been any significant shift in Chinese investment or trade towards the sub-region, with the exception of Papua New Guinea. Exports from China to the South Pacific have increased twelvefold in value between 2000 and 2018, though the numbers for exports from Pacific Island countries to China have grown at a much less impressive rate.”
Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu are the most indebted islands to China, with Tonga owing about 25 per cent of its annual GDP to the Export-Import Bank of China. Interestingly, only Solomon Islands and Kiribati signed up for new Chinese loans between 2017 and 2021.
By 2021, 64 per cent of BRI projects in Southeast Asia, the South Pacific and South Asia had been completed, according to Nouwen’s research. A further 22 per cent of projects were ongoing, and the remaining 14 per cent were still in the planning stage.
The BRI, therefore, looks rosy, right? Yet Nouwens pointed out, “…Judging implementation against these metrics risks overlooking both the fact that the last decade of BRI implementation has in some ways proved to be chaotic, and also the question of recipient countries’ agency. The BRI’s rollout in the last ten years has lacked central bureaucratic oversight and control or a coherent implementation strategy.”
The BRI was initially run under vague action plans, with existing projects simply rebadged as BRI ones. As Nouwens noted, “The reality of the BRI is that propaganda exceeds implementation, activity overtakes purpose, and actors further down the hierarchy have much latitude in interpreting the terms of their involvement. Instead of being seen as effective tools of statecraft, the BRI and DSR should perhaps be viewed as tools of the CCP’s ‘party craft’.”
For this reason, the BRI has not had the widespread impact that many Western leaders feared during its peak in 2016. “Importantly, the idea of debt-trap diplomacy turned out to be unproven, and China’s investment in nearly 60 ports worldwide has not – contrary to the expressed fears of some commentators – provided it with immediate access to a global network of dual-use ports, let alone naval bases,” the IISS researcher concluded.
Elsewhere, Lee Jones and Shahar Hameiri, in a Chatham House August 2020 research paper entitled “Debunking the Myth of Debt-Trap Diplomacy”, concluded “that the BRI is, in fact, motivated largely by economic factors. It has also shown that China’s fragmented and poorly coordinated international development financing system is not geared towards advancing coherent geopolitical aims … The BRI does not follow a top-down plan, but emerges piecemeal, through diverse bilateral interactions, with outcomes being shaped by interests, agendas and governance problems on both sides.”
China’s confused efforts, exacerbated by economic woes, have offered Western alternatives a fortuitous window of opportunity. However, to date, neither the USA nor the West has been able to offer the level of investment that the BRI has.
Additionally, Nouwens explained that “the notion that Beijing can leverage global debt as a strategic means to gain access to any and all strategic equity is a myth. Rather, it could be asked whether, instead of trapping sovereign countries in Chinese debt for strategic value, Beijing has inadvertently been caught in a debt trap of its own making.”
Fears of debt-trap diplomacy for client states have not really emerged. Ironically, China might be sufferings most from a debt trap, due to profligate and unregulated investment in the BRI’s early years, and the economic difficulties being faced by many recipients.
With the BRI facing stiffer headwinds, Xi has fine-tuned his prized BRI as he seeks to ram home perceived advantages. These three inchoate efforts are the Global Data Security Initiative (GDSI), Global Development Initiative (GDI) and Global Security Initiative (GSI).
Discussing each in turn, the GDSI was launched in 2020. Under it, China proposes a framework for data security, data storage and digital commerce. The chameleon-like concept seems to oscillate between security and the digital economy, depending on China’s target audience.
The GDI was first mentioned by Xi at a UN General Assembly meeting in September 2021. Stated priorities are “poverty alleviation, food security, COVID-19 response and vaccine, development financing, climate change and green development, industrialization, digital economy and connectivity”.
Although still unclear what the GDI actually is, more than 50 countries have joined the UN Group of Friends of the Global Development Initiative. Naturally, the GDI propagates China’s views on human rights (development is posited as a prerequisite for human rights, making human rights voluntary) and Xi’s efforts to reshape global rules and norms (where the “greater good” means that the state’s preferences override individual rights).
As for the GSI, it was first proposed in April 2022, backed up by a 21 February 2023 concept paper. That paper listed six principles: common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security; respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; abiding by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously; peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation; and maintaining security in both traditional and non-traditional domains.
Observers of China will have seen such phrases routinely bandied about, such as in reference to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. They will also know that these commitments are both vapid and downright disingenuous. Beijing has no intention of applying these principles to Ukraine or anywhere else, except when it is to its own advantage.
The GSI seems to replicate China’s concept of “Asia for Asians” in other regions, “which could potentially weaken the existing world order, as well as US capacity to help manage or resolve crises in other regions,” according to Nouwens. The
IISS senior fellow concluded: “These three initiatives aim to promote Chinese-centric norms and values in the Global South. This ambition will be particularly relevant in developing and emerging economies where China has invested heavily in development aid or infrastructure projects through the BRI and DSR. It also allows Beijing to continue to shape the international system in its favour at a time when large-scale infrastructure projects are not feasible due to economic conditions in China and questions of demand.”
“Beijing has previously argued that the BRI is ‘an economic cooperation initiative, not a geopolitical or military alliance’. However, these three initiatives indicate that Beijing’s engagement with the Global South is not just based on the provision of aid or helping to develop local economies; it is now expanding more formally to promote Chinese concepts of security, based closely on China’s own concept of comprehensive national security, its ‘golden prescription for global challenges’ and development, and the storage, processing and transfer of data globally according to Chinese norms.” As with BRI, it is a case of buyer beware for every initiative that China dreams up. (ANI)
Monks attend the award ceremony of the degree of Geshe Lharampa held in the Jokhang Temple in Lhasa, capital of southwest China's Tibet Autonomous Region, April 2, 2022. (Xinhua/Jigme Dorje/IANS)
In recent years, China has been actively engaging in a unique form of diplomacy through its promotion and utilization of Buddhism as a tool for soft power projection….reports Asian Lite News
While addressing a National Conference in 2021 on work related to religious affairs, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that religions in China must be Chinese in orientation.
China has been steadily building its own innovative narrative on Buddhism which hinges on a very controlled and regulated practice under the close supervision of the government and the party.
At the same time, China has realised the critical relevance of Buddhism as a soft power to counter any reference made to China’s association with atheism. The Buddhist narrative is also being used appropriately by China to push forward its economic and political ambitions abroad.
The Communist Party Congress of China has declared Buddhism as an indigenous religion that was destroyed in its birthplace of India and nurtured in China, from where it spread to Southeast Asia and Japan.
This declaration comes as part of China’s efforts to create a new globalized Buddhist network under the Buddhism Belt Road Initiative (BRI)’, (Belt and Road Buddhism) a project aimed at reviving ancient Buddhist connections and promoting cultural exchange.
In recent years, China has been actively engaging in a unique form of diplomacy through its promotion and utilization of Buddhism as a tool for soft power projection.
Chinese Buddhist diplomacy is an approach that seeks to enhance China’s international influence by leveraging its rich Buddhist heritage and engaging with Buddhist communities worldwide.
This strategy involves various initiatives, including cultural exchange programs, infrastructure development, financial support, and the establishment of Buddhist organizations.
China’s commitment to Buddhism became evident in 2006 when it established the World Buddhist Forum. The recent fifth session of the forum, held in Fujian province, focused on various aspects of Buddhism and resolved to support the BRI. This initiative aims to promote economic and cultural connectivity between China and other countries, with Buddhism as a common bond.
One of the key aspects of China’s strategy is the promotion of Bodhisattvas and sacred Buddhist sites as religious pilgrimage destinations. Bodhisattvas such as Avalokitesvara, Amitabha and Manjushri are being highlighted to attract devotees and tourists.
Additionally, China has been replicating Buddhist holy sites in India, with the Brahma Palace in Wuxi being touted as a replica of Rajgir.
To further strengthen its Buddhist influence, China has been backing the Shugden faction of the Gelug School. In collaboration with the Shugden group based in Switzerland, China has instituted the annual Dipankar Atisha Peace Award, which provides financial support to propagate Shugden teachings.
China’s efforts extend beyond its borders, with Nepal being a significant focus. China aims to counter the religious influence of Bodh Gaya, the place of Buddha’s enlightenment, by developing Lumbini, the birthplace of Prince Siddhartha.
A proposed rail link between Lumbini and Kathmandu, which will connect to Lhasa and other Buddhist sites in China, is intended to facilitate the movement of Chinese tourists and pilgrims.
Pakistan, too, has attracted China’s attention in its efforts to promote Buddhism. The development of the Gandhara trail, which connects Pakistan to South Korea and Japan, is a priority. The establishment of Gandhara University and the promotion of Tibetan Buddhism founder Guru Padmasambhava’s birthplace in the Swat Valley further exemplify China’s intentions.
Chinese authorities are taking Buddhist monks from Bhutan to the mythical Odiyana in Swat, aiming to attract Chinese followers of Tibetan Buddhism from around the world.
In Bangladesh, the birthplace of Atisha Dipankar, a revered Buddhist figure associated with the second coming of Buddhism, China has provided financial and technical expertise to conserve Buddhist sites in Comilla.
A joint China-Bangladesh team has also excavated the Bikrampur ruins, while China has engaged influential Buddhist clergy in Sri Lanka through hefty donations to various Nikayas.
China’s efforts in Tibetan Buddhism are particularly notable. The Chinese government has taken steps to control the selection and recognition of reincarnate lamas, including the future succession of the Dalai Lama.
Through these measures, China aims to shape the religious leadership and exert control over the narrative surrounding Tibetan Buddhism. This approach, while controversial, allows China to further strengthen its influence over Tibetan Buddhist communities worldwide. China’s preparations for the succession of the 15th Dalai Lama have raised concerns as it seeks to exert control over the process.
By downsizing the number of monks in monasteries and strategically appointing compliant monastic heads, China aims to create a loyal group of monks who align with its interests.
To further solidify its influence, China has implemented Order No. 5 on Management Measures for Reincarnation of Lamas, which grants it authority over the identification and recognition of reincarnations.
Already, China has taken steps to assert control over the selection of the next Dalai Lama by exerting influence on prominent Tibetan Buddhist figures such as the Panchen Lama, Penor, Reting, and Adoe Rinpoches. These actions highlight China’s efforts to manipulate the succession process and consolidate its power over Tibetan Buddhism.
Financial support plays a significant role in Chinese Buddhist diplomacy. China has donated to Buddhist organizations and monastic communities in various countries. These donations not only support the maintenance of religious institutions but also enable the propagation of Buddhist teachings and practices.
By financially supporting influential Buddhist clergy and organizations, China seeks to cultivate relationships and gain influence within the global Buddhist community.
China’s influence over international Buddhist organizations is also growing. It has gained considerable sway over the International Council of Day of Vesak (ICDV), the World Fellowship of Buddhists, and other organizations in Korea and Taiwan.
This influence is evident in the Common Text Project (CTP) undertaken by the ICDV, where Tibetan scholars have been marginalized, and Chinese texts have been given prominence over traditional Tibetan sources.
In 2021, China started the South China Sea Buddhism Foundation to influence Buddhist countries of South China Sea. The first South China Sea Roundtable was organised in Shenzhen in 2021 and second was organised in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The aim of the roundtable is to cooperate with Buddhist temples and monasteries in the South China Sea.
China’s efforts to create a new Buddhist order and expand its influence in the global Buddhist community are significant. By promoting Buddhism as an indigenous Chinese religion and leveraging its economic power, China aims to shape the future of Buddhism and foster cultural exchange through initiatives like the BRI.
While these actions have attracted both support and criticism, they undoubtedly mark a significant development in the landscape of Buddhism and China’s role within it.
China observers strongly feel that being an atheist state where the party is all powerful and in control, and where Tibetans and Uyghurs are persecuted endlessly, China intends using Buddhism to showcase its apparently accommodative attitude.
The Chinese objective is to use Buddhism to gain maximum mileage in the country’s political and economic strategies and hence the BRI initiative of China can best be referred to as �BBRI’ � Buddhist Belt and Road Initiative. However, what matters to the world outside is how China realistically deals with its overall human rights record and religious freedom landscape.
Chinese companies are not losing interest in BRI or overseas investment, but their preferences for engaging with the BRI have changed…reports Asian Lite News
Amid accusations of “debt-trap diplomacy”, Chinese companies seek more overseas direct investment opportunities and fewer foreign contracted projects as President Xi Jinping’s flagship initiative of BRI is stymied by poor risk management, Nadia Clark wrote in a blog for Council for Foreign Relations.
China is now realising the true cost of the BRI, as it is forced to choose between repayment on the hundreds of billions in loans its companies and state banks have issued and whatever goodwill it may have accumulated through this initiative, Clark wrote.
China should be wary lest the BRI follow the path of its ancient predecessor, with fragmentation contributing to decline and eventual collapse.
China’s ascent as an international financier (especially in low-income countries) has been accompanied by claims that it engages in so-called debt-trap diplomacy.
The term originated in 2017 to describe a deal that saw Beijing receive a 99-year lease for the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka after the country fell behind on debt payments and has since been more widely applied to any Chinese project that conflicts with Western interests, especially those under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Clark said.
Western media and senior policy officials seem to feel that China is using the BRI to exert undue influence over the world, especially because the initiative mostly funds infrastructure rather than the social sector projects, such as health or education initiatives, that are often favoured by large multilateral donors and Western nations.
Critics worry that China will be able to seize control of these assets for military use or use them as leverage in future negotiations, Clark said.
The real reason why the BRI has struggled to sustain itself is not due to debt traps or predatory lending, but something far more mundane: Poor risk management and a lack of attention to detail and cohesion from the Chinese state-owned enterprises and banks, private companies, and local governments involved, Clark added.
Chinese companies are not losing interest in BRI or overseas investment, but their preferences for engaging with the BRI have changed. It is possible that Chinese companies bit off more than they could chew when they began signing BRI foreign contracted projects at the start of the initiative, initially committing to a large volume of projects and leaving little room for participation in new projects in later years.
It could be that they feel less protected or supported without strong government oversight and therefore become more risk averse. It is also possible that less projects are being signed because companies cannot find willing host country partners, Clark wrote.
In recent years, there have been an increasing number of reports from BRI partner countries about construction flaws in major infrastructure projects, project cancelations initiated by BRI partner countries due to concerns over corruption and debt, project cancelations initiated by Chinese companies due to financial problems and projects that have led to nowhere (in some cases, literally – such as a BRI-funded that ends in the middle of a field in Kenya).
All of these factors do not point to malicious or predatory lending, but rather overzealous engagement on the part of both Chinese companies and BRI partners. BRI participants were so eager to see the gains from these projects (whether political, financial, or economic) that they rushed into deals without adequate planning.
Most projects were completed as standalone enterprises, with little thought for the bigger picture of how different pieces of infrastructure need to fit together in order to function effectively.
For example, standalone ports are essentially useless without accompanying roads and railways to transport goods from ships further inland. Such fragmentation has plunged both Chinese companies and BRI partners into billions of dollars of debt and a number of prolonged debt-restructuring deal negotiations, Clark added.
China has developed a system of “Bailouts on the Belt and Road” that helps recipient countries to avoid default, and continue servicing their BRI debts, at least in the short run, a new report has found.
In total, more than 20 debtor countries have received $ 240 billion in Chinese rescue lending since 2000. The scale of China’s global bailout lending program is also growing fast. More than $ 185 billion USD was extended in the past five years alone (2016-2021), as per a report by researchers from the World Bank, Harvard Kennedy School, AidData, and the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
Thirteen countries made total drawings of $170 billion in situations of economic or financial distress. Examples include Argentina (2014-2021), Mongolia (2012-2021), Suriname (2015-2021), and Sri Lanka (2021), which drew on their RMB swap lines right before and/or after sovereign defaults on their external creditors.
Other important users include Pakistan (2013-2021), Egypt (2016-2021) and Turkey (2021), which made large drawdowns during protracted balance of payments crises, as demonstrated by their crashing currencies in the face of dwindling foreign exchange reserves.
Another group, including Russia (in 2015 and 2016) and Ukraine (in 2015), activated its swap lines in the face of sanctions and deep geopolitical crises.
Nepal and China had signed the BRI agreement some six years ago but it has failed to make any tangible progress.
Senior officials from Nepal and China reviewed the entire gamut of bilateral ties in Beijing but failed to mention that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Global Security Initiative (GSI) were also discussed.
In a statement issued by the Nepali side on Friday evening upon completion of the 15th meeting of the Bilateral Diplomatic Consultation Mechanism between the Foreign Ministries of Nepal and China, there was no mention of discussions about BRI and GSI.
Nepal and China had signed the BRI agreement some six years ago but it has failed to make any tangible progress.
Beijing recently came up with the new security architecture named GSI and is pushing Nepal to support it but Nepal has not responded yet.
Both sides took stock of the existing Nepal-China bilateral relations and cooperation and deliberated on the ways to further expanding and consolidating cooperation in various areas, including the exchange of bilateral visits; economic cooperation; promotion of trade, investment and tourism; building connectivity; and strengthening cooperation in the fields of agriculture, education, culture and people-to-people relations, among others, according to a statement issued by the Nepal Embassy in Beijing said.
The two sides discussed promoting people to people contacts and cultural cooperation, increasing the number of scholarships to Nepali students and professionals, capacity development of technical experts, among others.
Ambassador Chen Song meets Prakash Jwala, Minister for Physical Infrastructure and Transport.
The meeting also reviewed the progress of different infrastructure development projects under China’s grant assistance as well as Chinese-contracted projects and agreed to expedite the implementation of the projects so as to complete them in time.
With a view to reduce trade deficit, Nepal’s Foreign Secretary Bharat Raj Paudyal proposed for preferential treatment to Nepali primary products such as tea, coffee, herbal products, cooked buffalo meat, and other agricultural products.
The Chinese side agreed to encourage Chinese investors to make investments in mutually beneficial areas, according to the statement.
On the occasion, the two sides reviewed the cooperation between the two countries at the multilateral forums, including in the UN, and exchange of mutual support to each other’s candidatures.
They also discussed the importance of implementation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the usefulness of the GDI to promote the SDG agenda.
Vice Foreign Minister of China Sun Weidong led the delegation from the Chinese side.
During the meeting, Paudyal appreciated the government of China for enlisting Nepal as one of the outbound destination countries for group tourism.
The Vice Minister of China admired Nepal’s consistent adherence to one China policy and respect for the five principles of peaceful coexistence.
Paudyal appreciated the Chinese policy of non-interference and respect for Nepal’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, reads the statement by the Nepali side.
Dr. Anand Parappadi Krishnan, recently joined the Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Shiv Nadar University, Greater Noida, as a Fellow. Prior to joining Shiv Nadar Institute of eminence, Dr. Krishnan has served for 6 years as a full-time Researcher at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi, and he continues his affiliation there as a visiting Associate Fellow. Recently, he was a Visiting Faculty at the National Law School of India University – Bengaluru.
Previously, he has held Fellowships at the India China Institute – The New School, New York City (under their China India Scholar Leaders Initiative) and at the Harvard-Yenching Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Dr. Krishnan holds a Ph.D. degree in Chinese Studies from Centre for East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His research interests include Labour and Supply chains in the Global South, Political economy of China and India, State-society relations, and Labour-Urban interface.
Asian Lite’s Abhish K. Bose meets Dr Krishnan to discuss the Belt and Road initiative of China. Excerpts from the interview.
ABHISH K BOSE: The belt and road project is aimed at improving the position of China in the global economic system and to boost the scope for its emerging hegemony. In many cases a country will be unable to change its economy in a particular direction without altering the way the world economy is organised. Is the belt and road project guided by that intent? What does it tell us of the Chinese strategic thinking and policy framework?
Dr ANAND: While there has been much written, speculated and anticipated, the BRI to put it in simple terms, was conceived by the Chinese party-state to export its overcapacities in economic production and therefore, look for new markets. In fulfilling this endeavour, if the initiative helps in altering how the world economy is organized, so be it. However, it does not seem that the BRI presents a credible and viable alternative by the Chinese which is very different from the existing world order and how the world economy is organized. I believe the BRI represents what geographer David Harvey calls ‘spatial fix’.
Xi Jinping delivers a speech at a ceremony marking the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CPC in Beijing. (Xinhua/Ju Peng/IANS)
ABHISH K. BOSE: The belt and road is mainly about economic cooperation, comprising building, factories, roads, bridges, ports, airports and other infrastructure as well as electric power grids, telecommunications networks, oil and natural resources pipelines and related projects. How will this project once executed can change the face of the regions where the project passes through? Is there any hidden Chinese agenda behind this project?
Dr ANAND: Lack of infrastructural development is a pertinent issue in the global south, and many of the countries do not have the requisite resources to fulfill that. The experiences of countries in Africa, Southeast Asia and South America to the efforts by the West have not been really satisfactory. Plus, the legacy of colonialism weighs largely in areas such as Africa. It is here that the Chinese with deep pockets and more resourceful fill the gap. Plus, the Chinese are palatable for governments of all persuasions and do not necessarily interfere with domestic politics in these countries. However, while this is largely the narrative put forth by China, over the years there are also issues that have cropped up like debt related concerns/anxieties, cultural tensions, and over the last couple of years, COVID-19 related delays. In committing and investing in the infrastructural development of these regions, the Chinese champion the ‘win-win’ discourse, and seek to showcase their economic development externally. Rather than any ‘hidden agenda’, the BRI seeks to provide more diplomatic muscle and great power status to China vis-a-vis the US-led West.
Aerial photo shows a view of the Lower Sesan II hydroelectric power station at Sesan District of Stung Treng Province, Cambodia. The Lower Sesan II hydroelectric power station, born of cooperation between Cambodia and China under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, was inaugurated in December 2018. (Photo by Chen Gang/Xinhua/IANS)
ABHISH K. BOSE: According to available estimates, this massive project comprises of the investment of 4 -8 trillion dollars. The terms of Chinese credit to countries party to the project vary widely, from interest free loans and even grants in the case of some projects in Pakistan up to commercial rate in the case of the Ethiopia – Djibouti railway. Revealingly, Djibouti’s public external debt has increased from 50 to 85 per cent of its GDP since 2015, the highest for any low income country. China has provided nearly 1.4 billion of funding for Djibouti’s major investment projects. The Chinese company operating the port of Gwadar in Pakistan reportedly receives 91 per cent of the ports profits. Is the project an expression of Chinese economic imperialism and to what extent is it likely to burden the stakeholders?
Dr ANAND: Concerns of debt burden are logical corollary of the infrastructural projects undertaken by Chinese companies in the BRI. There is no finality on this aspect, as there is also new scholarship which problematizes – and critiques – the narrative of debt-trap. Scholars like Deborah Brautigam have in fact summarily rejected the discourse on debt trap. However, while the real extent of debt burden may be debatable, it is a reality that some of these projects do take the shape of white elephants. The best example of that would be the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka. I would be careful not to use terms like imperialism loosely, since these are very loaded and have to be properly contexualized/ historisized.
ABHISH K. BOSE: Ports such as Gwadar and Kyaukpyu are intended to connect the Indian Ocean with China over land transport corridors. Pakistan and Myanmar may become China’s California, granting it access to a second Ocean and resolving the Malacca dilemma. Access to the offshore gas fields in the Bay of Bengal was always central to the Kyaukpyu project. These points to the strategic aims of China through the project. How, and to what extent, will these projects benefit China in the long run? How will it bear on its trade with India?
Dr ANAND: With China, a lot of things also fall under the ambit of dual use/dual purpose. So, it is quite logical or even rational to look at these ports as fulfilling strategic aims/objectives. These ports also help China to offset some of the chokepoints in the Malacca straits, along with providing some access to fulfilling China’s energy needs in the longer term. Further, it helps provide China additional maneuvering space in the south Asian region.
Soldiers attend the flag-raising ceremony in rain in Beijing, capital of China on National Day. (Xinhua/Zhang Yu) (mp)
However, these ports need not necessarily be seen in binary terms vis-a-vis India, even though India’s role in the region has to move out of its conventional ‘big brother’ attitude, or patronizing behaviour. India also needs to heighten its own infrastructural and diplomatic measures in the region for sustenance of its relationship with these countries and not necessarily to only ward off the China challenge.
ABHISH K. BOSE: Bypassing the Malacca strait by building a canal through the Kra Isthmus in Thailand – around 100 km long and 25 meters deep, would take ten years could be an even greater game changer. From a shipping perspective it would mean shorter and cheaper- and speedier by two or three days – route for all. But a number of countries including the US may resist the idea because it could mean the speedier deployment of the Chinese Navy to the Indian Ocean. Should this be a worry for the US or European powers?
Dr ANAND: It would not be wise to comment on something that is in the realm of speculation. Plus, this project would take some more time before it actually gets some proper shape. Hence, any possible opposition from US and others would also need to wait rather than do so now at the formative stage. Ultimately, it will depend on how effectively China is able to negotiate with the Thais in working on this project, especially given the delays on account of the pandemic and China only returning to normalcy now.
ABHISH K. BOSE: It is said that China hopes to build a ‘ Polar silk road’ along the Arctic shipping lanes, the third main sea route of the belt and road. Shipping through the northern sea route would shave almost twenty days off the regular passage time using the traditional route through the Suez canal. Among China’s main interests in the region is its major stake in Russia’s Yamal liquefied natural gas project which is expected to supply China with four million tons of LNG. How will this benefit China?
Dr ANAND: Again, a lot of these projects are more on paper and on the realm of ideas rather than being in actual flesh and blood. Post the propelling of BRI, there has been a lot of romanticizing/fantasizing about the various possibilities of China’s shipping lanes. The Polar Silk Route is in my view, a very premature project and there has not been much weight or financial resources dedicated in this regard.
China rail project aims to link Tibet to Kathmandu, may be extended to Indian border.
While undertaking analysis of the BRI, it is also important to not be overemphatic, and be aware of speculation-ridden narratives. Further, Arctic routes and building projects around those are also highly cost ridden and it remains to be seen how the Chinese economy now emerging out of Zero Covid policies, will be able to readily take up such projects.
ABHISH K. BOSE: The roads as part of the belt and road project passes through the China -. Indian Ocean – Africa – Mediterranean sea blue economic package linking the China – Indo China peninsula economic corridor, running westward from the south China sea to the Indian Ocean and connecting the China – Pakistan economic corridor and the Bangladesh – China- India – Myanmar economic corridor. Another road is the blue economic passage of China – Oceania – South Pacific, traveling south ward from the South China sea into the Pacific Ocean. Another passage is also envisioned leading up to Europe via the Arctic Ocean. What are the strategic importance of these roads?
Dr ANAND: Again, there is also a lot of fantasizing/romanticizing that is inadvertently associated with BRI. Hence, many of these roads are still on the realm of ideation, rather than actual presence. CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor) is a credible example, while BCIM (Bangladesh China India Myanmar) economic corridor is yet to be termed a credible project given how India is still not a participant in BRI and in fact, is correctly reluctant in fitting this into BRI. Hence, despite many efforts by China, it is not accurate to bracket BCIM within BRI. China’s aim, through the roads, is to find new markets for its goods and distribute its overcapacity. Thus, rather than spreading wide and covering all areas, I believe the party-state would be more prudent and realistic in choosing those areas – especially post pandemic – which are not only commercially viable but also cost effective and have better returns to investment.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping inside a house boat, in Wuhan. (Photo IANS_PIB)
ABHISH K. BOSE: Another central driver of the Road concerns the growing trade connections between China and India. In turn this will have to be based on huge infrastructure projects along the Indian Ocean coast or by train through Myanmar and Bangladesh. It was not surprising therefore to find that the port of Kolkata featured prominently in the original plans for the Road with the Indian city appearing on the famous map of the initiative published by Xinhua. The port could be an important conduit in developing value chains connecting Chinese and Indian manufacturers, but more recently it has been dropped from all the official references, as India increasingly distanced itself from the belt and road project. To what extent, if any, can the project boost the trade between India and China?
Dr ANAND: I do not think that India will, at least in the foreseeable future, be ready to be part of BRI in any manner. While its trade relations with the People’s Republic of China will continue in the conventional bilateral manner, it would be reticent (and correctly so, in my opinion) to join this Initiative. There has been no development in the last few years for India to change its course and adopt a different stance on BRI, especially given the developments on the boundary and attempts by Chinese to change the status quo. Further, India is ridden with weak infrastructural capacity – I have written about this here in the beginning of the year 2020. Any hope for BRI through/including India is at best, wishful thinking than anything else.
Chinese President Xi Jinping, also general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, attends a meeting celebrating the 25th anniversary of Hong Kong's return to the motherland and the inaugural ceremony of the sixth-term government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and delivers an important speech, at the Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Center in Hong Kong, south China, July 1, 2022. (Xinhua/Yao Dawei/IANS)
Some analysts see the Belt and Road Initiative as an unsettling extension of China’s rising power, and as the costs of many of the projects have skyrocketed, opposition has grown in some countries, a report by Sanjeev Sharma
The Belt and Road Initiative is a massive China-led infrastructure project that aims to stretch around the globe.
Some analysts see the project as a disturbing expansion of Chinese power, and the United States has struggled to offer a competing vision, as per an article in the Council on Foreign Relations.
The initiative has stoked opposition in some Belt and Road countries that have experienced debt crises, the article said.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), sometimes referred to as the New Silk Road, is one of the most ambitious infrastructure projects ever conceived.
Launched in 2013 by President Xi Jinping, the vast collection of development and investment initiatives was originally devised to link East Asia and Europe through physical infrastructure. In the decade since, the project has expanded to Africa, Oceania, and Latin America, significantly broadening China’s economic and political influence.
Some analysts see the project as an unsettling extension of China’s rising power, and as the costs of many of the projects have skyrocketed, opposition has grown in some countries.
Meanwhile, the United States shares the concern of some in Asia that the BRI could be a Trojan horse for China-led regional development and military expansion, the article in the Council on Foreign Relations said.
To date, 147 countries — accounting for two-thirds of the world’s population and 40 per cent of global GDP — have signed on to projects or indicated an interest in doing so, it added.
China’s ‘New Silk Road’ stokes opposition in nations wallowing in debt
China has both geopolitical and economic motivations behind the initiative. Xi Jinping has promoted a vision of a more assertive China, even as the country’s outstanding loans have grown to the equivalent of over a quarter of its GDP, the article said.
“China has had a fair amount of success in redrawing trade maps around the world, in ways that put China at the centre and not the U.S. or Europe,” says CFR’s David Sacks, an expert on U.S.-China relations.
The Belt and Road Initiative has also stoked opposition. For some countries that take on large amounts of debt to fund infrastructure upgrades, the BRI money is seen as a potential poisoned chalice, the article said.
Examples of such criticisms abound. In Malaysia, former prime minister Mahathir bin Mohamad campaigned against overpriced BRI initiatives and cancelled $22 billion worth of BRI projects, although he later announced his “full support” for the initiative. CFR’s Belt and Road Tracker shows overall debt to China has soared since 2013, surpassing 20 percent of GDP in some countries.
Since the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine roiled global markets, a climbing number of low-income BRI countries have struggled to repay loans associated with the initiative, spurring a wave of debt crises and new criticism for BRI.
In Pakistan, for example, imports required to build CPEC infrastructure contributed to a widening budget deficit, ultimately resulting in a bailout from the IMF. And in Ghana and Zambia, high debt loads that partly consisted of BRI loans led to sovereign default. However, many countries that sign on to BRI have few alternatives, Sacks says.
During the past decade, China handed out a trillion dollars in international loans as part of Beijing’s Belt and Road initiative, intended to develop economic trade and expand China’s influence across Asia, Africa and Latin America, Wall Street Journal reported.
Those loans made Beijing the largest government lender to the developing world by far, with its loans totalling nearly as much as those of all other governments combined, according to the World Bank.
Yet China’s lending practices have been criticised by foreign leaders, economists and others, who say the program has contributed to debt crises in places like Sri Lanka and Zambia, and that many countries have limited ways to repay the loans.
Some projects have also been called mismatches for a country’s infrastructure needs or damaging to the environment, Wall Street Journal reported.
Now, low-quality construction on some of the projects risks crippling key infrastructure and saddling nations with even more costs for years to come as they try to remedy problems.
“We are suffering today because of the bad quality of equipment and parts” in Chinese-built projects, said Ren Ortiz, Ecuador’s former energy minister and ex-secretary general of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.
Built near a spewing volcano, it was the biggest infrastructure project ever in this country, a concrete colossus bankrolled by Chinese cash and so important to Beijing that China’s leader, Xi Jinping, spoke at the 2016 inauguration.
Today, thousands of cracks have emerged in the $2.7 billion Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric plant, government engineers said, raising concerns that Ecuador’s biggest source of power could break down. At the same time, the Coca River’s mountainous slopes are eroding, threatening to damage the dam, Wall Street Journal reported.
It is one of many Chinese-financed projects around the world plagued with construction flaws.
Chinese money has been used to build everything from a port in Pakistan to roads in Ethiopia and a transmission line in Brazil.
Chinese construction companies often bid for government projects or directly approach local officials with projects with a promise that they can easily arrange financing packages from Chinese banks and insurers, Wall Street Journal reported.
That, developing-country officials say, has given Chinese companies a leg up, because it means governments eager to build a new dam or road don’t have to drum up their own funding. In Africa, more than 60 per cent of the revenue major international contractors collected in 2019 went to Chinese companies, according to a 2021 paper by the China-Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University.
Critics say the relatively easy availability of Chinese loans for Chinese construction can lead to inflated project costs because there is less pressure on governments to minimize expenses.
Flaws in some of the Chinese-built projects have come to light, Wall Street Journal reported.
In Pakistan, officials shut down the Neelum-Jhelum hydroelectric plant last year after detecting cracks in a tunnel that transports water through a mountain to drive a turbine.
The head of the country’s electricity regulator, Tauseef Farooqui, told Pakistan’s senate in November that he was concerned the tunnel could collapse just four years after the 969-megawatt plant became operational. That would be disastrous for a nation that has been battered by rising energy prices, said Farooqui.
The closure of the plant has already cost Pakistan about $44 million a month in higher power costs since July, according to the regulator, Wall Street Journal reported.
Disaggregated by regions, about 46.9 per cent (USD 28.8 billion) of China’s rail construction contracts were concentrated in Asia…reports Asian Lite News
China attaches great importance to the railway projects it funds across the world under the Belt and Road Initiative in order to strengthen its economic, political, and cultural linkages with partner countries, reported ChinaPower.
As of 2020, the BRI includes 138 countries with a combined GDP of some USD 29 trillion and 4.6 billion people and of the 34 countries that signed rail construction contracts with China, 29 are involved in the BRI. Middle-income countries have attracted most of China’s rail construction contracts since 2013. Lower middle-income countries took in 41.7 per cent (or USD 25.7 billion) of all contracts, while upper middle-income countries took in 29.1 per cent (or USD 17.9 billion). The remainder was split among other economies, reported ChinaPower.
Disaggregated by regions, about 46.9 per cent (USD 28.8 billion) of China’s rail construction contracts were concentrated in Asia. Within the region, the lion’s share (61.1 per cent) of contracts went to nine Southeast Asian countries.
In Malaysia, the top recipient in the region, China is constructing the East Coast Rail Link, which will stretch some 640 km and cost a total of USD 10.6 billion, reported ChinaPower.
Africa received the second-highest amount of rail contracts from 2013-2019. At USD 20.8 billion, this accounted for 33.8 percent of the total. Similar to Asia, the largest contracts in Africa are concentrated in a few countries.
About USD 7.5 billion worth of rail-related construction contracts (36.1 per cent of the amount in Africa) were signed with Nigeria, where China is constructing a series of lines that comprise the 1,300 km-long Lagos-Kano Railway Modernization Project. This massive undertaking has made Nigeria the world’s top recipient of Chinese rail construction contracts during the 2013-2019 period, reported ChinaPower.
Chinese leaders have made rail projects an important element of the BRI. In a 2014 speech, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated, “China attaches great importance to the railway and highway projects linking China to… neighboring countries,” and added, “These projects will enjoy priority consideration in the planning and implementation of the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative.”
In Pakistan, under CPEC, China will be part of USD 6.8 billion project to upgrade 2,655 km of the country’s existing railway lines. In Southeast Asia, China is pursuing one of its most ambitious BRI projects, the Kunming-Singapore Railway (also known as the Pan-Asian Railway). If completed, the railway would consist of three major corridors extending some 3,000 km from the southern Chinese province of Kunming down to Singapore, passing through Laos, Thailand, and Malaysia, reported ChinaPower.
Successful completion of these and other rail construction projects would significantly deepen connectivity between China and its neighbors, potentially boosting Beijing’s geopolitical and geoeconomic clout while shoring up China’s domestic economy.
For example, once completed, the Kunming-Singapore line is expected to increase two-way trade and tourism flows between southern China and mainland Southeast Asia. This would leave Southeast Asian countries more economically reliant on China, providing Beijing with additional leverage in the region. At the same time, the increased cross-border activity would promote economic growth in China’s less-developed border regions – a key goal of the BRI, reported ChinaPower.
Importantly, railway construction projects also help to open up new markets for Chinese companies. According to CGIT data, two Chinese SOEs in particular have benefited from rail construction projects abroad.
China Railway Construction Corporation signed 21 rail construction contracts worth USD 19.3 billion, accounting for nearly one-third of the global total during the 2013-2019 period. China Railway Engineering Corporation signed 19 contracts worth USD 12.9 billion, amounting to roughly one-fifth of the value of all contracts, reported ChinaPower.
While rail construction projects could benefit Beijing politically and economically, some projects have faced setbacks and criticism. Surveys indicate that rail and other infrastructure projects have had mixed impacts on China’s international image.
Several rail projects have also been criticized as instruments of “debt-trap diplomacy,” wherein China purportedly seeks to gain leverage over developing countries by burdening them with unsustainable debt. (ANI)
Terming these projects as milestones of progress, China shifted the focus of its foreign policy from internal development to external influence. And so, a fresh BRI push has begun…reports Asian Lite News
China is trying to expand its soft influence by strengthening its diplomatic and economic ties with 140 partner nations through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) push in 2023, reported The Singapore Post.
Like in 2022, in 2023 as well China proposes to make efforts to increase the transport capacity of the trains. In November 2022, the first full-time schedule China-Europe freight train was dispatched and arrived to Duisburg, Germany after an 11-day journey.
China used the last couple of pandemic years to test how much freight can be carried through BRI transport projects from China to Europe, reported The Singapore Post.
More than 109,000 tons of anti-pandemic products have been sent to Europe through the trains to date, along with auto parts, electronic products, and raw materials, effectively guaranteeing the stability of international industrial and supply chains.
“The train has created a new passage between China, Central Asia, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the European continent. It is also building a new landscape in global trade that will lead to win-win cooperation with countries and regions along the BRI,” Liang Haiming, dean of the Belt and Road Institute at Hainan University, told the Global Times recently.
China expects that once the freight services become successful and regular, many trading companies might for the train if the cargo was sent from Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia and heading to Mongolia, and central Asia, according to industry insiders.
In the new year, China expects the China-Europe freight trains to open up new markets and deepen China’s trade ties. This is seen as a counter to the United States’ trade monopoly with Europe, reported The Singapore Post.
The People’s Daily reports that as an important public product provided by China to improve global governance, the high-quality joint construction of the “Belt and Road” will continue to innovate and take the initiative, emphasizing “seeking common ground while reserving differences, inclusiveness, and promoting the incremental reform of the existing international order and international rules”.
The expectation is that the BRI freight project successes will enable China to sit more prominently on global forums like the United Nations, the G20, APEC and other regional organizations, and thus have a say on important consensus points on global governance, reported The Singapore Post.
It is such propaganda that encourages China to even consider hosting the third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation this year to inject new impetus into global development and prosperity, reported The Singapore Post.
Terming these projects as milestones of progress, China shifted the focus of its foreign policy from internal development to external influence. And so, a fresh BRI push has begun.
As analysts observed, the BRI has largely been successful “not in terms of concrete projects only but in ways that have helped China strengthen its diplomatic and economic ties with 140 partner nations and position itself as the champion of globalization”.
Belt & Road is Xi’s signature infrastructure investment initiative, and previous editions of the forum, in 2017 and 2019, drew leaders and officials from dozens of countries….reports Asian Lite News
Chinese President Xi Jinping said on Friday that China would consider hosting the third Belt & Road Forum for International Cooperation next year, which would be the first staging of the event since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Belt & Road is Xi’s signature infrastructure investment initiative, and previous editions of the forum, in 2017 and 2019, drew leaders and officials from dozens of countries.
However, China has all-but-shut its borders since COVID and cancelled most big in-person international events that it had been due to host.
China has recently begun to ease some elements of its strict zero-COVID policy, even as the country battles surging outbreaks in numerous cities, with many analysts predicting more significant opening up starting in March or April.
Xi was speaking on Friday at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering in Bangkok.
In February, Beijing staged the Winter Olympics inside a “closed loop”.
China has recently begun to ease some elements of its strict zero-COVID-19 policy, even as the country battles surging outbreaks in numerous cities, with many analysts predicting a more significant opening up starting in March or April.
Xi was speaking on Friday at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering in Bangkok, where the APEC leaders assembled to discuss ways to promote sustainable development and facilitate trade and investment.
The (B&R) Initiative is a global infrastructure development strategy adopted by the Chinese government in 2013, to invest in nearly 150 countries and international organizations.
BRI back on track
China has announced approval for infrastructure projects in mainland Southeast Asia at this year’s round of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summits. Beijing’s announcement on Thursday indicated that Belt and Road initiative is back on agenda after almost three years due to the COVID-19 pandemic, VOA News reported.
The infrastructure projects announced by China include a $1.6 billion expressway to be developed from Phnom Penh to Bavet at the Cambodian – Vietnamese border. In addition, Beijing announced support for a rail link between Phnom Penh, Bangkok and Vientiane, from where a high-speed rail link has already been made into China, as per the VOA News report.
During the signing ceremony, Cambodian Public Works and Transport Minister Sun Chanthol said that the expressway will connect with Vietnam’s expressway between Ho Chi Minh City and the Moc Bai border gate with Bavet.
Chanthol said that both projects are expected to be completed by the end of 2026 or early 2027. He said that the projects will help to create a key link with Asian Highway 1, connecting China through Myanmar to Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam.
Sun Chanthol announced that the length of the expressway will be 138 kilometres and will include one long bridge. He said that the estimated cost for the construction of the expressway is less than that of the Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville expressway.
